Kelly Well Co. v. Kirschke Concrete Well Co.

14 F.2d 274, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2035
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedAugust 5, 1926
DocketNo. 7237
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 14 F.2d 274 (Kelly Well Co. v. Kirschke Concrete Well Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelly Well Co. v. Kirschke Concrete Well Co., 14 F.2d 274, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2035 (8th Cir. 1926).

Opinion

SCOTT, District Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, confirming a master’s report and dismissing the plaintiff’s bill. Kelly Well Company, a Nebraska corporation, plaintiff, filed its bill against Kirsehke Concrete Well Company, an Arizona corporation, and Oscar R. Kirsehke, in substance alleging that William Kelly was the-original and first inventor of a certain new and useful improvement in well points and well screens and had obtained on February 19, 1918, letters patent of the United States, numbered No. 1,256,906; that said William Kelly on March 4, 1918, sold and assigned to the Kelly Well Company the entire right, title, and interest in said letters patent and invention, which assignment was recorded on March 28, 1918, and that plaintiff was the sole and exclusive owner of said letters patent; that after the issuance and assignment of said letters patent and about the 30th day of November, 1920, Osear R. Kirsehke, defendant, through inadvertence, oversight, and error of the office of the Commissioner of Patents, wrongfully secured letters patent on a pretended invention described as a “sand strainer,” said letters patent being numbered No. 1,360,301, which pretended invention wrongfully and illegally uses and embodies the invention in concrete wells, concrete well screens, and concrete well points, covered" and secured by letters patent No. 1,256,906, and that said letters patent No. 1,360,301, so procured, is an interfering patent as against letters patent No. 1,256,906; that said Oscar R. Kirsehke caused to be organized under the laws of Arizona the Kirsehke Concrete Well Company, which company since its organization, without license from the plaintiff, is engaging in making, using, and vending concrete wells, concrete well screens, and concrete well points in violation of the plaintiff’s right, and the said Osear R. Kirsehke has transferred his said patent in whole or in part to the Kirsehke Concrete Well Company; that the defendants and each of them, since the date of letters patent No. 1,256,-906, without license, have been and are now manufacturing, selling, and using concrete wells, concrete well screens, and concrete well points of a design, construction, and process method substantially as described in letters patent No. 1,256,906, and fully and completely covered in the claims thereof; and that the defendants threaten, and intend, unless restrained, to continue, so to infringe plaintiff’s letters patent.

Plaintiff prays for an injunction restraining the defendants from further infringement, and for a decree canceling letters patent No. 1,360,301, as an interfering patent. The defendants, answering the bill, admit the procuring of letters patent No. 1,360,301, deny that they were issued by inadvertence, oversight, fraud, or mistake, and by appropriate allegation plead absence of invention in the structure described in plaintiff’s patent, and that said patent does not interfere with letters patent No. 1,256,906, and joins issue upon the plaintiff’s allegation of infringement. It will therefore be observed that plaintiff’s bill has a double purpose: It is a bill for canceling an alleged interfering patent under section 4918 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Comp. St. § 9463), and also a bill to enjoin infringement in the usual form.

Upon the issues stated the cause was .referred to a special master to ascertain and report the facts, with his conclusions of law. The special master heard the cause and filed a very clear and comprehensive report. The report in the last analysis presents and determines two questions only: The question of interference, and the question of infringement. Upon the authority of Boston Pneumatic Power Co. v. Eureka Patents Co. (C. C.) 139 F. 29, the special master seems to have assumed that he was not called upon to determine the question of patentability, in view of his conclusion upon the questions of interference and infringement. The special master found that none of the claims of letters patent No. 1,360,301 interferes with either of the claims in letters patent No. 1,256,-960, and further found that the defendants had not infringed letters patent No. 1,256,-960. The plaintiff filed 14 exceptions to the special master’s report; the cause was heard before the District Court upon the report of the special master, the plaintiff’s exceptions, and the evidence and proceedings therein; and upon argument and submission the District Court overruled the exceptions to the [276]*276report of the special master, confirmed the report, and entered a decree dismissing the plaintiff’s bill.

The first 11 exceptions to the report of the special master challenge findings of fact as being against the evidence. In order to clear the diseussion, we will say at this point that we are convinced that the trial court was entirely correct in overruling these exceptions and confirming the findings of the master. Exception 12 goes generally to the special master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, 13 excepts to the failure of the master to render findings and conclusions respecting the patentability of defendants’ invention, and 14 is a general exception to the special master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law without elaboration. We think the trial cpurt was correct in overruling these exceptions. The trial court, however, in its decree finds patent No. 1,360,301 valid. We think, however, that finding was unnecessary, and may be here treated as superfluous. As heretofore indicated, there are but two questions for determination on this record: The question of interference, and the question of infringement. We take these questions up in their1 order.

It is well settled that the question whether a claim or claims of one patent interferes with a claim or claims in another patent is to be determined by a reference to the claims themselves. Walker on Patents (5th Ed.) § 317; Dederick v. Fox (C. C.) 56 F. 714; Donner v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. (C. C.) 160 F. 971: Gold & Silver Ore Separating Co. v. United States Disintegrating Co., 10 Fed. Cas. 539.

It is also weE settled that, in eonstru-, ing a claim, the court proceeds as in the construction of any other contract. The specifications and designs may be referred to, to throw light upon any doubtful language. We therefore proceed to examine the claims in these respective patents, to ascertain whether any claim in defendants’ patent is in substance identical with any claim in that of the plaintiff. ®

The specification of plaintiff’s patent states:

“This invention relates to weE points and particularly to casings adapted for use in wells, the same being of a sectional type and provided with means whereby they are bound together in a manner to afford1 means of communication between the external and internal surfaces of the said easings at the joints, means being provided for permitting Equid to find its way to the passages of the joints while at the same time preventing the accumulation of foreign substances, such as gravel, dirt, and the like, into the ducts or passages or in the interior of the easing.
“A further object of this invention is to provide means for holding the sections of the casing in spaced relation to each other and provide a bearing whereby one may be supported on the other, while they are, at the same time, bound together, as stated.”

The claims of plaintiff’s patent are two, and as follows:

“1.

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Bluebook (online)
14 F.2d 274, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-well-co-v-kirschke-concrete-well-co-ca8-1926.