1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 KELVIN LANEIL JAMES, Case No. 2:25-cv-02560-CDS-EJY
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v. and
7 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
8 Defendant.
9 10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 11 and Complaint alleging the Library of Congress infringed on his copyright. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. 12 Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish the elements of a claim for copyright 13 infringement. Although this would typically prompt the Court to grant leave to amend, Plaintiff sues 14 a single federal defendant, the Library of Congress that must be sued in the Court of Federal Claims. 15 Thus, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, but without leave 16 to amend in this Court. This allows Plaintiff to refile, if he so chooses, in the Court of Federal 17 Claims. 18 I. Screening Standard 19 When reviewing a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must identify any 20 cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 21 relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim is 23 established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When a court dismisses a complaint under 24 § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend with directions to cure its deficiencies unless 25 it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato 26 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the Court treats 27 all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the 1 That is, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 2 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards 3 than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under 4 Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere 5 labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation 6 of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin 7 by identifying … [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled 8 to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions 9 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. 10 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 11 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a 12 complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 13 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 14 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 15 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 16 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 17 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 18 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); McKeever 19 v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 II. Discussion 21 To state a claim for copyright infringement, generally, Plaintiff must establish “(1) ownership 22 of a copyright, and (2) copying of protectable expression by Defendant.” Rearden LLC v. Walt 23 Disney Co., 293 F.Supp.3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enter., 24 Inc., 847 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017)). “To plead ownership, [a plaintiff] must plausibly allege 25 it owns a valid copyright registration for its work.” Barnes v. T.V. Network, Case No. 1:20-cv- 26 01331-NONE-EPG (PC), 2020 WL 6342787, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2020), report and 27 recommendation adopted, Case No. 1:20-cv-01331-NONE-EPG (PC), 2020 WL 7319367 (E.D. Cal. 1 2019)). “A certificate of registration from the U.S. Copyright Office raises the presumption of 2 copyright validity and ownership.” Unicolors, Inc. v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 988 (9th 3 Cir. 2017) (citing Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)). 4 Plaintiff says he owns a valid copyright to “the Magnet.” ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. However, 5 Plaintiff has not submitted a certificate of registration or otherwise pleaded facts sufficient to support 6 this ownership assertion. See Signatours Corp. v. Hartford, Case No. C14-1581RSM, 2015 WL 7 1058181, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2015) (“Plaintiff has provided no other proof of ownership, 8 other than its bare allegation that it is the legal or beneficial owner of the copyright. This is not 9 enough.”). As to the second element, it is unclear how the Library of Congress supposedly interfered 10 with Plaintiff’s protected expression. Plaintiff must “plausibly allege facts indicating that someone 11 other than himself—someone for whose actions the United States is liable under 28 U.S.C. § 12 1498(b)—copied elements of [Plaintiff’s work] protectable under the Copyright Act.” Clark v. U.S., 13 632 Fed.Appx. 1027, 1031 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiff offers nothing more 14 than the statement the “copyright infringement law [was] broken by the Library of Congress.” ECF 15 No. 1-1 at 2. In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a prima facie claim for copyright 16 infringement. 17 Again, while the Court in other circumstances might grant leave to amend, here, Plaintiff 18 alleges a federal defendant infringed upon his copyright. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), copyright 19 claims against the federal government must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. Zaccari v. 20 Apprio, Inc., 390 F.Supp.3d 103, 110-11 (D.D.C. 2019) (emphasis added). The District of Nevada 21 lacks jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims brought against the United States. See Fowler 22 v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case No. CV-20-01516-PHX-DJH, 2021 WL 2474031, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 23 16, 2021) (citing Jeter v. President of the United States, 670 Fed.Appx. 493 (9th Cir. 2016)).
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 KELVIN LANEIL JAMES, Case No. 2:25-cv-02560-CDS-EJY
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v. and
7 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
8 Defendant.
9 10 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 11 and Complaint alleging the Library of Congress infringed on his copyright. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. 12 Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish the elements of a claim for copyright 13 infringement. Although this would typically prompt the Court to grant leave to amend, Plaintiff sues 14 a single federal defendant, the Library of Congress that must be sued in the Court of Federal Claims. 15 Thus, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, but without leave 16 to amend in this Court. This allows Plaintiff to refile, if he so chooses, in the Court of Federal 17 Claims. 18 I. Screening Standard 19 When reviewing a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must identify any 20 cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 21 relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim is 23 established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When a court dismisses a complaint under 24 § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend with directions to cure its deficiencies unless 25 it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato 26 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the Court treats 27 all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the 1 That is, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 2 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards 3 than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under 4 Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere 5 labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation 6 of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin 7 by identifying … [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled 8 to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions 9 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. 10 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 11 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a 12 complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 13 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 14 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 15 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 16 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 17 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 18 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); McKeever 19 v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 II. Discussion 21 To state a claim for copyright infringement, generally, Plaintiff must establish “(1) ownership 22 of a copyright, and (2) copying of protectable expression by Defendant.” Rearden LLC v. Walt 23 Disney Co., 293 F.Supp.3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enter., 24 Inc., 847 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017)). “To plead ownership, [a plaintiff] must plausibly allege 25 it owns a valid copyright registration for its work.” Barnes v. T.V. Network, Case No. 1:20-cv- 26 01331-NONE-EPG (PC), 2020 WL 6342787, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2020), report and 27 recommendation adopted, Case No. 1:20-cv-01331-NONE-EPG (PC), 2020 WL 7319367 (E.D. Cal. 1 2019)). “A certificate of registration from the U.S. Copyright Office raises the presumption of 2 copyright validity and ownership.” Unicolors, Inc. v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 988 (9th 3 Cir. 2017) (citing Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)). 4 Plaintiff says he owns a valid copyright to “the Magnet.” ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. However, 5 Plaintiff has not submitted a certificate of registration or otherwise pleaded facts sufficient to support 6 this ownership assertion. See Signatours Corp. v. Hartford, Case No. C14-1581RSM, 2015 WL 7 1058181, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2015) (“Plaintiff has provided no other proof of ownership, 8 other than its bare allegation that it is the legal or beneficial owner of the copyright. This is not 9 enough.”). As to the second element, it is unclear how the Library of Congress supposedly interfered 10 with Plaintiff’s protected expression. Plaintiff must “plausibly allege facts indicating that someone 11 other than himself—someone for whose actions the United States is liable under 28 U.S.C. § 12 1498(b)—copied elements of [Plaintiff’s work] protectable under the Copyright Act.” Clark v. U.S., 13 632 Fed.Appx. 1027, 1031 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiff offers nothing more 14 than the statement the “copyright infringement law [was] broken by the Library of Congress.” ECF 15 No. 1-1 at 2. In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a prima facie claim for copyright 16 infringement. 17 Again, while the Court in other circumstances might grant leave to amend, here, Plaintiff 18 alleges a federal defendant infringed upon his copyright. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), copyright 19 claims against the federal government must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. Zaccari v. 20 Apprio, Inc., 390 F.Supp.3d 103, 110-11 (D.D.C. 2019) (emphasis added). The District of Nevada 21 lacks jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims brought against the United States. See Fowler 22 v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case No. CV-20-01516-PHX-DJH, 2021 WL 2474031, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 23 16, 2021) (citing Jeter v. President of the United States, 670 Fed.Appx. 493 (9th Cir. 2016)). Thus, 24 even if Plaintiff were able to amend his Complaint to allege facts to support his ownership of a valid 25 copyright and infringing conduct by the Library of Congress, this Court would lack jurisdiction to 26 review his Complaint. 27 1 III. Order 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDER that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 3 pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 4 IV. Recommendation 5 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) be 6 DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend in the U.S. District Court for the District 7 of Nevada. This dismissal allows Plaintiff to bring a claim alleging copyright infringement against 8 the Library of Congress, if he so chooses, in the Court of Federal Claims. 9 Dated this 30th day of June, 2026. 10
11 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 NOTICE 14 Pursuant to Local Rule IB 3-2 any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be 15 in writing and filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days of service of this document. The 16 Supreme Court has held that the courts of appeal may determine that an appeal has been waived 17 due to the failure to file objections within the specified time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 18 (1985). This circuit has also held that (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and 19 (2) failure to properly address and brief the objectionable issues waives the right to appeal the 20 District Court’s order and/or appeal factual issues from the order of the District Court. Martinez 21 v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 22 454 (9th Cir. 1983). 23 24 25 26 27