Kennard Cheyenne Taylor v. M. Gray and Winnebago County Jail

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided August 31, 2026·No. 1:26-cv-00739·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

KENNARD CHEYENNE TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-CV-739

M. GRAY and WINNEBAGO COUNTY JAIL,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Kennard Cheyenne Taylor, who is currently incarcerated at the Racine County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $154.37. On August 26, 2026, Plaintiff advised that his financial circumstances have changed and he cannot afford to pay the $154.37 initial partial filing fee. (ECF No. 15.) Based on Plaintiff’s representation, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks the assets and means to pay an initial partial filing fee and waives that obligation. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Plaintiff will still be required to pay the $350 statutory filing fee over time as set forth in § 1915(b). Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any

complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of

any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT In screening a complaint, the Court accepts the allegations as true and draws all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The Court notes, however, that the allegations in the complaint are just that, allegations; they are Plaintiff’s version of the events that have purportedly occurred. With this in mind, the Court will summarize Plaintiff’s allegations as presented in the complaint. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was housed at the Winnebago County Jail. On January 9, 2026, all sixty inmates in Plaintiff’s pod were taken to the booking room for strip searches. While in the booking area of the jail, the inmates were strip searched in two designated areas. Staff collected urine samples for each inmate, including Plaintiff. While Plaintiff was being strip searched by Sgt. McIntosh, female Deputy M. Gray walked into the room and observed Plaintiff

while he was nude. Deputy Gray knew that the area she entered was one of the two areas utilized for strip searches that day. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (ECF No. 1 at 2–4.) ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff names the Winnebago County Jail as a defendant. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law. The Winnebago County Jail is not a “person” and, thus, is not a suable entity under § 1983. See Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects (in a severely limited way) an inmate’s right to bodily privacy during visual inspections, subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incarceration often demand.” Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 779 (7th Cir. 2020). This holding “pertains to

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