Kendra Petitt v. Gina D. Feist

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 16, 2024
• Docket: 04-24-00497-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00497-CV

Kendra PETITT, Appellant

v.

Gina D. FEIST, Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024CV02564 Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Beth Watkins, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 16, 2024

DISMISSED AS MOOT

This is an appeal in a forcible detainer action in which the clerk’s record shows the

county court at law signed a judgment of possession in favor of appellee on July 5, 2024. The

clerk’s record shows that the county court set a supersedeas bond of $3,000 to stay execution of

the judgment, but the record does not show that appellant paid the bond. The record further

shows the county court at law issued a writ of possession to enforce the July 5 judgment, and the 04-24-00497-CV

writ of possession was executed on July 25, 2024. The executed writ notes, “Property returned to

Agent/Colby Taylor at above address.”

The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the

property. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198

S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001–.002. A judgment of

possession in such an action determines only the right to immediate possession and is not a final

determination of whether an eviction was wrongful. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. When a

forcible detainer defendant fails to pay a supersedeas bond in the amount set by the county court

at law, the judgment may be enforced and a writ of possession may be executed, evicting the

defendant from the property. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.13;

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786. If a forcible detainer defendant fails to supersede the judgment and

loses possession of the property, the appeal is moot unless she: (1) timely and clearly expressed

her intent to appeal; and (2) asserted “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession of the [property].” See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786–87.

Because the record appeared to show appellant did not pay a supersedeas bond to stay

execution of the judgment and that the writ of possession was subsequently executed, we ordered

appellant to file a written response by September 3, 2024 showing why the appeal should not be

dismissed as moot. Appellant did not respond to our order. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal

as moot.

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