Keniston v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

Superior Court of Maine·Decided March 16, 2006·No. CUMcv-05-232·Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION

CUMBERLAND, SS. DOCKET NO: CV-05-232

BRENDA FARXIS KEMSTON,

Plaintiff *

R ~ \\I~ ED

EORDER

l

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, *

*

Defendant *

This case comes before the Court on Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

On or about klarch 22,2001, Plaintiff Brenda Farris Keniston (Plaintiff)

was divorced from Dana A. Keniston. Pursuant to the divorce decree, a parcel of real property located at 152 Bragdon Road in Freeport was set-aside to Plaintiff as her sole and exclusive property.' The divorce decree further ordered that each party assume, pay, and hold harmless the other from all credit card and other debt standing in the name of each party. On or about April 4,2002, Providian National Bank recovered a judgment against Dana Keniston for approximately $24,100,00 from the use of a credit card. Shortly thereafter, Providian recorded a writ of execution in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds against Dana Keniston that operates as a lien upon 152 Bragdon Road property. Plaintiff did

1 152 Bragdon Road was jointly owned by Brenda and Dana Keniston during their marriage.

not receive notice of the ~ ' r iof t execution. Plaintiff recorded the divorce abstract

on March 5,2004.' JP Morgan Chase Bank (Defendant) is the successor-in-

interest to Providian.

Plaintiff instituted h s Declaratory Judgment action seelung to establish that Defendant has no right to claim a lien against property solely owned by

Plaintiff based GF,a debt =wed by Dana K e r i s t ~ n .The ~ sole issiie is whe'uELer

Plaintiff's failure to record the divorce abstract before Providian recorded its writ of execution establishes that Defendant's rights to 152 Bragdon Road are superior to those of Plaintiff.

DISCUSSION

In moving for summary judgment, Defendant argues that by recording the writ of execution prior to the recording of the divorce abstract, Defendant is entitled to priority pursuant to Maine's recordng statute. 33 M.R.S.A. 201. In respmss, P!aintiff argues that the writ of execut;on is void because Defendant failed to notify Plaintiff of the writ of execution pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 4651-

A(5). In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that equitable considerations warrant an outcome in her favor. The Court reviews a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to decide whether the parties' statements of material fact and the referenced record evidence indicate any genuine issue of material fact. Bayviezu Bank, N.A. v. The Highland Gold Mortgagees Realty Trust, 2002 ME 178, 9 9, 814 A.2d 449,451. Plaintiff admits that there are n o genuine issues of material fact.

2 Plaintiff became aware of the lien when she tried unsuccessfully to refinance the properv. 3 Dana Keniston received a discharge in bankruptcy o n August 9, 2004.

Recording an interest in property is paramount to protecting it from other interested persons. According to Maine's recording statute, the first person to properlv record a conveyance in Maine takes priority over all other unrecorded conveyances. 33 J41.R.S.A. 5 201.4 Recording a writ of execution in the registry of deeds for the county in w h c h the property is located constitutes perfection of the attzchrnefit. 14 M.R.S.A. 4154. The serL;rityiintsrest remains peTf2cted u d e s s the judgment debtor is not notified before the twentieth day of the recording of the lien. 14 M.R.S.A.5 4651-A(5). Furthermore, according to the divorce laws, the disposition of property upon a divorce is effective against a person when the divorce decree or abstract is filed in the registry of deeds for the county where the real estate is situated. 19-A M.R.S.A. 5 953(7) (Supp. 2004).

Here, although Plaintiff argues that she was not notified of the recording of the writ of execution, she is not the judgment debtor. The law requires only that the judgment debtor be notified of the recording of the writ of execution. The issue then becomes whether Defendant has a priority interest in 152 Bragdon Road bv nature of recording the writ of execution before Plaintiff recorded the divorce abstract.

Recording statutes aim to protect "persons who have any interest in examining the record title to property to w h c h they might thereafter become owner, either in whole or in part, absolutely or otherwise." Banton v. Shorey, 77

"NO conveyance of a n estate in fee simple, fee tail or for life, or lease for more than 2 years or for a n indefinite term is effectual against any person except the grantor, his heirs and devisees, a n d persons having actual notice thereof unless the deed or lease is acknowledged and recorded i n the registry of deeds . . . Conveyances of the right, title or interest of the grantor, if duly recorded, shall be effectual against prior unrecorded conveyances, as if they purported to convey a n actual title. All recorded deeds, leases or other written instruments regarding real estate take precedence over unrecorded attachments a n d seizures." 33 M.R.S.A. 5 201 (1999).

Me. 45 (1988). These statutes protect said persons by providing actual notice of

changes in title. B a y v i m Bank, N.A., 2002 ME 178, ¶ 14, 814 A.2d at 453.

Similarly, after a divorce court divides property between the divorcing parties, the divorce laws require the recording of divorce decrees or abstracts to provide notice of changes in ownership of property. Until those decrees or abstracts are

recorded, c ~ e d i t ~ rszch s , as Defendant, are -ii& p i t ox riotice of ckcii-igein

ownershp. Defendant's argument would be greatly weakened if Providian had actual notice of the divorce and the property disposition prior to recording the writ.j However, Providan was not aware of the divorce. When Providian filed the writ of execution, it did so in the county where Dana A. Keniston was a record joint owner of 152 Bragdon Road.

Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to record the divorce abstract, Plaintiff is aslung the Court to permit her to present facts supporting her request for zcpitable relief from the writ of e~ecution.The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that despite her failure to record her ownershp interest in the property, a lien on her property arising from her ex-husband's debt is improper, unjust, and inequitable when a divorce decree establishes her sole right to the property.

Although Plaintiff is aslung h s Court for lenience in light of h s unfortunate situation, the events that have taken place could have been avoided had Plaintiff simply recorded her divorce decree in 2001. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, there is an adequate remedy at law. Providian recorded first and therefore has a priority interest in 152 Bragdon Road.

5 G a p e r v.Kittery W a t e r District, 385 A.2d 206, 207-08 (Me. 1978) ("When the facts known to the purchaser cast doubt upon the very existence of the seller's title, l ~ is e bound to inquire of him whether he has any real title or not.").

The entry is as follows:

Defendant JP hlorgan Chase Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

DATE: 2- l d 86

COURTS ~dCounty 'x 2 8 7 041 12-0287

KENNETH ALTSHULER ESQ

257 DEERING AVENUE

PORTLAND ME 0 4 1 0 3

COURTS ~dCounty )x 2 8 7 e 041 12-0287

MICHAEL MCCORMACK ESQ

PO BOX 1318

CONCORD NH 03301

tiI<l-SL>.?i f;:\RlilS KEYIS SON,

AMENDED ORDER

*

and

B-L-[SF, I.1-C,

Jueigmcnt and 191dln'tiff i3rtlnela Farris ktmstim's klirhi-rntor 1Iotic~nfr1r Stln~rn;lr)*

UNDISPUTED FACTS

O n or abtsrtt Slc3rch 22, 20.03, P l a ~ ~ ~ Wrencia tlif Farns Kt;ni.;tr)n (I'lnintibil

\\-as divorccti from T>,~II,I A. Keni\tctr~. Prrr5~1nnt k t ) the ciirrorct. decree, a parcel of

redl prtfperts ii>cat~'cd at 152 Bragc:i~>~i i Freepcjrt i\-;ib;

R ~ > d cill set-aside to PIalnti tt

yrtrp~rtir.' 1 IIL.

as Kcr sr.tle , ~ n dexclt~sEt.t~ t.h,l.t:clach divt3rcc decree turther t~rclere.~!

part>-~ l s ~ e l r ~pa!, thil c~tlwrt r ~ ~allmcredit z,tsc%,111ci c~tjter t ' , and I~oldI~,trn~fi~ss

debt stiincli~igln th~skiit!f>ct$ C~ICII pLirtx-.(.%I or akwut XpriI 3, 3002,f'nwidian

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Keniston v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, (Me. Super. Ct. 2006).

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Related

Gagner v. Kittery Water District
385 A.2d 206 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1978)
Bay View Bank, N.A. v. Highland Golf Mortgagees Realty Trust
2002 ME 178 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2002)