Kendall Manufacturing Co. v. Rundle

47 N.W. 364, 78 Wis. 150, 1890 Wisc. LEXIS 304
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 25, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 47 N.W. 364 (Kendall Manufacturing Co. v. Rundle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kendall Manufacturing Co. v. Rundle, 47 N.W. 364, 78 Wis. 150, 1890 Wisc. LEXIS 304 (Wis. 1890).

Opinion

Oassoday, J.

We were at first strongly impressed with an equity in favor of Rundle, Spence db Go. to reclaim and retake the ■ooiler and fixtures they had put into the premises, and for which they had never received any pay. But after very carefully considering the- legal rights of the respective parties, we are unable to perceive any rule of law under which such removal of the boiler and fixtures from the premises by them can be justified. It is true the statute declares, in effect, that any person ordering or contracting for any machinery to be placed or connected to or with any building or premises in which such person has not am, interest sufficient for a Hen, as provided for in the statutes, to secure the payment therefor, shall have and retain a lien upon such machinery, and shall have the right to remove from such building or premises such machinery in case there shall be default in the payment of such machinery when due, learning such building or premises in as good condition as they were before such machinery was placed in or on the same.” Sec. 8314, S. & B. Ann. Stats. But Rundle, Spence & Go. cannot justify such removal under this provision, for the obvious reason that Cooper had a sufficient interest in the building and premises to authorize a lien thereon, as prescribed in the statutes. Sec. 2025, R. S.; Jessup v. Stone, 13 Wis. 466. This is virtually conceded by counsel for the defendants. Besides, it is apparent from the evidence and the findings that such removal was not made, and could not have been made, in such a way1 as to leave the building or premises in as good condition as they were before such machinery was placed therein. Moreover, the statute declares, in effect, that no lien given thereby shall exist, and no action to enforce the same shall be maintained, unless, within the time therein prescribed, a claim for such lien [158]*158shall be filed as therein provided, etc. Sec. 3318, S. & B. Arm. Stats.; Wilson v. Rudd, 70 Wis. 98. There is no pretense that Bundle, Spence & Co. ever filed any claim, gave any notice, or commenced any action to preserve and perpetuate the lien which they manifestly at first acquired by putting the boiler and fixtures into and upon the premises as found by the court.

The result is that Bundle, Spenee & Go. must be regarded, in law, as having waived and abandoned any and all claim to any lien under or by virtue of the statutes. Whatever right or claim they had to such boiler and fixures, therefore, was acquired by and based entirely upon the chattel mortgage taken by them March 3, 1884. Since the boiler and fixtures became so incorporated in and attached to the building and premises as to become part of the realty, as in effect found by the trial court, it is very questionable whether the chattel mortgage ever became operative at all. Frankland v. Moulton, 5 Wis. 1; Smith v. Waggoner, 50 Wis. 155; Taylor v. Collins, 51 Wis. 123.

But, however that may be, since the plaintiff’s claim attached to and became a lien upon all of Cooper’s interest in the premises and the fixtures therein as early as February 25, 1884, and since the statute expressly declares that “such lien shall he prior to any other lien which originates subsequent to the commencement of the construction, repairs, ... or work aforesaid of or upon such . . . building, machinery, ... or erection thereon,” etc. (sec. 3314, S. & B. Ann. Stats.), it necessarily follows that such lien of the plaintiff could not be defeated by the chattel mortgage given by Cooper March 3, 1884. The subsequent absconding of Cooper, the taking possession by Rim-die, Spence & Go., and operating the establishment, and paying the rent which accrued during the time, the removal of the boiler and fixtures, and the subsequent re-entry by the lessor for broken conditions in the lease, did not defeat [159]*159the plaintiff’s lien, although they may have impaired its value. Nor did they in any way enlarge the assumed rights of Bundle, ¡Spence ds Oo. under them chattel mortgage.

By the Gourt.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
47 N.W. 364, 78 Wis. 150, 1890 Wisc. LEXIS 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kendall-manufacturing-co-v-rundle-wis-1890.