ACCEPTED 15-24-00079-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/14/2025 1:34 PM CAUSE NO. 15-24-00079-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 3/14/2025 1:34:24 PM AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
KENEDY COUNTY-WIDE COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant
vs.
GLENN HEGAR, TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, Appellee
Appeal from the 353rd District Court Travis County, Texas Hon. Judge Maya Guerra Gamble, Presiding Judge Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-23-002042
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ____________________________________________________
Judith A. Hargrove State Bar No. 11595050 HARGROVE LAW SEALY, TEXAS 77474 (512) 750-0338 judy@hargrovelawtx.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………i
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………..………………1
ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………..…2
I. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. Reply to ……………………….…..2 Appellee’s Brief II. A.-C.
II. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. E……………………………………5
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER………………………………………………..6
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT…………………………………….……..7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………..7
i APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
Appellant files this Reply Brief to respond to and clarify the arguments made
by Appellee. Although Appellee’s Brief fails on its own merit to controvert
Appellant’s position, it does confuse the issues by mischaracterizing the relief sought
by Appellant. To be clear, Appellant is not requesting revaluation of the entire
category of all land appraised at productivity value under the provision focused on
by Appellee. It merely requests reduction of its total taxable value to account for
ARB orders reducing productivity values of specific protested properties as found
by the ALJ’s Proposal for Decision. In over-ruling and replacing the ALJ’s
Decision, Appellee violated the statute by focusing only on one provision and
ignoring the others.
Appellee does not dispute Appellant’s authorities concerning the standard of
review. Nor does it dispute Appellant’s argument that the term “taxable value” as
defined in the statute includes “productivity value”. In fact, Appellee explicitly
confirms Appellant’s argument that “taxable value” includes productivity value.
The relevant authorities hold that a reviewing court must reverse and remand the
agency’s order if the appellant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced by an
agency decision that violates a constitutional or statutory provision. Nevertheless,
Appellee insists that it has discretion to act as it wishes even it violates the statute.
1 This position further demonstrates its abuse of discretion in this matter.
ARGUMENT
I. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. A.-C.
Appellee states that “the dispute on appeal can be reduced to a single legal
question: What value(s) does the language of Texas Government Code section
403.302(b)(4) authorize PTAD to adjust to account for ARB orders? [Appellee’s
Brief at 8]. Although it’s true this question must be answered, it side-steps the
ultimate question of whether Appellee abused its discretion in refusing to comply
with §403.302(b)(4) and (d)(7) by adjusting Appellant’s taxable values for ARB
orders determining productivity value.
Appellee acknowledges that “When an agency decision turns on the
construction of a statute, the question of whether the agency properly construed the
statute is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de novo….the appellate
court’s primary concern is the express statutory language…When an agency
decision turns on the construction of a statute, the question of whether the agency
properly construed the statute is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de
novo. …the appellate court’s primary concern is the express statutory language…
The court applies the plain meaning of the text unless a different meaning is supplied
by legislative definition”. [Appellant’s Brief at 11-12; Appellee’s Brief at 8].
Ignoring these principles, Appellee argues that Texas Government Code 2 section 403.302(b)(4) authorizes the Comptroller to make adjustments only for ARB
orders determining “taxable value,” not “productivity value.” [Appellee’s Brief at
8]. This argument is completely undermined by Appellee’s own analysis of Tex.
Gov. Code §403.302(d)(7) proving that “productivity value” is “taxable value” for
land qualified for productivity appraisal. See Appellee’s Brief at 15-16. Appellee
states:
Tracking the precise language of these two code provisions (Tex. Gov. Code
§403.302(d) and (d)(7)), it is possible to express in mathematical terms the
rules set out, when the property in question is all native pasture land and
where:
x =taxable value,
y =market value,
z =productivity value, and y = z in all cases.
The statutory language can thus be expressed as follows:
x =y - (y- z), which is equivalent to
x -y =-(y- z), or
x -y =-y+ z, or
x =z, or restoring the statutory terms in the place of the variables,
taxable value = productivity value.
In sum, in the case of the native pasture land under review in this case, the
taxable value is equivalent to the productivity value. 3 [Appellee’s Brief at 15-16] [emphasis added]
Appellee’s admission that taxable value of the properties at issue is their
productivity value is a 360º pivot from its earlier position that §403.302(d) defines
taxable value as market value, not productivity value. [RR 39 2-25; SOAH-
004814]. In any case, Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(d) defines “taxable value” “for
purposes “of this section”, which includes §403.302(a) and (b) as well as (d). Thus
by Appellee’s own admission Appellant is correct in arguing that §403.302(b) and
(d) require adjustment to taxable values for ARB orders reducing productivity value
as a matter of law.
Despite this admission, Appellee argues that because §403.302(a) shows that
market value and productivity value are separate and distinct concepts, §403.302(b)
and (d) do not authorize adjustments to taxable values for ARB orders reducing
productivity value. [Appellant’s Br. at 16-18]. Appellee appears to argue that Tex.
Gov. Code §403.302(a) somehow nullifies §403.302(b) and (d). [Appellee’s Brief at
16-18]. This ignores the rules of statutory construction requiring the statute to be
read as a whole and give effect to each provision unless they are in conflict.
Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a), (b) and (d) are not in conflict; they simply refer
to different requirements of the PVS. Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a) requires the PVS
to “determine the taxable value of all property and of each category of property in
the district and the productivity value of all land that qualifies for appraisal on the 4 basis of its productive capacity.” On the other hand, §403.302(b) and (d) require
reducing overall taxable values to account for ARB orders reducing those values.
Again, Appellant is not requesting reduction of value for the entire category of all
land appraised at productivity value under Tex. Gov.
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ACCEPTED 15-24-00079-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/14/2025 1:34 PM CAUSE NO. 15-24-00079-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 3/14/2025 1:34:24 PM AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
KENEDY COUNTY-WIDE COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant
vs.
GLENN HEGAR, TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, Appellee
Appeal from the 353rd District Court Travis County, Texas Hon. Judge Maya Guerra Gamble, Presiding Judge Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-23-002042
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ____________________________________________________
Judith A. Hargrove State Bar No. 11595050 HARGROVE LAW SEALY, TEXAS 77474 (512) 750-0338 judy@hargrovelawtx.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………i
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………..………………1
ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………..…2
I. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. Reply to ……………………….…..2 Appellee’s Brief II. A.-C.
II. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. E……………………………………5
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER………………………………………………..6
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT…………………………………….……..7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………..7
i APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
Appellant files this Reply Brief to respond to and clarify the arguments made
by Appellee. Although Appellee’s Brief fails on its own merit to controvert
Appellant’s position, it does confuse the issues by mischaracterizing the relief sought
by Appellant. To be clear, Appellant is not requesting revaluation of the entire
category of all land appraised at productivity value under the provision focused on
by Appellee. It merely requests reduction of its total taxable value to account for
ARB orders reducing productivity values of specific protested properties as found
by the ALJ’s Proposal for Decision. In over-ruling and replacing the ALJ’s
Decision, Appellee violated the statute by focusing only on one provision and
ignoring the others.
Appellee does not dispute Appellant’s authorities concerning the standard of
review. Nor does it dispute Appellant’s argument that the term “taxable value” as
defined in the statute includes “productivity value”. In fact, Appellee explicitly
confirms Appellant’s argument that “taxable value” includes productivity value.
The relevant authorities hold that a reviewing court must reverse and remand the
agency’s order if the appellant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced by an
agency decision that violates a constitutional or statutory provision. Nevertheless,
Appellee insists that it has discretion to act as it wishes even it violates the statute.
1 This position further demonstrates its abuse of discretion in this matter.
ARGUMENT
I. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. A.-C.
Appellee states that “the dispute on appeal can be reduced to a single legal
question: What value(s) does the language of Texas Government Code section
403.302(b)(4) authorize PTAD to adjust to account for ARB orders? [Appellee’s
Brief at 8]. Although it’s true this question must be answered, it side-steps the
ultimate question of whether Appellee abused its discretion in refusing to comply
with §403.302(b)(4) and (d)(7) by adjusting Appellant’s taxable values for ARB
orders determining productivity value.
Appellee acknowledges that “When an agency decision turns on the
construction of a statute, the question of whether the agency properly construed the
statute is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de novo….the appellate
court’s primary concern is the express statutory language…When an agency
decision turns on the construction of a statute, the question of whether the agency
properly construed the statute is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de
novo. …the appellate court’s primary concern is the express statutory language…
The court applies the plain meaning of the text unless a different meaning is supplied
by legislative definition”. [Appellant’s Brief at 11-12; Appellee’s Brief at 8].
Ignoring these principles, Appellee argues that Texas Government Code 2 section 403.302(b)(4) authorizes the Comptroller to make adjustments only for ARB
orders determining “taxable value,” not “productivity value.” [Appellee’s Brief at
8]. This argument is completely undermined by Appellee’s own analysis of Tex.
Gov. Code §403.302(d)(7) proving that “productivity value” is “taxable value” for
land qualified for productivity appraisal. See Appellee’s Brief at 15-16. Appellee
states:
Tracking the precise language of these two code provisions (Tex. Gov. Code
§403.302(d) and (d)(7)), it is possible to express in mathematical terms the
rules set out, when the property in question is all native pasture land and
where:
x =taxable value,
y =market value,
z =productivity value, and y = z in all cases.
The statutory language can thus be expressed as follows:
x =y - (y- z), which is equivalent to
x -y =-(y- z), or
x -y =-y+ z, or
x =z, or restoring the statutory terms in the place of the variables,
taxable value = productivity value.
In sum, in the case of the native pasture land under review in this case, the
taxable value is equivalent to the productivity value. 3 [Appellee’s Brief at 15-16] [emphasis added]
Appellee’s admission that taxable value of the properties at issue is their
productivity value is a 360º pivot from its earlier position that §403.302(d) defines
taxable value as market value, not productivity value. [RR 39 2-25; SOAH-
004814]. In any case, Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(d) defines “taxable value” “for
purposes “of this section”, which includes §403.302(a) and (b) as well as (d). Thus
by Appellee’s own admission Appellant is correct in arguing that §403.302(b) and
(d) require adjustment to taxable values for ARB orders reducing productivity value
as a matter of law.
Despite this admission, Appellee argues that because §403.302(a) shows that
market value and productivity value are separate and distinct concepts, §403.302(b)
and (d) do not authorize adjustments to taxable values for ARB orders reducing
productivity value. [Appellant’s Br. at 16-18]. Appellee appears to argue that Tex.
Gov. Code §403.302(a) somehow nullifies §403.302(b) and (d). [Appellee’s Brief at
16-18]. This ignores the rules of statutory construction requiring the statute to be
read as a whole and give effect to each provision unless they are in conflict.
Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a), (b) and (d) are not in conflict; they simply refer
to different requirements of the PVS. Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a) requires the PVS
to “determine the taxable value of all property and of each category of property in
the district and the productivity value of all land that qualifies for appraisal on the 4 basis of its productive capacity.” On the other hand, §403.302(b) and (d) require
reducing overall taxable values to account for ARB orders reducing those values.
Again, Appellant is not requesting reduction of value for the entire category of all
land appraised at productivity value under Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a). It is
requesting its total taxable value be reduced to account for ARB orders reducing
productivity values of specific properties under §403.302(b) and (d). Appellee’s
argument that Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a) somehow nullifies §403.302(b) and (d)
should be rejected.
II. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. E.
Appellee urges that if its erroneous legal arguments are rejected, it cannot
make the requested adjustments for ARB orders because there is no evidence
showing the amount of any appropriate adjustment. [Appellee’s Brief at 21-22].
This deflection erroneously assumes that Appellant is requesting Comptroller to
adjust the value of the entire category of land appraised at productivity value. This
misrepresents the relief sought by Appellant, which is that Comptroller adjust its
total taxable value for ARB orders reducing productivity value as ordered by the
ALJ Proposal for Decision. [Appellant’s Brief Appendix 1]. [SOAH-000066,
004826, 004834, 0048280, 000369-000718, 000723-000729]. The evidence is
clearly sufficient to allow such adjustments.
As found by the ALJ, Appellant introduced Supporting ARB Documentation 5 including Notices of Appraised Value/Property Value and ARB Orders Determining
Owners Protests. [SOAH-004680] [Appellant’s Brief Appendix 1]. [SOAH-00270-
000719]. This evidence is all that is necessary to calculate the reductions ordered
by the ARB on the protested productivity values. The calculation is as simple as
(noticed appraised productivity value) – (ARB reduced productivity value) = final
taxable value of protested property. Comptroller routinely makes such adjustments
for ARB reductions of market value. Thus its claim that it lacks evidence to make
the requested adjustments to productivity value is merely a misleading attempt to
avoid doing what it is required by law to do.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(b)(4) directs that in conducting the PVS and
determining Appellant’s taxable value, Comptroller was required adjust for ARB
orders reducing those taxable values. Appellee admits that “productivity value” is
“taxable value” for land qualified for productivity appraisal. This it was required to
adjust Appellant’s taxable value for ARB orders reducing productivity value as a
matter of law. Because substantial rights of Appellant are prejudiced by Appellee’s
Decision, which is arbitrary and without regard to the facts, not supported by
substantial evidence, and contrary to law, Appellant prays that this Court remand
Comptroller’s Decision to prevent mis-application of law, contravention of public
policy, and manifest injustice, and for all other relief to which it is justly entitled. 6 Respectfully submitted,
HARGROVE LAW 2029B DOROTHY SEALY, TEXAS 77474 (512) 750-0338 judy@hargrovelawtx.com
By: /s/ Judith A. Hargrove Judith A. Hargrove State Bar No. 11595050
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
This document complies with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(i); exclusive of the exempted portions, it contains 1432 words.
/s/ Judith A. Hargrove
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on the following counsel of record on this 14th day of March, 2025.
THOMAS BEVILACQUA Texas Bar No. 00793342 Assistant Attorney General General Litigation Division
7 P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel : (512) 936-1162 Fax: (512) 320-0667 thomas.bevilacqua@oag.texas.
Jim L. Lambeth State Bar No. 00793047 LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP 1517 W. Front St., Suite 202 Tyler, TX 75702 (903) 597-2897 (903) 597-2402 – FAX Jim.lambeth@lgbs.com
/s/ Judith A. Hargrove
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Judith Hargrove on behalf of Judith Hargrove Bar No. 11595050 judy@hargrovelawtx.com Envelope ID: 98477319 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Status as of 3/14/2025 2:04 PM CST
Associated Case Party: Kenedy County Wide Common School District
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Jim LLambeth Jim.Lambeth@lgbs.com 3/14/2025 1:34:24 PM SENT
Sharita Morrow Sharita.Morrow@lgbs.com 3/14/2025 1:34:24 PM SENT
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Associated Case Party: GLENN HEGAR, TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
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