UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
KENNARD CHEYENNE TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-CV-739
M. GRAY and WINNEBAGO COUNTY JAIL,
Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
Plaintiff Kennard Cheyenne Taylor, who is currently incarcerated at the Racine County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $154.37. On August 26, 2026, Plaintiff advised that his financial circumstances have changed and he cannot afford to pay the $154.37 initial partial filing fee. (ECF No. 15.) Based on Plaintiff’s representation, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks the assets and means to pay an initial partial filing fee and waives that obligation. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Plaintiff will still be required to pay the $350 statutory filing fee over time as set forth in § 1915(b). Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of
any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT In screening a complaint, the Court accepts the allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The Court notes, however, that the allegations in the complaint are just that, allegations; they are Plaintiff’s version of the events that have purportedly occurred. With this in mind, the Court will summarize Plaintiff’s allegations as presented in the complaint. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was housed at the Winnebago County Jail. On January 9, 2026, all sixty inmates in Plaintiff’s pod were taken to the booking room for strip searches. While in the booking area of the jail, the inmates were strip searched in two designated areas. Staff collected urine samples for each inmate, including Plaintiff. While Plaintiff was being strip searched by Sgt. McIntosh, female Deputy M. Gray walked into the room and observed Plaintiff
while he was nude. Deputy Gray knew that the area she entered was one of the two areas utilized for strip searches that day. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (ECF No. 1 at 2–4.) ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff names the Winnebago County Jail as a defendant. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law. The Winnebago County Jail is not a “person” and, thus, is not a suable entity under § 1983. See Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects (in a severely limited way) an inmate’s right to bodily privacy during visual inspections, subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incarceration often demand.” Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 779 (7th Cir. 2020). This holding “pertains to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
KENNARD CHEYENNE TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-CV-739
M. GRAY and WINNEBAGO COUNTY JAIL,
Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
Plaintiff Kennard Cheyenne Taylor, who is currently incarcerated at the Racine County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $154.37. On August 26, 2026, Plaintiff advised that his financial circumstances have changed and he cannot afford to pay the $154.37 initial partial filing fee. (ECF No. 15.) Based on Plaintiff’s representation, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks the assets and means to pay an initial partial filing fee and waives that obligation. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Plaintiff will still be required to pay the $350 statutory filing fee over time as set forth in § 1915(b). Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of
any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT In screening a complaint, the Court accepts the allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The Court notes, however, that the allegations in the complaint are just that, allegations; they are Plaintiff’s version of the events that have purportedly occurred. With this in mind, the Court will summarize Plaintiff’s allegations as presented in the complaint. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was housed at the Winnebago County Jail. On January 9, 2026, all sixty inmates in Plaintiff’s pod were taken to the booking room for strip searches. While in the booking area of the jail, the inmates were strip searched in two designated areas. Staff collected urine samples for each inmate, including Plaintiff. While Plaintiff was being strip searched by Sgt. McIntosh, female Deputy M. Gray walked into the room and observed Plaintiff
while he was nude. Deputy Gray knew that the area she entered was one of the two areas utilized for strip searches that day. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (ECF No. 1 at 2–4.) ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff names the Winnebago County Jail as a defendant. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law. The Winnebago County Jail is not a “person” and, thus, is not a suable entity under § 1983. See Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects (in a severely limited way) an inmate’s right to bodily privacy during visual inspections, subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incarceration often demand.” Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 779 (7th Cir. 2020). This holding “pertains to
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners alike.” Id. When evaluating a “Fourth Amendment claim regarding a strip or body cavity search, courts must assess that search for its reasonableness, considering ‘the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.’” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). “It is well established that strip searches of inmates performed for security purposes are reasonable as a general matter.” West v. Radtke, 48 F.4th 836, 853 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Plaintiff does not allege that the strip search itself was unreasonable or that it was performed for an improper purpose. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the presence of a female officer
during the search violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not allege that Deputy Gray conducted the strip search; he alleges that Deputy Gray walked into the main room where Plaintiff was being strip searched and observed that Plaintiff was nude. The Seventh Circuit has held that “occasional and incidental cross-sex viewings do not invade a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment privacy interests.” Id. (citation omitted). “There is no question that strip searches may be unpleasant, humiliating, and embarrassing to prisoners, but not every psychological discomfort a prisoner endures amounts to a constitutional violation.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The complaint contains no allegations from which the Court can infer that Deputy Gray violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the complaint will be dismissed. If Plaintiff wants to proceed with this lawsuit, he will need to file an amended complaint by October 1, 2026, that cures the deficiencies identified in this decision. Plaintiff should draft his proposed amended complaint as if he is telling a story to someone who knows nothing about
his situation. This means that he should explain (1) what happened to make him believe he has a legal claim; (2) when it happened; (3) who did it; (4) why; and (5) how the Court can assist him in relation to those events. Plaintiff should set forth his allegations in short and plain statements. Plaintiff should ensure that his amended complaint can be understood by someone who is not familiar with the facts of his case. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint replaces the prior complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1056–57 (7th Cir. 1998). If an amended complaint is received, the Court will screen it as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If an amended complaint is
not received, the Court will dismiss this case based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim in his original complaint. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before October 1, 2026, Plaintiff shall file an amended pleading curing the defects in the original complaint as described herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner amended complaint form and a copy of the guide entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” along with this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect from his institution trust account the $350.00 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action. If Plaintiff is transferred to another institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this order along with Plaintiff’s remaining balance to the receiving institution. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is located. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions must submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. The Prisoner E-Filing Program is mandatory for all inmates of Green Bay Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, Dodge
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Columbia Correctional Institution, and Oshkosh Correctional Institution. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities must submit the original document for each filing to the Court to the following address: Honorable Byron B. Conway c/o Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 125 S. Jefferson Street, Suite 102 Green Bay, WI 54301 PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter. Plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties. Dated at Green Bay, Wisconsin on August 31, 2026. s/ Byron B. Conway BYRON B. CONWAY United States District Judge