Kemble v. Wolfe

14 Tenn. App. 545, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedDecember 19, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 14 Tenn. App. 545 (Kemble v. Wolfe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kemble v. Wolfe, 14 Tenn. App. 545, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

Opinion

PORTRUM, J.

Mr. and Mrs. E. K. Byrd and Jennie J. James owned a large house in the City of Bristol, Tennessee, which had been in use as a boarding house. One E. R. Shipley desired to lease this property for a term of five years with an option to buy the property during the term, and convert it into apartments to sublease. To accomplish this desired result it was necessary that extensive permanent improvements be made upon the property to make it available as an apartment house, and to realize monthly rentals from these apartments from the tenants. To this end the owners leased the property to Shipley for a term of five years at a nominal rental of $30 per month, with a provision that these permanent improvements be made, without specifying them, by the lessee, but that he assume any increase in taxes by reason of the improvements or otherwise, and also pay any street improvement assessments assessible against the property during the term of the lease. The lease further provided that the lessee could purchase or sell the property at any time during the term of the lease, for *547 a stipulated price of $13,000 payable to tlie owners, part in cash and the balance in deferred payments, but if the lessee failed to exercise this option he should return the property at the expiration of the lease, after reconditioning the property and leaving it suitable for the purpose for which it was to be used. Certain things to be done by the lessee at the expiration of the lease were designated in the contract. A supplemental agreement was attached to the lease specifying some of the permanent improvements to be done at the outset, among others being the installation of a hot air furnace. This property under the lease was taken over by the lessee who made of it a six or eight room apartment house, and installed six or eight bathrooms with their fixtures, placing in the same a number of gas stoves and heaters, together with electrical equipment or fixtures, window screens and the like. These improvements were made in the first few months of the lease, and the lessee was able to realize in monthly rentals the sum of $230.. But he had expended in improvements the sum of $3000' or $4000. This lease went into effect April 5, 1921, and upon December 4, or eight months later, Shipley, with the consent of the lessors, assigned his lease to the defendant, J. H. Wolfe. As a consideration for this assignment Wolfe paid Shipley the sum of $5000, and assumed the rights and obligations of the lease. During the balance of the term Wolfe made a few insignificant permanent improvements; he permitted one or more of the annual installments of street assessments to default, and the lessor became uneasy and spoke to him about it, he assured the lessor that he expected to exercise his option of purchase, and promised her to pay the street assessments in full. The street assessments under the law were payable either at the completion of the improvements, or in annual installments over a period of ten years. One street improvement had been completed for three years and another one year and a half at the date of the expiration of the lease. But the defendant did not exercise his right to purchase the property, or find a buyer, and as a consequence the lease expired by its own limitation. The defendant did not make the repairs, and recondition the property as provided for in the lease, and which work was to be done at the expiration of the lease.

Within a few days after the expiration of this lease the owner of this property sold it to Mrs. W. H. Kemble, the daughter of Mrs. Byrd,' for a stipulated support of the vendors during their natural lives. And as an incident they transferred all their rights and interests growing out of the leased estate named and held by the defendant. Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Kemble brings this suit against the defendant for the breach of his contract. They seek to recover the value of the necessary improvements which he contracted to *548 make at the expiration of the lease, and prior to the return of the property to the lessor. The defendant admits his failure to perform this provision of the lease contract; but says he made valuable permanent improvements expecting to exercise his rights to purchase the property, and since the lessor declined to allow him to exercise this privilege immediately after the expiration of the contract, he is entitled to set off the value of these valuable improvements against their claim for damages. For instance he says the lessee was required to install a hot air furnace, which could have been done for about $200, but the lessee installed a steam heating system which cost $1400, and since the lessee did more than he was called upon to do he is entitled to off-set this value against the claim for damages. lie relies upon the maxim of “lie who seeks equity must do equity.” He files a cross-bill, and seeks to recover the amount paid in street, improvements over and above the amount falling due during the term of his lease. And also the value of the six or eight gas stoves, which he claims are detachable fixtures, and which did not pass as permanent improvements.

The Special Chancellor held that the defendant was entitled to set off the value of these permanent improvements against the claim for a breach of the provisions of the contract, applying the maxim “He who seeks equity must do equity.” He granted the defendant a recovery under his cross-bill for the amount of the street improvements falling due after the expiration of the lease, or that would have fallen due had it not been that the defendant had paid the installments as a whole during the term of the lease. He denied the claim of the defendant for the value of the gas stoves, for the reason that they were placed in the building with the intention that they would remain permanently there. The complainant appealed; and the defendant has prosecuted a writ of error.

The defendant admits that the $30 monthly rental, payable to the lessors, who were to pay the assessed taxes on the property, was a nominal rental, and that the moving consideration was the anticipated conversion of the property into apartments, and the permanent improvements to be placed upon the property by the lessee to make the conversion. The return passing to the lessee was the increased monthly rentals, of $230 per month, which were anticipated, together with the right to exercise his option to buy or sell. At the time the assignment of the lease was taken by the defendant the improvements had been made, and for the sum of $5000 he purchased a lease that would yield, during the term of the lease, $12,880, for which he paid $5000, leaving him a profit of $7880, upon paper. The lease had fifty-six months to run at a monthly rental of $230. As a business proposition he could well assume the remaining requirements stipulated in the lease. Is he in a position *549 to be released on these requirements under the maxim that “He who seeks equity must do equity?” This is a favorite maxim with a court of equity, and it is used to enforce claims that cannot be enforced by suit. But it is not used to make a new contract between parties, nor to destroy the anticipated consideration of an executed contract. Under these circumstances the lessee should have consulted the lessor before installing a heating plant costing $1400, and which materially increased the renting value of the apartments, instead of a hot air plant contemplated to cost no more than $200.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 Tenn. App. 545, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kemble-v-wolfe-tennctapp-1931.