Kelly Porter v. Axelon, Inc.
This text of Kelly Porter v. Axelon, Inc. (Kelly Porter v. Axelon, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: MAY 2, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1030-WC
KELLY PORTER APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION v. OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD ACTION NO. WC-17-85945
AXELON, INC.; JOHN JACQUEMIN; HONORABLE JONATHAN WEATHERBY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; KAREM AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Kelly Porter (Appellant) appeals from an opinion
and order of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board) dismissing an appeal
from a January 22, 2024 order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Hon.
Jonathan R. Weatherby. The ALJ granted the motion of Appellant’s attorney, Hon. Alex Berger, for attorney fees. After careful review, we find no error and
affirm the opinion and order of the Board.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 21, 2021, the ALJ determined that Appellant sustained a
work-related back injury on March 27, 2017, while in the employment of Axelon,
Inc. (Appellee). It awarded Appellant total temporary disability benefits,
permanent partial disability benefits, and medical benefits. The ALJ rendered
amended opinions and awards on May 13, 2021, and June 2, 2021. On appeal, the
Board affirmed in part the second amended opinion and award, and remanded the
matter to the ALJ for consideration of the two-multiplier. Neither party appealed
from the decision of the Board and the matter was returned to the ALJ for
recalculation of post-injury wages.
On remand, the ALJ entered an opinion and award on January 6,
2022, concluding that Appellant was entitled to application of the two-multiplier.
Both parties petitioned for reconsideration. On February 18, 2022, the ALJ issued
additional findings of fact to support its conclusion that Appellant was entitled to
the application of the two-multiplier. Appellee appealed to the Board.
On appeal, the Board vacated the ALJ’s determination concerning the
application of the two-multiplier and remanded with directions to recalculate
Appellant’s post-injury wages. Neither party sought further review. On remand,
-2- the ALJ entered an opinion and award on August 16, 2022, recalculating
Appellant’s post-injury wages under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
342.140(1)(d). The ALJ further concluded the two-multiplier did not apply
because Appellant did not return to work at the same or greater wages as the pre-
injury amount. Neither party filed a petition for reconsideration. On September
15, 2022, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to approve his attorney’s fee pursuant
to KRS 342.320.
Appellant did not timely appeal. On September 16, 2022, Appellant,
pro se, mailed a request for an extension of time to file an appeal to the Board,
which was received on September 19, 2022. Appellee filed a response in
opposition to the motion. The Board subsequently entered an opinion and order
dismissing Appellant’s appeal as untimely. Appellant appealed to a panel of this
Court, then to the Kentucky Supreme Court, each of which affirmed.
After finality of that appeal, the Board remanded the matter to the
ALJ for consideration of Berger’s amended attorney fees motion. The ALJ granted
the motion by way of order rendered on January 22, 2024. Appellant objected to
the award of attorney fees by way of a motion filed on January 26, 2024. That
motion was treated by the Chief ALJ (CALJ) as a petition for reconsideration. The
petition was overruled on February 8, 2024. Appellant filed another petition for
reconsideration, which again was overruled.
-3- On February 22, 2024, Appellant, still proceeding pro se, appealed the
January 22, 2024 award of attorney fees to the Board. The appeal was held in
abeyance pending Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
Thereafter, the Board rendered an order directing Appellant to show
cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to name an
indispensable party, i.e., attorney Berger. Appellant responded on July 18, 2024.
On July 26, 2024, the Board rendered an opinion and order dismissing the appeal
based on Appellant’s failure to name Berger. This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Board erred in dismissing his appeal of the
ALJ’s award of attorney fees.1 The focus of his argument is that the ALJ
improperly awarded attorney fees while Appellant’s action before the United
States Supreme Court had reached finality. He asserts that Berger wrongfully
abandoned him by withdrawing from representation; that the ALJ erred in denying
1 Appellant’s Petition for Review, which he styled as a “Notice of Appeal,” does not conform to Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 49 addressing appeals from decisions of the Board. In the interest of judicial economy, we will ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review. Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010).
-4- Appellant’s motion for reconsideration on this issue; and, that the Board erred in
failing to so rule.2
In workers’ compensation proceedings, the ALJ may award attorney
fees. KRS 342.320(1). “In approving an allowance of attorney’s fees, the
administrative law judge shall consider the extent, complexity, and quality of
services rendered[.]” KRS 342.320(3). “No attorney’s fee in any case involving
benefits under this chapter shall be paid until the fee is approved by the
administrative law judge[.]” KRS 342.320(4).
It is well-established that where attorney fees are awarded in a
workers’ compensation proceeding, and an issue arises on appeal as to the
propriety of the award, the attorney is a necessary party to the appeal. Peabody
Coal Co. v. Goforth, 857 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Ky. 1993). Further, 803 KAR3 25:010
§ 22(2)(c)2. requires that, on appeal to the Board, an appellant shall “[d]enote all
parties against whom the appeal is taken as respondents[.]” The failure to name an
indispensable party is considered a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 19.02.
2 Appellee Axelon, Inc. has filed a responsive brief, but takes no position on the issue raised in Appellant’s Notice of Appeal. 3 Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
-5- CONCLUSION
The Board dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the ALJ’s award of
attorney fees because Appellant failed to name Berger as a party to the appeal.
Berger, as attorney of record who moved for an award of attorney fees for his
representation of Appellant, was an indispensable party to that appeal. Per the
relevant provisions of the KRS, the KAR, and Peabody Coal Co., supra, the Board
properly dismissed the appeal. We find no error. For these reasons, we affirm the
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