Kelly Street Block Ass'n v. Thompson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Kelly Street Block Ass'n v. Thompson

64 A.D.2d 597, 407 N.Y.S.2d 158, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12352

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 20, 1978

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 64 A.D.2d 597 (Kelly Street Block Ass'n v. Thompson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kelly Street Block Ass'n v. Thompson, 64 A.D.2d 597, 407 N.Y.S.2d 158, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12352 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered on November 14, 1977, which granted defendants-respondents’ (Edward Thompson, as Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, and Benjamin Nolan, as Judge in Charge, Civil Court of the City of New York) motion to dismiss the action and denied plaintiffs-appellants’ cross motion for summary judgment and motion seeking leave to serve and file a supplemental complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. Although defendant Thompson, as the Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, was fully authorized and empowered to administer that court, his authority extends only to matters of administration and he may not issue rules affecting substantive rights of parties to Civil Court proceedings. It does not appear to us that Directives 255, 276 and Memo J-3 were intended to impinge upon substantive rights or abrogate the discretion of the Judges of the Civil Court. These "directives” are hortatory rather than mandatory in form, they are guidelines, not calculated to interfere with the customary discretion accorded to Civil Court Judges. Accordingly, said directives are not to be deemed a limitation of the judicial discretion to be exercised by each Judge in each case according to its particular merits. Concur—Silverman, J. P., Evans, Fein, Lane and Sandler, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered on November 14, 1977, which granted defendants-respondents’ (Edward Thompson, as Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, and Benjamin Nolan, as Judge in Charge, Civil Court of the City of New York) motion to dismiss the action and denied plaintiffs-appellants’ cross motion for summary judgment and motion seeking leave to serve and file a supplemental complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. Although defendant Thompson, as the Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, was fully authorized and empowered to administer that court, his authority extends only to matters of administration and he may not issue rules affecting substantive rights of parties to Civil Court proceedings. It does not appear to us that Directives 255, 276 and Memo J-3 were intended to impinge upon substantive rights or abrogate the discretion of the Judges of the Civil Court. These "directives” are hortatory rather than mandatory in form, they are guidelines, not calculated to interfere with the customary discretion accorded to Civil Court Judges. Accordingly, said directives are not to be deemed a limitation of the judicial discretion to be exercised by each Judge in each case according to its particular merits. Concur—Silverman, J. P., Evans, Fein, Lane and Sandler, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

64 A.D.2d 597, 407 N.Y.S.2d 158, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-street-block-assn-v-thompson-nyappdiv-1978.

Opinion

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