Kelly v. Coffer

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Kelly v. Coffer

256 S.E.2d 635, 150 Ga. App. 24, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2075

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMay 14, 1979

Docket57248, 57305

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 256 S.E.2d 635 (Kelly v. Coffer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kelly v. Coffer, 256 S.E.2d 635, 150 Ga. App. 24, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2075 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinion

Smith, Judge.

On a date prior to July 1, 1978, each appellant committed his third DUI offense within ten years. In accordance with Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1008, 1032 (prior Code § 68B-308 (a)), the Department of Public Safety determined each appellant to be a habitual violator and revoked his driver’s license. Hearing officers rejected appellants’ administrative appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s sustention of the department’s action.

Appellants contend the courts erred in failing to apply the changed version of Code § 68B-308 (a), which was effective at the time of the courts’ proceedings. The new section, which reads as follows, lessened by five years the time period relevant to license revocation for the habitual violator. "When the records of the department disclose that any person who has been convicted of a violation of Title 68 A or of a valid local ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, of an offense occurring on or after the effective date of this Title, which record of conviction, when taken with, and added to, the previous convictions of such person of offenses occurring within five years prior to the date of such offenses, as contained in the files of the department, shall reveal that said person is an habitual violator, as hereinafter defined in this section, the department shall forthwith notify such person that upon the date of notification such person has been declared by the department to be an habitual violator, and that hence forth it shall be unlawful for said habitual violator to operate a motor vehicle in this State.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1978, pp. 225, 226, eff. July 1, 1978. We must reject appellants’ contention, as it is contrary to the express legislative intent that the lesser time period be invoked only when the third (or fourth, etc.) offense takes place on or subsequent to July 1, 1978.

Judgments affirmed.

Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur. *25 J. Greg Wolinski, Paul E. Kauffmann, Lois Shingler, for appellant (Case No. 57248). Smith, Smith & Frost, Steven P. Gilliam, for appellant (Case No. 57305). Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnson, William B. Hill, Jr., Staff Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

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Smith, Judge.

On a date prior to July 1, 1978, each appellant committed his third DUI offense within ten years. In accordance with Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1008, 1032 (prior Code § 68B-308 (a)), the Department of Public Safety determined each appellant to be a habitual violator and revoked his driver’s license. Hearing officers rejected appellants’ administrative appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s sustention of the department’s action.

Appellants contend the courts erred in failing to apply the changed version of Code § 68B-308 (a), which was effective at the time of the courts’ proceedings. The new section, which reads as follows, lessened by five years the time period relevant to license revocation for the habitual violator. "When the records of the department disclose that any person who has been convicted of a violation of Title 68 A or of a valid local ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, of an offense occurring on or after the effective date of this Title, which record of conviction, when taken with, and added to, the previous convictions of such person of offenses occurring within five years prior to the date of such offenses, as contained in the files of the department, shall reveal that said person is an habitual violator, as hereinafter defined in this section, the department shall forthwith notify such person that upon the date of notification such person has been declared by the department to be an habitual violator, and that hence forth it shall be unlawful for said habitual violator to operate a motor vehicle in this State.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1978, pp. 225, 226, eff. July 1, 1978. We must reject appellants’ contention, as it is contrary to the express legislative intent that the lesser time period be invoked only when the third (or fourth, etc.) offense takes place on or subsequent to July 1, 1978.

Judgments affirmed.

Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur. *25 J. Greg Wolinski, Paul E. Kauffmann, Lois Shingler, for appellant (Case No. 57248). Smith, Smith & Frost, Steven P. Gilliam, for appellant (Case No. 57305). Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnson, William B. Hill, Jr., Staff Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

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256 S.E.2d 635, 150 Ga. App. 24, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-coffer-gactapp-1979.

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