Kendall College v. National Labor Relations Board

570 F.2d 216, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2878, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12555
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 17, 1978
Docket77-1418
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 570 F.2d 216 (Kendall College v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kendall College v. National Labor Relations Board, 570 F.2d 216, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2878, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12555 (7th Cir. 1978).

Opinion

WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.

The sole question presented in this case concerns the propriety of a collective bargaining unit determination made by the National Labor Relations Board (Board). Kendall College (Kendall) petitions this *218 Court for review of the Board’s decision and order 1 requiring the college to bargain collectively with Kendall College Council North Suburban Teachers Union, AFT Local 1274, AFL-CIO. For the reasons set forth, we deny the petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

Kendall is a small college which offers a two-year liberal arts curriculum to students who generally transfer to four-year institutions to complete their college education. At the relevant times Kendall employed about 19 full-time and an equal number of part-time faculty members. The part-time faculty members consist of teachers employed on a “per-course” contract and those employed on a “pro-rated” full-time contract. 2

The differences between pro-rated part-time teachers and their per-course colleagues are significant. Like their full-time counterparts, pro-rated part-timers receive salaries which reflect their training and experience. These teachers are employed under contracts identical to full-time contracts, and receive the same level of compensation as full-timers, but their contracts are pro-rated to reflect the lesser number of hours they teach during the contract year. 3 Full-time faculty and pro-rated part-timers are required by contract to attend Faculty Senate meetings and to serve on its various committees. Full-time faculty also receive such fringe benefits as retirement plan, health insurance, tuition reduction for themselves and their dependents, and sabbatical leaves. Pro-rated part-timers are entitled to most of these same fringe benefits.

In contrast, the educational background and teaching experience of per-course part-time teachers have no effect on their rate of compensation. The standard compensation for a three-credit course is $720. 4 This fixed amount may be less if fewer than eight students enroll in a course, or may be slightly higher for a laboratory science course. Per-course part-timers are not required to attend the Faculty Senate meetings, but are permitted to attend if they wish. Most fringe benefits are not available to per-course part-timers. Furthermore, the record reflects that almost half of the per-course part-timers hold full-time jobs elsewhere, and many are graduate students working toward degrees.

The Board determined that an appropriate collective bargaining unit at Kendall consisted of the full-time faculty and those part-time faculty members employed on the basis of pro-rated full-time contracts. The Board excluded the per-course part-timers because it found that they did not share a community of interest with the full-time and pro-rated part-time faculty. Kendall refused to bargain, and has petitioned for review of the Board’s bargaining unit determination.

I.

Kendall first maintains that we must “closely scrutinize” the Board’s unit determination in the instant case, since it presents for review for the first time the Board’s exclusion of part-time faculty members from a unit determination. Whatever *219 the phrase “close scrutiny” means in the context of this case, we note that the primary responsibility for determining appropriate units for collective bargaining purposes rests with the Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). We are also mindful that

“[T]he issue as to what unit is appropriate for bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and none should be by decision. It involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion, and the decision of the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed.”

Packard Motor Car Co. v. N L R B, 330 U.S. 485, 491, 67 S.Ct. 789, 793, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947); See also: South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local No. 627, International Union, 425 U.S. 800, 805, 96 S.Ct. 1842, 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976). Our scope of review of Board action is thus narrowly circumscribed and we may “disturb” the Board’s unit determination if it is unreasonable, N L R B v. Krieger—Ragsdale & Co., 379 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 780, 19 L.Ed.2d 831 (1968), if it is arbitrarily or capriciously made, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. N. L. R. B., 411 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 432, 24 L.Ed.2d 423 (1969), if it is unsupported by substantial evidence, N L R B v. Pinkertons, Inc., 416 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1969), or if the Board’s determination “oversteps the law.” Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 171-172, 92 S.Ct. 383, 30 L.Ed.2d 341 (1971). See also: N L R B v. Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977) at 335.

II.

In C. W. Post, 189 NLRB 904 (1971), and in University of New Haven, Inc., 190 NLRB 478 (1971), the Board viewed part-time faculty members of institutions of higher education in the same light as part-time employees in industrial work settings, and announced the principle that appropriate bargaining units must consist of both full-time and regular part-time faculty members. About two years later in New York University, 205 NLRB 4 (1973), quoting Justice Frankfurter’s observation in Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600, 69 S.Ct. 290, 293, 93 L.Ed. 259 (1949) (dissenting opinion) that “[wjisdom too often never comes, and one ought not to reject it merely because it comes too late,” the Board overruled the principle established in the C. W. Post and New Haven cases. In New York University,

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Bluebook (online)
570 F.2d 216, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2878, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12555, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kendall-college-v-national-labor-relations-board-ca7-1978.