Kelly v. Georgia

68 F. 652, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedMay 30, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 68 F. 652 (Kelly v. Georgia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelly v. Georgia, 68 F. 652, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122 (S.D. Ga. 1895).

Opinion

SPEEK, District Judge

(orally). T regret that anything has been said in the argument of this case which tends to take it out of the category of ordinary judicial investigation. Tt is in that view that the court considers if. It is true that, pending the trial, there has been some bitterness of publication, with regard to the action of the court in granting the writ, and some bitterness of denunciation of the officers, but. in the main the cause has been trea ted fairly by the press, and if it has been treated unfairly in any particular, it will be no more proper to hold fair journalism responsible than it would be to hold the good people of Telfair county responsible for the character a,nd conduct of such a man as Lhe evidence demonstrates Lucius Williams to have been. I am here to obey the law of my country. That commands the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, when applied for by any person who is in custody “for an act; done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or a judge thereof.” That is announced in section 753 of the Revised statutes, and is an epitome of the law upon the subject, from the 24th day of September, 1789, down to a very recent date. When the writ is issued, the duty of the judge is marked out with equal clearness. “The court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require.” Section 7(51, Rev. Hr.

Now, that is the law; and it is not only law, but it is the paramount law. Not only is it declared to be paramount law by the constitution of the United Htates, which of course every intelligent mind concedes is controlling upon the action of the court, but it is the law as stated in the initial paragraph of that admirable codification, the Code of Georgia. Section 1 declares: The laws of general operation of this state are “as the supreme law, the constitution of the United States, the la,ws of the United States in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States.” In subordination to this supreme law are the laws of the state of Georgia, first as expressed by its constitution, and then asJ expressed by its statutory enactments not in conflict with its constitution. It appears, then, unquestionably, that I am acting in obedience to law. Well, am I acting in accordance with the formal procedure of the law? There is no doubt about that. The decisions of the supreme court, from an early period in the history of our country, and a multitude of decisions of the circuit and district courts of the United States, have approved and sanctioned the precise proceeding we have before us. These questions have been already passed upon and decided here in a ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction and demurrer interposed in the progress of the case, and therefore it is not necessary to state them more elaborately at this time. I will, however, call the attention of counsel to the fact that,the authority of the United States is not re[654]*654stricted, as they supposed, to dockyards, arsenals, and the like, but the sovereignty of this nation extends to every foot of its soil. This has been so repeatedly and so lucidly stated by the courts of highest authority that the informed lawyer can no longer doubt it. In the. case of Ex parte Siebold, 100 IT. S. 371, Justice Bradley, in rendering the opinion of the court, declares:

“Here, again, we are met with the theory that the government of the United States does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of That government. We hold it to he an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United States, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, executes on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the.power to keep the peace to that extent. This power to enforce its laws, and to execute its functions in all places, does not derogate from the power of the state to execute its laws at the same time and in the same places. The one does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be executed at the same time. In that ease the words of the constitution itself show-which is to yield: ‘This constitution and all laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land.’ Without the concurrent sovereignty referred to, the national government would be nothing but an advisory government. Its executive power would be absolutely nullified. Why do we have marshals at all if they cannot ifiiysically lay their hands on persons and things in the performance of their proper duties? What functions can they perform if they cannot use force? In executing the processes of the courts, must they call on the nearest constable for protection? Must they rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and keep the peace, whilst they are soliciting and entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to'take its course? This is the necessary consequence of the positions that are assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on refining and refining, we shall drive the national government out of the United States, and relegate it to the District of Columbia, or, perhaps, to some foreign soil. We shall bring it back to a condition of greater helplessness than of the old confederation. It must execute its powers, or it is no government. It must execute them on the land as well as on the sea, on things as well as on persons. And, to do this, it must necessarily have power to command obedience, preserve order, and keep the peace, and no person or power in this lamí has the right to resist or question its authority so long as it keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction.”

That case is expressly approved by the court in the last case upon the subject (In re Neagle, reported in 135 TJ. S. 1,10 Sup. Ct. 658), and in summing up the argument in that case, Justice Miller, ior the court, said:

“It would seem as if the argument might close here. If the duty of the United States to protect its officers from violence, even to death, in discharge of the duties which its laws impose upon them, be established, and congress has made the habeas corpus one of the means by which this provision is made efficient, and if the facts of this case show that the prisoner was acting both under the law and the direction of his superior officers of the department of justice, we can see no reason why this writ should not be made to serve its purpose for the present case.”

Nor is there, as stated by counsel for the state, any dissent from this conclusion, even by those judges who are supposed by some to take a. more limited and literal view of the power vested in the United States by the constitution, and to attach more importance to the sovereignly of the states than do other judges who are more disposed to treat the implied powers of the constitution as operative [655]*655and effective. In the Case of Neagle, Justice Lamar and Chief Justice Fuller use this language in tlieir dissenting opinion, — language which indicates that these eminent jurists do not dissent from any question which affects the rights of these prisoners at the bar:

“Many of the propositions advanced on the behalf of the appellee, and urged with impressive force, we do not challenge.

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Bluebook (online)
68 F. 652, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-georgia-gasd-1895.