Kemeys v. Netterstrom

86 Ill. App. 590, 1890 Ill. App. LEXIS 687
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJanuary 16, 1900
StatusPublished

This text of 86 Ill. App. 590 (Kemeys v. Netterstrom) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kemeys v. Netterstrom, 86 Ill. App. 590, 1890 Ill. App. LEXIS 687 (Ill. Ct. App. 1900).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellants’ testator filed his bill to foreclose three trust deeds given by William Kinsella to Edwin F. Bayley, trustee, to secure his, Kinsella’s, promissory notes aggregating the principal sum of seventy-five hundred dollars, for money loaned.

The appellees, JNetterstrom and Yider, were, with others, made parties defendant, and they answered denying the material allegations of the bill, but setting up no affirmative rights. Some time afterward, they were given leave to file a cross-bill. The purpose of the cross-bill was to foreclose a deed absolute upon its face, but in reality intended as security, made by the said Kinsella to one Lindsten, which in effect constituted a second mortgage upon the same premises covered by the prior trust deeds to Bayley, and to establish an equitable lien prior to and as against the Bayley trust deeds, to the extent of $1,345.72, alleged to have been paid by cross-complainants for certain outstanding certificates of a tax sale of the property, made subsequent to the making of the Bayley trust deeds, but before the making of the deed to Lindsten.

The master to whom the cause was referred reported adversely to the cross-complainants in respect of their claim of priority over the Bayley trust deeds for the amount, or any part of it, paid by them for the tax certificates, and recommended that the court deny the prayer of the cross-bill in such respect. The Circuit Courtj however, sustained exceptions to the master’s report, and gave the decree appealed from, according to the prayer of the cross-bill.

The questions raised here relate wholly to the propriety of the decree in so far as it gives a priority of lien to the cross-complainants for the amount paid for the tax certificates.

The tax certificates were originally held by one Johnson, who had previously agreed with Bayley, who was not only the trustee named in the trust deeds, but was also the agent of the loan owner, not to part with them to any third party without Bayley’s consent. The cross-complainants, Netterstrom and Yider, came to be concerned in Kinsella’s affairs in this regard, because of a joint judgment for some $6,800 having been recovered against them and him in the United States court, which, as between themselves, he ought to pay one-third of.

They, Netterstrom and Yider, seem to have been able to pay their share of that judgment, but he, Kinsella, was unable to pay his part.

After considerable negotiation it was substantially arranged that Netterstrom and Yider should lend to Kinsella an amount about equal to his share of that judgment, and take as their security his equity in the real estate covered by the Bayley trust deeds, and some other of his real estate. There was also a junior judgment for $4,000 against Kinsella alone, in the United States Court, which under the proposed arrangement was to be cut out by a sale under the prior joint judgment, if possible.

At first it was contemplated that the amount Netterstrom and Yider would be required to loan to Kinsella would be in the neighborhood of $2,000, but it was soon ascertained that these tax certificates must be procured, in order that they should not constitute a lien prior to the conveyance that Kinsella should make of his equity in the land, and thereupon $4,000 was the sum agreed upon to be advanced by Netterstrom and Yider.

Johnson, the holder of the tax certificates, was willing, as he could not help being, that the tax sales should be redeemed from, but he was not willing, nor at liberty under his agreement with Bayley, to sell the certificates to anybody but Bayley or his principals without Bayley’s consent. It therefore became incumbent upon Kinsella’s attorney, Hr. Anderson, who was also acting for Netterstrom and Yider, with Kinsella’s approval, to procure Bayley’s consent that Johnson might sell the certificates. For some reason, not very plain, it was thought that acquiring the tax certificates would in some way lend additional security to Netterstrom and Yider—perhaps in some eventuality as against the junior judgment against Kinsella alone— although it is plain it was never intended until after this litigation was begun that they should be used adversely to the Bayley trust deeds.

Hr. Anderson so expressly testifies, and says he was to hold them as a shield to both Netterstrom and Yider and, the interests represented by Bayley, so that neither one should procure tax deeds adverse to the others.

Bayley had been pressing Kinsella to redeem from these tax sales, and the trust deeds provided such to be Kinsella’s duty. Anderson had been trying for weeks to get somebody to lend Kinsella money with which to get rid of the certificates, and seems to have had reasonable expectations of succeeding without the aid of Netterstrom and Yider, and, after his negotiations with the latter were in progress, he wrote the following letter to Bayley, who was then absent from Chicago:

“ Chicago, Harch 25, 1895.
Hr. Edwin F. Bayley, Waupun, Wis.:
Hy Dear Sir—I write you in regard to the Kinsella matter, of which I spoke to you some weeks ago. We had found a friend of Hr. Kinsella who had promised to loan him a sufficient sum to take up the tax certificates and the judgment, of which I spoke to you, and the papers and arrangements had all been completed, when to our very great disappointment, on Saturday last he backed out because he had made up his mind to go to Europe and didn’t want to leave a matter of that kind open.
This morning I got a client of mine, who is also a friend of Mr. Kinsella’s, to agree to advance the money, but he can not advance it all until we complete our arrangements about selling the property under the judgment of which I spoke to you, but he will advance a sufficient sum to take up the tax certificates, but he desires to hold them until the other arrangements are made. When that is done the certificates will be canceled. There is no doubt he is acting in the utmost good faith, and Mr. Kinsella is perfectly satisfied with the arrangement, and we were going to complete it to-day, and would have done so, except that Mr. Wm. M. Johnson, who holds the tax certificates, and somewhat in your interest, did not want to sell them to us without your consent. Mr. Waldo knew nothing of the matter, and did not care to interfere, but Mr. Johnson agreed that the additional penalty of twenty-five per cent, which will be added the day after to-morrow in the regular course of the suit, would not be added until next Monday, so that we should have time to communicate with you. I desire to assure you that as soon as the other arrangements are made, and I have not the slightest doubt that they will be made, the certificates will be canceled. The title is perfectly good enough without the aid of those certificates or a deed thereunder.
Will you please send a brief note to Mr. Johnson informing him that you have no objection to me holding the tax sale certificates, as it is arranged that' I shall hold them until the other arrangements are made. Otherwise it will not be possible for Mr. Kinsella to raise this money.
Yours very truly,
H. M. Anderson.”

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Bluebook (online)
86 Ill. App. 590, 1890 Ill. App. LEXIS 687, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kemeys-v-netterstrom-illappct-1900.