Kendrick Dujuan Reagor v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00386-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00386-CR

KENDRICK DUJUAN REAGOR, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from Criminal District Court Number 3 Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 1786545, Counts 1, 2, & 3, Honorable Steve Jumes, Presiding

October 15, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Following pleas of not guilty to a three-count indictment for burglary, Appellant

Kendrick Dujuan Reagor, was convicted by a jury of only Count 1—burglary of a habitation

with intent to commit sexual assault. The conviction was enhanced by a prior felony,2

1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court

by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 30.02(d), 12.42(c)(1). with an affirmative finding on use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.3 Punishment was

assessed by the trial court at confinement for life. By two issues, Appellant maintains (1)

the evidence is insufficient to prove burglary of a habitation because it failed to prove he

entered and had the intent to commit sexual assault and (2) the judgment is invalid

because the jury failed to make findings of either “guilty” or “not guilty” in the verdict forms

for Counts 2 and 3. We affirm as modified.

BACKGROUND

Appellant has a criminal history including a conviction for aggravated sexual

assault of a child resulting in him being a registered sex offender. In May 2023, he

allegedly stalked a female living at an apartment complex. She called police and

Appellant was stopped and questioned but no reason was found to arrest him.

Appellant was then accused of stalking another female, the complainant, at an

apartment complex across from the one where the other female lived. The complainant

lived in a ground floor studio apartment. She testified she saw Appellant one afternoon

but after she parked her car, he was gone. She changed into a bikini to go swimming at

her parents’ home. When she returned to her apartment a few hours later, she again saw

Appellant while parking her vehicle. She was still in her bikini. She exited her vehicle

and made her way to her apartment and as she tried to close the door, Appellant forced

his way inside and locked the door behind him. The complainant screamed at him, and

he pointed a gun at her face and told her to be quiet. She continued to scream and the

two struggled. He moved her toward her bed, threw her down, and straddled her.

3 The affirmative finding is a clerical error and is deleted from the judgment. See infra, page 10. 2 The complainant kept asking what he wanted and pleaded with him to get off her.

He never spoke to her or gave a reason why he broke into her apartment. He put his

hands on her mouth to try and silence her and also choked her. She fought back by

grabbing his private parts. He eventually got off her and left which she attributed to her

loud and persistent screams.

She called 911 and waited for police officers to arrive. She testified she had some

minor injuries and pain but did not require hospitalization. Her neck and nails were

swabbed for DNA, the results of which did not exclude Appellant as a contributor. The

next day, she identified Appellant from a photo line-up.

A warrant was issued for Appellant and a few days later, a patrol officer stopped

his vehicle. Appellant was handcuffed and detained. Once the warrant was confirmed,

several officers conducted an inventory search of Appellant’s vehicle. One of the officers

found a black 9-millimeter handgun in the vehicle.4

After the State’s case-in-chief, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on all three

counts, which the trial court denied. The defense then presented its witnesses, including

Appellant. The jury rejected Appellant’s version of the event and convicted him.

ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Due process requires that a conviction be based on legally sufficient evidence.

Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The only standard a

reviewing court should apply is whether a rational jury could have found each essential

4 Appellant’s brother testified he owned the gun found in Appellant’s car and produced a bill of sale.

He claimed he placed the gun in the car by mistake and Appellant was unaware of it. 3 element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all

evidence, direct and circumstantial and whether properly or improperly admitted, and view

it in the light most favorable to the verdict. Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2023). In doing so, we compare the statutory elements as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge. Id. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility

and weight to be attached to the evidence. Id. When the record supports conflicting

inferences, we presume the trier of fact resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict and

defer to that determination. Id.

The State was required to show Appellant, without the effective consent of the

complainant, entered her habitation with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a)(1). The felony offense of sexual assault is accomplished if

the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ

of another person by any means, without that person’s consent; causes the penetration

of the mouth of another person by the sexual organ of the actor, without that person’s

consent; or causes the sexual organ of another person, without that person’s consent, to

contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the

actor. § 22.011(a). Intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and may be

inferred from either the person’s words, acts, or conduct and the surrounding

circumstances. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The events

of a burglary may imply the intent with which the burglar entered, and the jury is

4 empowered to determine intent. Coleman v. State, 832 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.]1992, pet. ref’d).

The complainant testified she did not know Appellant’s intentions when he broke

into her apartment. She did not consider he may have attempted to sexually assault her

until after she spoke with her family. She testified inconsistently that “clues had lead me

to believe that he either, A, wanted to kill me or to rape me,” and in response to the next

question testified, “[h]e did not attempt to rape me, no.” She further testified, “he didn’t

try to do anything.”

One of complainant’s neighbors testified he heard screaming and went outside his

apartment but did not see anyone in distress. When the screams got louder, he went

outside a second time and saw the complainant. He described her as “scratched up, in

a bathing suit, like, half naked. Looked like it was trying to get ripped off . . . .”

Appellant testified in his own defense.5 He claimed it was physically impossible

for him to run or do what he was accused of due to a disability resulting from an accident.

He explained he was stabbed in 2020 and “got behind the wheel, hit a concrete

embankment under a bridge, broke my whole right leg from the ankle, shattered the

vehicle, broke the fibula, tibia and femur, and shattered my hip.”6 He testified he has an

5 He testified he had been in the area earlier because he was trying to buy “weed,” which he did

frequently, and denied stalking anyone.

6 To support his testimony, photos of his injuries with explanations of his surgical procedures were

admitted. All but two photographs, which the court found to be duplicative, were admitted over the State’s objection the photos were more prejudicial than probative. 5 injured lung, gets short of breath easily, and walks with a limp. He insisted he could not

have dragged the complainant across her apartment or wrestled her due to his disabilities.

Appellant further testified he knew the complainant because “she would do sexual

favors for money.” The State objected and defense counsel responded the testimony

was related to the issue of Appellant’s DNA being found on the complainant. The trial

court overruled the State’s objection but gave the jury a limiting instruction. Appellant

then explained his DNA was found underneath the complainant’s fingernails because she

scratched him during a sexual encounter.

The State presented sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude Appellant

entered the complainant’s apartment with intent to commit sexual assault. He forced his

way inside and locked the door. He threw her on the bed and straddled her all while using

his hands to silence her. He threatened her with a gun. He also admitted he had

previously engaged in sexual encounters with her. See Johnson v. State, 397 S.W.3d

424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (finding evidence of defendant latching doors to prevent

anyone from entering while shoving victim down and restraining her while threatening her

with a butcher knife sufficient to show specific intent to have “carnal knowledge” by force);

Caballero v. State, 292 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d)

(rejecting the appellant’s sufficiency argument that he had no intent to commit sexual

assault because “there was no sexual connotation to his interaction” with the

complainant).

The jury was free to resolve inconsistencies in the testimony, weigh the evidence,

and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448

6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). This Court is required to consider the combined force of all the

evidence. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we hold the evidence is sufficient

to establish Appellant entered the complainant’s apartment with intent to commit sexual

assault. Issue one is overruled.

ISSUE TWO—JURY VERDICT FORMS

Appellant maintains the jury’s failure to make findings of either “guilty” or “not guilty”

on Counts 2 and 3 render the judgment invalid. He argues his due process rights were

violated because the jury entered only a partial judgment which necessitates review for

harm under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). We disagree.

The application paragraphs of the jury charge provide as follows:

COUNT ONE

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, on or about the 28th day of June, 2023, in the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, did intentionally or knowingly, without the effective consent of [the complainant], the owner thereof, enter a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault, then you will find the defendant guilty of burglary with intent to commit sexual assault as charged in Count One of the Indictment and will cease your deliberations.

Unless you believe such beyond a reasonable doubt or you have a reasonable doubt, thereof, you will find the Defendant not guilty of Count One and next consider Count Two.

COUNT TWO

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, on or about the 28th day of June, 2023, in the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, did intentionally or knowingly, without the effective consent of [the complainant], the owner thereof, enter a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault, and the defendant did use or exhibit a deadly

7 weapon, during the commission of the assault, namely, firearm then you will find the defendant guilty of burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault as charged in Count Two of the Indictment and cease your deliberations.

Unless you believe such beyond a reasonable doubt or you have a reasonable doubt, thereof, you will find the Defendant not guilty of Count Two and next consider Count Three.

COUNT THREE

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, on or about the 28th day of June, 2023, in the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, did intentionally or knowingly, without the effective consent of [the complainant], the owner thereof, enter a habitation with intent to commit assault, then you will find the defendant guilty of burglary with intent to commit assault as charged in Count Three of the Indictment.

Unless you believe such beyond a reasonable doubt or you have a reasonable doubt, thereof, you will find the Defendant not guilty of Count Three.

The verdict forms submitted to the jury provide as follows:

We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Kendrick Reagor, guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault as charged in Count One of the Indictment.

_[foreperson signature]__ FOREPERSON

-OR-

We, the jury, find the Defendant, Kendrick Reagor, not guilty of the offense charged in Count One of the Indictment. _____________________ FOREPERSON

We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Kendrick Reagor, guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as charged in Count Two of the Indictment.

8 _____________________ FOREPERSON

We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Kendrick Reagor, not guilty of the offense as charged in Count Two of the Indictment.

_____________________ FOREPERSON

We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Kendrick Reagor, guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit assault as charged in Count Three of the Indictment.

We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Kendrick Reagor, not guilty of the offense charged in Count Three of the Indictment.

______________________ FOREPERSON

Following deliberations, the jury found Appellant guilty of only Count 1 and the verdict

form was signed by the foreperson. As instructed by the court’s charge, the jury ceased

deliberations based on its finding and left the verdict forms for Counts 2 and 3 blank and

unsigned.

APPLICABLE LAW

“A ‘verdict’ is a written declaration by a jury of its decision of the issue submitted

to it in the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.01; Blunston v. State, __ S.W.3d __, No.

AP-77-067, 2025 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 297, at *111 (Tex. Crim. App. May 7, 2025). An

9 error in the verdict form that fails to correctly set forth the law applicable to the case is

cognizable on appeal. Jennings v. State, 302 S.W.3d 306, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Such an error is reviewable under the Almanza test. Callins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176,

190–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). When an alleged jury charge error is not brought to the

trial court’s attention, reversal is required only if the defendant suffered egregious harm.

Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Egregious harm exists if

the error “affects the very basis of the defendant’s case, deprives him of a valuable right,

or vitally affects a defensive theory.” Id.

Appellant asserts the blank verdict forms for Counts 2 and 3 invalidate the

judgment of conviction for Count 1. We disagree. The jury was instructed to cease its

deliberations if it found Appellant guilty of Count 1. (Emphasis added). The jury found

Appellant guilty of Count 1 and followed the trial court’s instructions to cease deliberating,

dispensing with the need to make findings on Counts 2 and 3. Thus, we find the trial court

did not err in providing verdict forms for Counts 2 and 3. Finding no error, Almanza does

not apply. The judgment of conviction is not invalidated by the jury’s failure to make

findings on those Counts. Issue two is overruled.

REFORMATION OF JUDGMENT

During the charge conference, the State announced it was abandoning the deadly

weapon language in Count 1 as superfluous. The trial court granted the request.

This Court has the power to modify the judgment of the court below to make the

record speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Appellate courts

10 have the power to reform whatever the trial court could have corrected by a judgment

nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to correct the judgment appears in the

record. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). The

power to reform a judgment is “not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it

turn on the question of whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id. at

529–30. Thus, we modify the trial court’s judgment to delete “Yes, A Firearm” in the

summary portion under “Findings on Deadly Weapon.”

The trial court is ordered to enter a judgment to reflect this reformation, and the

trial court clerk is directed to provide a copy of the corrected judgment to Appellant, the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and this Court.

As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Alex Yarbrough Justice

Do not publish.