Kender v. Taj Hotel

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Kender v. Taj Hotel

234 A.D.2d 518, 651 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13265

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 23, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 234 A.D.2d 518 (Kender v. Taj Hotel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kender v. Taj Hotel, 234 A.D.2d 518, 651 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13265 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oshrin, J.), dated April 4, 1996, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In light of the circumstances of the assault upon the infant plaintiff, the history of criminal acts—including a prior assault—on the defendant’s premises, and the affidavit of the plaintiff’s security expert, it cannot be said that the criminal conduct in question was unforeseeable as a matter of law (see, Johnson v New York City Hous. Auth., 114 AD2d 438; compare, Iannelli v Powers, 114 AD2d 157, 162-163). This record raises issues of fact as to whether the defendant breached its duty to take minimal precautions to protect members of the public from such acts, and whether the defendant’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries (see, Nailon v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507, 519; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 514; compare, Ospina v City of New York, 214 AD2d 551, 552). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Pizzuto, J. P., Santucci, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oshrin, J.), dated April 4, 1996, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In light of the circumstances of the assault upon the infant plaintiff, the history of criminal acts—including a prior assault—on the defendant’s premises, and the affidavit of the plaintiff’s security expert, it cannot be said that the criminal conduct in question was unforeseeable as a matter of law (see, Johnson v New York City Hous. Auth., 114 AD2d 438; compare, Iannelli v Powers, 114 AD2d 157, 162-163). This record raises issues of fact as to whether the defendant breached its duty to take minimal precautions to protect members of the public from such acts, and whether the defendant’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries (see, Nailon v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507, 519; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 514; compare, Ospina v City of New York, 214 AD2d 551, 552). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Pizzuto, J. P., Santucci, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

234 A.D.2d 518, 651 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13265, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kender-v-taj-hotel-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack