Kelly Patterson v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00539
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Kelly Patterson, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00539-JAD-DJA 4 Plaintiff v. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for 5 Reconsideration Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 6 et al., [ECF No. 153] 7 Defendants 8 Plaintiff Kelly Patterson sues the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and officer 9 Salim Salazar after he was arrested for failing to identify himself to Salazar’s satisfaction during 10 a traffic stop. Patterson has maintained throughout this lawsuit that Nevada’s stop-and-identify 11 statute, NRS 171.123(3), has been definitively interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court to 12 permit an officer to ask only for a suspect’s name, so arresting a suspect for refusing to identify 13 himself through other means like a date of birth or social security number would be a violation of 14 the law. At summary judgment I concluded otherwise, finding that the Nevada and United States 15 Supreme Court’s opinions analyzing NRS 171.123(3) did not so limit the statute and that asking 16 for more identifying information so that an officer can find a suspect in Metro’s police database 17 does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 18 Patterson seeks reconsideration of that conclusion. He argues that the Nevada Supreme 19 Court did narrow the scope of NRS 171.123(3) in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court,1 20 pointing to statements made in the state’s appellate brief and at oral argument before the United 21 States Supreme Court as support. Metro responds that Patterson has not shown that this court 22 committed clear error or that any newly discovered evidence or change in controlling law 23 1 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d. 1201 (Nev. 2002). 1 warrants reconsideration. Because Patterson merely regurgitates his prior arguments and relies 2 on unpersuasive evidence, I deny his motion. 3 Discussion 4 A district court “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or 5 modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient[,]” so long as it still has

6 jurisdiction.2 This court’s local rule 59-1 contemplates reconsideration of an interlocutory order 7 if “(1) there is newly discovered evidence that was not available when the original motion or 8 response was filed, (2) the court committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly 9 unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.”3 The rule cautions that 10 “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored,” and “[a] movant must not repeat arguments 11 already presented unless (and only to the extent) necessary to explain controlling, intervening 12 law or to argue new facts. A movant who repeats arguments will be subject to appropriate 13 sanctions.”4 “A motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and 14 arguments upon which the court already has ruled,”5 and it may not be based on arguments or

15 evidence that could have been raised previously.6 16 17 2 City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 18 2001) (quotation and emphasis omitted); see also Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013); LR 59-1. 19 3 L.R. 59-1(a). Patterson moves for reconsideration under this rule. See ECF No. 153 at 1. 20 4 L.R. 59-1(b). See also Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). While the Ninth Circuit has not established a standard of review for motions to reconsider 21 interlocutory orders like this one, district courts frequently apply the standard applicable to FRCP 59(e) motions to reconsider final judgments. See In re Intel Corp. CPU Mktg., Sales 22 Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 614 F. Supp. 3d 783, 788 (D. Or. 2022), aff’d, 2023 WL 7211394 (9th Cir. 2023) (collecting authorities). 23 5 Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev. 2005). 6 See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 1 Patterson contends that this court was “not aware of—or [] overlooked—important facts 2 and law when it held that ‘the Nevada Supreme Court didn’t definitively interpret NRS 3 171.123(3) to require only a name.”7 He points to two documents (the State of Nevada’s brief in 4 opposition to the appellant’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 5 in Hiibel, and a transcript of the oral argument in that case) to show that the State argued in its

6 arguments before the United States Supreme Court that NRS 171.123(3) only requires a name. 7 Patterson’s motion is unpersuasive for several reasons. 8 First, Patterson challenges only one sentence of my order: “the Nevada Supreme Court 9 didn’t definitively interpret NRS 171.123(3) to require only a name.”8 Patterson’s reliance on 10 arguments made before the United States Supreme Court have no bearing on whether the Nevada 11 Supreme Court definitively interpreted NRS 171.123(3) in any particular way. Second, the 12 parties’ arguments to the United States Supreme Court do not dictate what that Court actually 13 held, and Patterson does not seek reconsideration of the detailed analysis of the Hiibel opinions 14 that supported my conclusion. Third, whether the Nevada Supreme Court definitively

15 interpreted NRS 171.123(3) to require only a name doesn’t have any impact on whether Metro’s 16 actions in this case violated the Fourth Amendment because the opinions of state supreme courts 17 are not binding when it comes to issues of federal constitutional law.9 Finally, Patterson hasn’t 18 19 7 ECF No. 153 at 1. 20 8 Id. at 3. In his reply, Patterson raises new arguments and a new request to certify the question of NRS 171.123(3)’s scope to the Nevada Supreme Court. I decline to consider arguments and 21 requests raised for the first time in reply. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” 22 (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003))). 9 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that “while [s]tates are free to regulate 23 . . . arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections”). explained—at any point in this action—why the Nevada Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 2\|law has any bearing on the constitutional questions raised in his complaint. So Patterson’s motion and evidence do not show that this court committed clear error when it ruled that NRS 171.123(3) could be interpreted to allow an officer to seek identifying information beyond just a name and that such an interpretation does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. 6 Patterson’s newly presented evidence is also not new—the brief and transcript Patterson relies on were available in 2003 and 2004. Nor does the evidence present any change in controlling law. So because Patterson has not shown that this court committed clear error or that 9]| it must consider new or changed law, I deny his motion for reconsideration. 10 Conclusion 11 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Kelly Patterson’s motion for reconsideration [ECF No. 153] is DENIED.

U.S. District Judge Tdanifer A. Dorsey 14 DéGember 5, 2025 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23