Kelly v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.

53 N.W.2d 651, 333 Mich. 629, 1952 Mich. LEXIS 520
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 2, 1952
DocketDocket 71, Calendar 45,444
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 53 N.W.2d 651 (Kelly v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelly v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 53 N.W.2d 651, 333 Mich. 629, 1952 Mich. LEXIS 520 (Mich. 1952).

Opinion

Reid, J.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries received by her by reason of slipping on a damp spot on the floor of defendant’s store, and falling, so that her back was injured. A verdict for $12,000 was rendered for plaintiff by a jury. Prom judgment had thereon, defendant appeals.

Defendant operates a serve-self grocery, vegetable and meat store in Escanaba, Michigan. On Thursday, August 25, 1949, a 3-ounce glass jar of olives fell or was knocked off a shelf in defendant’s store onto the floor of an aisle leading from the front entrance of the store back to the meat counter. The glass jar broke and the contents, half olives and half juice, spilled onto the floor at a place about 20 to 25 feet from the front entrance. The floor was a mottled dark green asphalt tile. Ronald Moras, a 22-year-old employee of defendant, went immediately to the scene and swept the olives and broken glass into a cardboard box, took the debris to a back room and immediately returned with a mop and mopped up the rest of the fluid, leaving a damp spot about 3 or 4 feet in area. There were no pools of *631 water or fluid and the damp spot was visible. Moras then went again to the back room, picked up a dry mop and “went right back” to dry up the damp spot. The plaintiff testified that as she walked from the front of the store, the aisle was clear and she saw nothing in the aisle and there were no people in the aisle. Witness Moras testified that in general his instructions were to put up a barricade or box to warn people, i.e., of a dangerous condition of the floor.

Mr. John Ryan, the manager of the defendant’s store, was within 30 or 40 feet of the place of the accident, heard the crash of the jar of olives when it struck the floor, walked over there, saw the damage that was done, watched Moras clean up the olives, glass, et cetera, and took the label that was on the broken jar of olives. The store is 100 feet long and 70 feet wide,- the mops are located in the north part of the store, north 50 feet and east 25 or 30 feet from the place of the accident. Mr. Ryan stayed at the spot in question while Moras cleaned up the glass and after removing the label from the broken glass, went about his business.

Before Moras returned with the dry mop, plaintiff came to the damp spot, slipped, both her feet went out from under her, and she fell on her back.

Ryan testified that he examined the spot after ■plaintiff had left the spot. The spot was damp, not •slippery.

There is no showing that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

Defendant argues with considerable force that the •defendant moved with fair and reasonable diligence to remedy the condition caused by the fall and breaking of the glass jar of olives. Defendant is not shown to have been at fault as to the breaking of the glass container and is not an insurer of the safe *632 ty of patrons; It would take an ordinarily prudent and careful person some little time to remedy the condition.

Defendant’s employee, Moras, testified, “I knew it was slippery,” referring to the spot in question and referring apparently to the time when he first returned after carrying out the olives. Negligence of defendant could only be found on the proposition that Moras, who was left by the manager Ryan in charge of the cleanup operations, knew that the spot had not been sufficiently cleaned up when he left to get the second mop, but left the spot unguarded either by a person in charge, or by barricade, while he went after the second móp. The round trip for the second mop required Moras to travel 75 feet each way, a total of 150-feet. Plaintiff was not in sight when Moras left to obtain the second mop; she had fallen before he returned. There was some foundation for the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of negligence, even though it is easier to come to that conclusion after the accident occurred, than it would have been before plaintiff fell, viewing the situation as things would occur to the mind of an ordinarily prudent person. The jury could well have found that even with the damp spot remaining after the first mopping, the aisle was reasonably safe for the public to use.

Plaintiff testified that when she fell she did not try to arise, that a store clerk came to assist her; that someone brought a box on which she sat 5 or 7 minutes; that Mr. Ryan came and said he would get a doctor and wanted her to go to a hospital, but she refused and said she wanted to go home first; that several men assisted her to an automobile, which took her to her home at the residence of Father Thompson where she was staying permanently as assisting housekeeper; after her- arrival at Father *633 Thompson’s residence, Mrs. Clara Potvin, the housekeeper, tried to get plaintiff to lie on a couch, but she couldn’t lie down; an overstuffed chair was brought; Mr. Rodman brought boards and took the mattress from the bed and put the boards on the springs and plaintiff tried to lie like that, but couldn’t lie on a soft bed. Two days later, and on Saturday, August 27th, she went to a hospital and there Dr. LeMire attended, her. Plaintiff remained in the hospital a week and had to sit in a chair all the time. Plaintiff testified that her meals had to be brought to her in her bedroom all winter and that she suffered pain all the time, and especially when she moved; she got up 3 or 4 times during the night and Mrs. Potvin assisted her; that she wears a corset and never, leaves it off, because she feels the corset helps her. Mrs. Potvin testified that the mattress was put back on her bed in March. Plaintiff says she sleeps on the boards yet.

Dr. William A. LeMire, plaintiff’s attending physician, sworn as a witness for plaintiff, testified that he examined plaintiff August 27, 1949, 2 days after the accident, and that there was a muscular spasm in the lumbar group of muscles, and tenderness' along the spine and lower back region. He further testified:

“I had her confined to St. Francis hospital in Escanaba on September 2, 1949. X-rays were taken at that time. The X-rays showed a compressed fracture of the first lumbar vertebra with fracture of the anterior lip which more than likely is a fracture through an arthritic spur, increase in the intervertebral space between the first and twelfth lumbar vertebrae; there is shortening in the length of the anterior body of the first lumbar, shortening in the twelfth lumbar showing slight compression of the thoracic vertebrae and compressed fracture of the first lumbar vertebra. A compressed fracture is when *634 part of the vertabra is crushed down, due to pressure. The X-rays taken from the anterior-posterior view, show a compression in the first lumbar vertebra and twelfth thoracic vertebra. Exhibit 5 is an anterior-posterior view showing a compression in the first lumbar and twelfth thoracic vertebrae. On. December 7th, the X-rays again showed our depressed or compressed fracture of the first lumbar vertebra. The twelfth shows healing; the first lumbar shows healing; but we still have our shortening in the distance between the anterior body of the first lumbar as compared with the second lumbar and the eleventh thoracic. The shortening here. This body here is compressed as compared with this one. And the distance.

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Bluebook (online)
53 N.W.2d 651, 333 Mich. 629, 1952 Mich. LEXIS 520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-red-owl-stores-inc-mich-1952.