Kendrick v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kendrick v. State

868 So. 2d 654, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3514, 2004 WL 535084

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 19, 2004

DocketNo. 2D03-1639

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 868 So. 2d 654 (Kendrick v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kendrick v. State, 868 So. 2d 654, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3514, 2004 WL 535084 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004).

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Opinion

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Kenneth James Kendrick appeals from his resentencing for attempted sexual battery with a deadly weapon. Kendrick challenges his designation as a sexual predator, claiming that he did not qualify for the designation. Kendrick also challenges the constitutionality of the sexual predator statute on due process grounds, relying on Espindola v. State, 855 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Kendrick acknowledges that Espindola conflicts with this court’s decision in Milks v. State, 848 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 859 So.2d 514 (Fla.2003).

Neither of Kendrick’s arguments supports reversal. First, Kendrick qualifies for the sexual predator designation under section 775.21(4)(a)(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), because his offense is an attempt of a life felony under chapter 794, Florida Statutes. See § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). Second, we reject Kendrick’s due process challenge based on our decision in Milks and certify conflict with Espindola.

Affirmed; conflict certified.

FULMER and STRINGER, JJ„ concur.

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SILBERMAN, Judge.

Kenneth James Kendrick appeals from his resentencing for attempted sexual battery with a deadly weapon. Kendrick challenges his designation as a sexual predator, claiming that he did not qualify for the designation. Kendrick also challenges the constitutionality of the sexual predator statute on due process grounds, relying on Espindola v. State, 855 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Kendrick acknowledges that Espindola conflicts with this court’s decision in Milks v. State, 848 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 859 So.2d 514 (Fla.2003).

Neither of Kendrick’s arguments supports reversal. First, Kendrick qualifies for the sexual predator designation under section 775.21(4)(a)(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), because his offense is an attempt of a life felony under chapter 794, Florida Statutes. See § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). Second, we reject Kendrick’s due process challenge based on our decision in Milks and certify conflict with Espindola.

Affirmed; conflict certified.

FULMER and STRINGER, JJ„ concur.

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Bluebook (online)

868 So. 2d 654, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3514, 2004 WL 535084, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kendrick-v-state-fladistctapp-2004.

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