Kenedy County Wide School District v. Glenn Hegar, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, in His Official and Individual Capacity
Opinion
ACCEPTED
15-24-00079-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
3/14/2025 1:34 PM
CAUSE NO. 15-24-00079-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 3/14/2025 1:34:24 PM
AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
KENEDY COUNTY-WIDE COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant
vs.
GLENN HEGAR, TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, Appellee
Appeal from the 353rd District Court Travis County, Texas
Hon. Judge Maya Guerra Gamble, Presiding Judge Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-23-002042
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
Judith A. Hargrove
State Bar No. 11595050
HARGROVE LAW
2029 DOROTHY
SEALY, TEXAS 77474
(512) 750-0338
judy@hargrovelawtx.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………i INTRODUCTION……………………………………………..………………1 ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………..…2
I. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. Reply to ……………………….…..2 Appellee’s Brief II. A.-C.
II. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. E……………………………………5 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER………………………………………………..6 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT…………………………………….……..7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………..7
i
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
Appellant files this Reply Brief to respond to and clarify the arguments made by Appellee. Although Appellee’s Brief fails on its own merit to controvert Appellant’s position, it does confuse the issues by mischaracterizing the relief sought by Appellant. To be clear, Appellant is not requesting revaluation of the entire category of all land appraised at productivity value under the provision focused on by Appellee. It merely requests reduction of its total taxable value to account for ARB orders reducing productivity values of specific protested properties as found by the ALJ’s Proposal for Decision. In over-ruling and replacing the ALJ’s Decision, Appellee violated the statute by focusing only on one provision and ignoring the others.
Appellee does not dispute Appellant’s authorities concerning the standard of review. Nor does it dispute Appellant’s argument that the term “taxable value” as defined in the statute includes “productivity value”. In fact, Appellee explicitly confirms Appellant’s argument that “taxable value” includes productivity value. The relevant authorities hold that a reviewing court must reverse and remand the agency’s order if the appellant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced by an agency decision that violates a constitutional or statutory provision. Nevertheless, Appellee insists that it has discretion to act as it wishes even it violates the statute.
This position further demonstrates its abuse of discretion in this matter.
ARGUMENT
I. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. A.-C.
Appellee states that “the dispute on appeal can be reduced to a single legal question: What value(s) does the language of Texas Government Code section 403.302(b)(4) authorize PTAD to adjust to account for ARB orders? [Appellee’s Brief at 8]. Although it’s true this question must be answered, it side-steps the ultimate question of whether Appellee abused its discretion in refusing to comply with §403.302(b)(4) and (d)(7) by adjusting Appellant’s taxable values for ARB orders determining productivity value.
Appellee acknowledges that “When an agency decision turns on the construction of a statute, the question of whether the agency properly construed the statute is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de novo….the appellate court’s primary concern is the express statutory language…When an agency decision turns on the construction of a statute, the question of whether the agency properly construed the statute is a legal question that an appellate court reviews de novo. …the appellate court’s primary concern is the express statutory language… The court applies the plain meaning of the text unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition”. [Appellant’s Brief at 11-12; Appellee’s Brief at 8].
Ignoring these principles, Appellee argues that Texas Government Code
section 403.302(b)(4) authorizes the Comptroller to make adjustments only for ARB orders determining “taxable value,” not “productivity value.” [Appellee’s Brief at 8]. This argument is completely undermined by Appellee’s own analysis of Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(d)(7) proving that “productivity value” is “taxable value” for land qualified for productivity appraisal. See Appellee’s Brief at 15-16. Appellee states:
Tracking the precise language of these two code provisions (Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(d) and (d)(7)), it is possible to express in mathematical terms the rules set out, when the property in question is all native pasture land and where:
x =taxable value,
y =market value,
z =productivity value, and y = z in all cases.
The statutory language can thus be expressed as follows:
x =y - (y- z), which is equivalent to x -y =-(y- z), or
x -y =-y+ z, or
x =z, or restoring the statutory terms in the place of the variables, taxable value = productivity value.
In sum, in the case of the native pasture land under review in this case, the taxable value is equivalent to the productivity value.
[Appellee’s Brief at 15-16] [emphasis added]
Appellee’s admission that taxable value of the properties at issue is their productivity value is a 360º pivot from its earlier position that §403.302(d) defines taxable value as market value, not productivity value. [RR 39 2-25; SOAH- 004814]. In any case, Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(d) defines “taxable value” “for purposes “of this section”, which includes §403.302(a) and (b) as well as (d). Thus by Appellee’s own admission Appellant is correct in arguing that §403.302(b) and (d) require adjustment to taxable values for ARB orders reducing productivity value as a matter of law.
Despite this admission, Appellee argues that because §403.302(a) shows that market value and productivity value are separate and distinct concepts, §403.302(b) and (d) do not authorize adjustments to taxable values for ARB orders reducing productivity value. [Appellant’s Br. at 16-18]. Appellee appears to argue that Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a) somehow nullifies §403.302(b) and (d). [Appellee’s Brief at 16-18]. This ignores the rules of statutory construction requiring the statute to be read as a whole and give effect to each provision unless they are in conflict.
Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a), (b) and (d) are not in conflict; they simply refer to different requirements of the PVS. Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a) requires the PVS to “determine the taxable value of all property and of each category of property in the district and the productivity value of all land that qualifies for appraisal on the
basis of its productive capacity.” On the other hand, §403.302(b) and (d) require reducing overall taxable values to account for ARB orders reducing those values. Again, Appellant is not requesting reduction of value for the entire category of all land appraised at productivity value under Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a). It is requesting its total taxable value be reduced to account for ARB orders reducing productivity values of specific properties under §403.302(b) and (d). Appellee’s argument that Tex. Gov. Code §403.302(a) somehow nullifies §403.302(b) and (d) should be rejected.
II. Reply to Appellee’s Brief II. E.
Appellee urges that if its erroneous legal arguments are rejected, it cannot make the requested adjustments for ARB orders because there is no evidence showing the amount of any appropriate adjustment. [Appellee’s Brief at 21-22]. This deflection erroneously assumes that Appellant is requesting Comptroller to adjust the value of the entire category of land appraised at productivity value. This misrepresents the relief sought by Appellant, which is that Comptroller adjust its total taxable value for ARB orders reducing productivity value as ordered by the ALJ Proposal for Decision. [Appellant’s Brief Appendix 1]. [SOAH-000066, 004826, 004834, 0048280, 000369-000718, 000723-000729]. The evidence is clearly sufficient to allow such adjustments.
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Kenedy County Wide School District v. Glenn Hegar, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, in His Official and Individual Capacity (Kenedy County Wide School District v. Glenn Hegar, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, in His Official and Individual Capacity) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.