Kelly v. Planning & Zoning Commission

Connecticut Appellate Court

Kelly v. Planning & Zoning Commission

537 A.2d 509, 13 Conn. App. 446, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 52

CourtConnecticut Appellate Court

DecidedFebruary 16, 1988

Docket5652

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 537 A.2d 509 (Kelly v. Planning & Zoning Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kelly v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 537 A.2d 509, 13 Conn. App. 446, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The defendants appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal from a decision of the defendant Hamden planning and zoning commission (commission), granting the applications of the defendant, C.M.C. Development, Inc. (C.M.C.). We find error.

On September 20, 1984, the Hamden zoning board of appeals (board) granted a variance which allowed construction of multi-family dwellings by C.M.C. Notice of the hearing and the board’s decision granting the variance was published as required. No appeal was taken from the granting of this variance. On December 10,1985, the commission approved C.M.C.’s applications for a special permit, site plan approval and for an aquifer protection zone permit, on the basis of the variance granted by the board in September of 1984.

The plaintiffs appealed this action of the commission and therein attacked the validity of the variance granted by the board on the ground that they had not been given supplementary notice by mail as required under the Hamden zoning regulations. The trial court found that notice was not given as required, and further found that the validating provisions of Special Acts 1985, No. 47¹ did not apply. The court entered judgment accordingly, sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal.

The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in not giving efficacy to Special Acts 1985, No. 47. We find that it did.

[448]*448This appeal is controlled by the holding of Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 421, 426, 518 A.2d 49 (1986). There is nothing in the present case to indicate that the legislative body did not have the right to prospectively alter a procedural requirement, or that the enactment’s retroactive application would “unjustly abrogate vested rights.” Id., citing Enfield Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bissell, 184 Conn. 569, 572, 440 A.2d 220 (1981); Connecticut State Employees Assn., Inc. v. Connecticut Personnel Policy Board, 165 Conn. 448, 454, 334 A.2d 909 (1973); Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 186-87, 198 A. 746 (1938); 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986) § 41.05.

There is error, the judgment sustaining' the appeal is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the appeal.

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Per Curiam.

The defendants appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal from a decision of the defendant Hamden planning and zoning commission (commission), granting the applications of the defendant, C.M.C. Development, Inc. (C.M.C.). We find error.

On September 20, 1984, the Hamden zoning board of appeals (board) granted a variance which allowed construction of multi-family dwellings by C.M.C. Notice of the hearing and the board’s decision granting the variance was published as required. No appeal was taken from the granting of this variance. On December 10,1985, the commission approved C.M.C.’s applications for a special permit, site plan approval and for an aquifer protection zone permit, on the basis of the variance granted by the board in September of 1984.

The plaintiffs appealed this action of the commission and therein attacked the validity of the variance granted by the board on the ground that they had not been given supplementary notice by mail as required under the Hamden zoning regulations. The trial court found that notice was not given as required, and further found that the validating provisions of Special Acts 1985, No. 47¹ did not apply. The court entered judgment accordingly, sustaining the plaintiffs’ appeal.

The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in not giving efficacy to Special Acts 1985, No. 47. We find that it did.

[448]*448This appeal is controlled by the holding of Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 421, 426, 518 A.2d 49 (1986). There is nothing in the present case to indicate that the legislative body did not have the right to prospectively alter a procedural requirement, or that the enactment’s retroactive application would “unjustly abrogate vested rights.” Id., citing Enfield Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bissell, 184 Conn. 569, 572, 440 A.2d 220 (1981); Connecticut State Employees Assn., Inc. v. Connecticut Personnel Policy Board, 165 Conn. 448, 454, 334 A.2d 909 (1973); Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 186-87, 198 A. 746 (1938); 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986) § 41.05.

There is error, the judgment sustaining' the appeal is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the appeal.

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Bluebook (online)

537 A.2d 509, 13 Conn. App. 446, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-planning-zoning-commission-connappct-1988.

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