Kelvin James v. Division of Parole and Probation, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 26, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02353
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 5 Kelvin James, Case No. 2:25-cv-02353-JAD-MDC 6 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND Plaintiffs, RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS 7 vs. CASE 8 Division of Parole and Probation, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 On 2/6/26, the magistrate judge entered this report and recommendation [ECF No. 9]: 11 The Court previously granted incarcerated plaintiff Kelvin James’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 12 application and ordered plaintiff to pay the initial partial filing fee prior to screening. ECF No. 8. 13 Plaintiff has not filed anything or paid the filing fee, and the deadline to do so has passed. The Court 14 also confirmed with the Clerk’s office finance department that plaintiff has not paid the filing fee in this 15 case. It appears that plaintiff has abandoned this case. The Court recommends that this case be 16 dismissed. 17 I. LEGAL STANDARD 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that 19 power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. 20 Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action 21 based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. Malone v. U.S. Postal 22 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); Henderson 23 v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply 24 with local rules). 25 In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) 1 the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; 2 and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 3 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 4 1987)). 5 II. ANALYSIS 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the court’s 7 interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiff has chosen 8 not to comply with this Court’s Order. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in 9 favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in 10 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor— 11 the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors 12 favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. Yourish v. Cal. 15 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 16 the party has disobeyed a Court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 17 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases 18 that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the Court’s Order as 19 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of 20 dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every 21 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful 22 alternatives.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 23 This Court cannot operate without collecting reasonable fees and litigation cannot progress 24 without a plaintiff’s compliance with Court orders. The only alternative is to enter another order setting 25 1 || another deadline. Issuing another order, however, will only delay the inevitable and further squander the 2 || Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 3 || circumstances. The fifth factor favors dismissal. Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by this Report and 4 || Recommendation because plaintiff will have an opportunity to object. 5 After weighing these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 6 || Plaintiff has apparently abandoned this case. For the reasons discussed in this Order and the Court’s 7 || earlier Order (ECF No. 8), plaintiff's case should be dismissed. 8 IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT this case be DISMISSED. 9 Dated: February 6, 2026. 10 11 ORDER ADOPTING R&R 12 13 The deadline for any party to object to this recommendation was 2/20/2026, and no party filed 14 || anything or asked to extend the deadline to do so. “[N]o review is required of a magistrate □□□□□□□ 15 || feport and recommendation unless objections are filed.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 16 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Having reviewed the report and recommendation, I find good cause to adopt it, 7 and I do. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

[ECF No. 9] is ADOPTED in its entirety, and THIS CASE IS DISMISSED for the reasons stated in

the report and recommendation. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE.

0 Dated: February 26, 2026 23 24 25