Kelly v. Turner

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedApril 25, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-00247
StatusUnknown

This text of Kelly v. Turner (Kelly v. Turner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelly v. Turner, (D. Or. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

In re the Application of Case No. 3:25-cv-247-SI TIMOTHY R. KELLY, FINDINGS OF FACT AND Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

and

CHRISTINA ASHLEY TURNER,

Respondent.

Leonard Williamson, LEONARD WARREN WILLIAMSON P.C., 1900 Hines Street SE, Suite 211, Salem, OR 97302; and Andrew M. Bonderud, THE BONDERUD LAW FIRM, P.A., 2130 Riverside Avenue, Jacksonville, FL 32204. Of Attorneys for Petitioner.

Sarah J. Crooks, Michael McCullough, and Justin J. Richter, PERKINS COIE, LLP, 1120 NW Couch Street, 10th Floor, Portland, OR 97209. Of Attorneys for Respondent.

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

Timothy R. Kelly (“Kelly”) filed a Verified Petition for Return of Child to Habitual Residence (“Petition for Return”) under the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Convention”). Kelly requested the return to Mexico of his 27- month-old daughter (“MKK”). Kelly asserts that his former partner, who is the mother of MKK, Christina Ashley Turner (“Turner”), took MKK from Mexico to the United States in June 2024, in violation of Kelly’s parental and custodial rights and in violation of the Convention. The Convention mandates that a child wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence” must be returned to that country unless, as relevant here, the return would pose a grave risk of harm to the child or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. Kelly argues that MKK’s country of habitual residence is Mexico and that under the Convention the Court must immediately order MKK’s return to Mexico.

Turner responds that Kelly fails to meet his prima facie burden under the Convention. Turner also argues that under Article 13(b) of the Convention, returning MKK to Mexico would create a grave risk of exposing her to “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place [MKK] in an intolerable situation.” The Court held an expedited evidentiary hearing on March 27 and 28, 2025, at which both parties testified, presented exhibits, and provided testimony of other witnesses.1 The Court also permitted the parties to file post-hearing briefs and response briefs. Considering the evidence and arguments presented in the Court filings and at the evidentiary hearing, the Court DENIES the Petition for Return. The evidence presented shows that returning MKK to Mexico would present a grave risk of exposing her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation.2

1 Kelly called the following witnesses: himself; Charlene Shaver, a former neighbor in Mexico, who testified by video; and Christian Audova, a former client, who testified by video. Turner called the following witnesses: herself; Saul Martinez, a former neighbor in Mexico, who testified by video; and Samantha Narducci, Turner’s sister. 2 In considering whether returning MKK to Mexico poses a grave risk of danger, the Court evaluates “the degree of harm that could occur . . . . during the period necessary to obtain a custody determination.” Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666 (2022); see also In re ICJ, 13 F.4th 753, 765 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that the question for the “grave risk” analysis is whether the child would face the grave risk while the courts in the home country would “make a custody determination” (quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Golan, 596 U.S. 666. The Court does not consider general issues of child custody or what would make MKK most happy. See Conv. Art. 19 (instructing courts resolving a petition under the Convention not to make “a determination on the merits of any custody issue”); Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1035 (“[T]he exception FINDINGS OF FACT The Court makes these findings of fact based on the exhibits submitted and the testimony presented at trial. Both parties agreed to substantially relax the rules of evidence. See 22 U.S.C. § 9005 (“With respect to any application to the United State Central Authority, or any petition to a court under section 9003 of this title, which seeks relief under the Convention, or any other

documents or information included with such application or petition or provided after such submission which relates to the application or petition, as the case may be, no authentication of such application, petition, document, or information shall be required in order for the application, petition, document, or information to be admissible in court.”); see also Farr v. Kendrick, 2019 WL 2568843, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2019) (“Rule 1101(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the Rules of Evidence ‘do not apply’ to ‘miscellaneous proceedings such as . . . extradition and rendition,’ and [a Hague Convention] proceeding is—in the Court’s view— similar to an extradition proceeding.”), aff’d, 824 F. App’x 480 (9th Cir. 2020); Nisbet v. Bridger, 2023 WL 6998081, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 24, 2023) (“Nisbet I”) (“Like the Farr court, this Court concluded that the most expeditious procedure, particularly given Petitioner’s confinement

abroad, would be ‘to apply a relaxed admissibility standard during the hearing and then discount the evidentiary value of any dubious evidence during the fact-finding process.’” (quoting Farr, 2019 WL 2568843, at *2)), aff’d, 124 F.4th 577 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Nisbet II”). The Court accepted all exhibits that were submitted and will discount the evidentiary value of any dubious evidence during the fact-finding process. The Court finds the ultimate issue

for grave harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest.” (alteration in original) (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996)). of the grave risk defense by clear and convincing evidence and all other facts by a preponderance of the evidence. A. Credibility Determinations “Where based in whole or in part on a witness’s testimony, the Court’s findings reflect credibility determinations based on its assessment of, inter alia, the relevant witness’s demeanor,

bias, and the extent to which the testimony was inherently logical and consistent with the testimony of other witnesses and relevant documentary evidence.” See Swett v. Bowe, 733 F. Supp. 3d 225, 243 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. Urquieta v. Bowe, 120 F.4th 335 (2d Cir. 2024). The Court finds that Kelly’s other witnesses were generally credible, although not particularly relevant. Ms. Shaver testified regarding a short period of time in which Kelly and Turner lived in the same neighborhood, and that they appeared happy. She noted that the longest period of time she spent with them was a barbeque that she hosted. When asked if she had the type of relationship with Turner that Ms. Shaver would expect Turner to confide in her about domestic violence, Ms. Shaver pointed out that they had a substantial age difference, talked with one another mostly about Turner’s artwork, and were not “best buddies.” She also testified that

she did not speak with either Kelly or Turner after they moved out of Eve’s Garden, when MKK was about six months old, until Kelly notified her about the breakup. Mr. Audova testified that he had no information about Kelly and Turner’s relationship. Turner’s other witnesses also were generally credible, and they provided more relevant information. Mr.

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Kelly v. Turner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-turner-ord-2025.