Kelly Maureen Silva, et al. v. Ford Motor Company, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 9, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03674
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KELLY MAUREEN SILVA, et al., No. 2:24-cv-03674-DJC-SJR 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 This is a lemon law case involving an allegedly defective 2019 Ford Fiesta. 19 Plaintiffs Kelly and Lauren Silva sued Defendant Ford Motor Company under 20 California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. After more than a year of litigation, 21 the parties settled. Plaintiffs now move for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. (ECF 22 No. 21.) For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted in part and 23 denied in part. 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 BACKGROUND 2 On June 28, 2022, Plaintiffs purchased a 2019 Ford Fiesta. (Compl. (ECF No. 1- 3 1) ¶ 8.) The vehicle allegedly presented with various defects, and after multiple 4 attempts at repair, Ford was unable to conform the vehicle to warranty. (Compl. 5 ¶¶ 22–24; Daghighian Decl. (ECF No. 21-1) ¶¶ 22–25.) Plaintiffs sent a demand letter 6 to Ford by certified mail on December 11, 2023, requesting that the vehicle be either 7 replaced or refunded. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 26; Douglas Decl. (ECF No. 23-1) ¶ 1.) In 8 response to the demand letter, Ford emailed Plaintiffs on December 20, 2023, called 9 on December 27, 28, and 29, 2023, and mailed a letter on December 29, 2023. 10 (Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) Ford did not receive any response from Plaintiffs. (Id.) 11 Thereafter, on January 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit in Solano County Superior Court, 12 alleging certain violations of the Song-Beverly Act. (See generally Compl.) After 13 nearly a year of litigation, Ford removed the action to this Court on December 23, 14 2024. (Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1).) Plaintiffs moved to remand, but before the 15 fully briefed motion could be heard, the parties settled. (Notice of Settlement (ECF 16 No. 16).) By the parties’ stipulation, the Court retained jurisdiction over the terms of 17 the settlement. (ECF Nos. 18, 19, 20, 22.) The parties also expressly agreed that 18 Plaintiffs, as prevailing party, could seek an award of reasonably incurred fees and 19 costs under California Civil Code section 1794(d) and that California law should apply. 20 (Notice of Settlement at 2.) Following attempts at informal resolution of the 21 outstanding fees, on July 30, 2025, Plaintiffs moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and 22 expenses. (Mot. (ECF No. 21).) Ford filed an opposition and Plaintiffs replied. (Opp’n 23 (ECF No. 23); Reply (ECF No. 24).) Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court finds this 24 matter suitable for resolution on the papers. 25 DISCUSSION 26 Under the Song-Beverly Act, Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., the prevailing party is 27 entitled to attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. Civil Code section 1794(d) provides 28 that: 1 If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the 2 judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual 3 time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the 4 commencement and prosecution of such action. 5 Civ. Code ¶ 1794(d). 6 Plaintiffs request $56,895.69 in attorneys’ fees and costs. In opposing the 7 motion, Ford first contends Plaintiffs acted in bad faith prior to litigation and are thus 8 not entitled to any attorneys’ fees. Ford alternatively asserts that the requested fees 9 should be reduced because the rates and hours claimed are unreasonable and that a 10 negative multiplier is warranted. The parties do not dispute the amount of costs. The 11 Court addresses each argument in turn. 12 I. Attorneys’ Fees 13 The lodestar method is typically used in determining reasonable attorneys’ 14 fees. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1996). The lodestar 15 calculation is the “product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.” Hensley v. 16 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); see also Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 17 1132 (2001). “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the 18 community; it may be adjusted by the court based on . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty 19 of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to 20 which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] 21 (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. The fee 22 applicant “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting 23 the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 24 A. Prompt Repurchase and/or Bad Faith 25 Before reaching the substance of the attorneys’ fees calculation, the Court first 26 addresses the alleged prelitigation actions taken by the parties. Ford asserts that 27 Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorneys’ fees because they acted in bad faith by 28 failing to respond to Ford’s attempts to communicate with them after Ford received 1 Plaintiffs’ initial buyback demand letter and, instead, prematurely filed suit a month 2 later. (Opp’n at 4–5.) Plaintiffs object that Ford failed to tender any buyback offer at 3 all during litigation. (See generally Reply.) 4 California Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2) lays out the manufacturer’s obligation 5 to “promptly” repurchase or replace a defective vehicle it is unable to repair. The 6 statute provides that if a manufacturer is unable to service or repair a new motor 7 vehicle to conform to its express warranties after a reasonable number of repair 8 attempts, “the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the . . . vehicle . . . or 9 promptly make restitution to the buyer.” Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2). Plaintiffs rely on 10 California appellate decisions Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 38 Cal. App. 11 4th (1995), and Lukather v. General Motors, LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1041 (2010), to 12 contend they had no obligation to request a buyback from Ford and, instead, Ford 13 had an affirmative duty to buy the vehicle back without their asking after repairs were 14 unsuccessful. (Reply at 4.) Thus, Plaintiffs argue, because Ford breached this duty 15 and failed to tender a buyback offer after conducting reasonable repairs on the Fiesta, 16 they were justified in filing a lawsuit. (Id.) 17 The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ characterization of Krotin and Lukather. At 18 least two district courts have declined to adopt the argument that these cases stand 19 for the proposition that manufacturers have an affirmative duty to offer to repurchase 20 a defective vehicle prior to a buyer’s repurchase demand.1 In Islas v. Ford Motor 21 Company, the court found that such an argument “read too much into Krotin and 22 Lukather” and that while a manufacturer may make a pre-demand offer on its own 23 initiative, it was not “require[ed] to do so before th[e consumer’s] prompting.” No. 18- 24

25 1 In Krotin, the court was analyzing the correctness of a single jury instruction pertaining to the buyer’s responsibilities in rejecting a vehicle under the Song-Beverly Act. 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 300 (1995). In 26 evaluating Krotin, the Islas court observed that such a limited issue “does not encompass the imposition or scope of any duty that might be imposed upon a manufacturer under Song-Beverly.” 2019 WL 27 10855294, at *6. In Gonzalez, the district court reinforced Islas’s point, observing that to find such an affirmative duty “is at odds with how the Song-Beverly Act is typically understood.” 2024 WL 5371341, 28 at * 4. The Gonzalez court thus held that there was no such affirmative duty. Id. 1 cv-2221-GW(SPx), 2019 WL 10855294, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2019). In Gonzalez v. 2 Volkswagen Group of America, the district court concurred with Islas, concluding that 3 manufacturers do not have an affirmative duty to offer a replacement vehicle or 4 repurchase prior to a consumer making such a request. No. 2:22-cv-06058-JLS-JC, 5 2024 WL 5371341, at * 4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2024). In line with this authority, the Court 6 declines to adopt Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Lukather and Krotin. 7 While there is no set timeframe for an offer to be prompt, California courts have 8 found that a manufacturer’s buyback offer made between 40 and 50 days after a 9 purchaser’s demand request is reasonably prompt. Carver v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 10 Inc., 107 Cal. App. 5th 864, 879–80 (2024) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiffs mailed 11 their buyback demand letter to Ford on December 12, 2023, and filed suit on 12 January 24, 2024. (Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 1–3.) This abbreviated timespan does indicate 13 that Plaintiffs did not allow sufficient time for Ford to submit a buyback offer before 14 filing suit, even as Ford was attempting to contact them about the demand letter. But 15 the record also demonstrates that Ford did not tender an offer even after litigation 16 commenced, that the parties engaged in more than a year of litigation, that Ford 17 elected to remove the case to federal court a few months before trial, and that Ford 18 agreed to settle the case on terms identifying Plaintiffs as the prevailing party. 19 Considering the entire record, Ford’s failure to tender any buyback offer undercuts 20 their prelitigation bad faith argument against Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court rejects 21 the argument and turns to the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees requested. 22 B. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees 23 Plaintiffs seek $37,230.00 for attorneys’ fees with a lodestar enhancement of 24 .5x, in the amount of $18,615.00, for a total amount of $55,845.00. (Mot. at 14.) Five 25 attorneys litigated this case on behalf of Plaintiffs and the chart below reflects the time 26 expended and the attorneys’ requested rates: 27 //// 28 //// 1 Attorney Years in Position Hours Proposed Total 2 Practice Billed Rate 3 Sepehr 19+ Partner 5.2 $625.00 $3,250.00 4 Daghighian 5 Alastair 13 Associate 32.0 $550.00 $17,600.00 6 Hamblin 7 Bill 5 Associate 26.7 $350.00 $9,345.00 8 Oppenheim 9 Miguel Ortiz 19 Associate 5.8 $525.00 $3,045.00 10 Michael 30+ Partner 5.7 $700.00 $3,990.00 11 Rosenstein 12 13 1. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates 14 The Court first determines whether the hourly rates requested by Plaintiffs’ 15 attorneys are reasonable. As previously noted, the California Supreme Court has 16 explained that “the lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the 17 community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant 18 herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in 19 presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other 20 employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum, 21 24 Cal. 4th at 1132 (internal citation omitted); see also Goglin v. BMW of N. Am., 4 Cal. 22 App. 5th 462, 470 (2016) (setting out factors) (citation omitted).2 Moreover, “the

23 2 Some courts in the Eastern District have declined to follow a community-based approach in 24 determining whether rates are reasonable under Song-Beverly Act. See, e.g., Heffington v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00317-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 5017610, at *6 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (distinguishing 25 forum-based framework used by federal courts from factors analysis under Goglin). However, in Ketchum, the California Supreme Court reasoned that “the lodestar was based on detailed 26 documentation by counsel and there was extensive litigation concerning the time spent and the prevailing hourly rate in the area for comparable services.” 24 Cal. 4th at 1140 (emphasis added). As 27 Ketchum remains good law, the undersigned evaluates reasonableness in part based on the community in which the case was litigated, that is, the Eastern District. See also Pulliam v. HNL Auto. Inc., 60 Cal. 28 App. 5th 396 (2021) (assessing market rates in the local community to determine lodestar). 1 contingency adjustment may be made at the lodestar phase of the court’s calculation 2 or by applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar calculation (but not both).” 3 Horsford v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395 (2005) (citation 4 omitted). 5 In support of their requested rates, Plaintiffs provide declarations by counsel, 6 the billing records, the 2019 United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Report, the 7 2021 Wolters Kluwer Real Rate Report, and several state and federal decisions in 8 comparable cases in Southern California in which Plaintiffs’ requested fees were 9 granted in whole or in large part. (See generally Daghighian Decl. and Exs. A–H.) In 10 opposition, Ford points to three state court decisions that applied a lower blended 11 rate of $350/hour for prevailing firms in Song-Beverly actions. (Douglas Decl. ¶¶ 10– 12 12 and Exs. K–M.) 13 Plaintiffs’ counsel explains that the hourly rates the firm charges are the same 14 for both contingent and noncontingent litigation. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs’ 15 counsel argues that Los Angeles rates should control, which is the metropolitan 16 community in which they practice, rather than local rates in the case venue. (Mot. at 17 16.) Plaintiffs rely on Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University for the 18 principle that because “financial incentives should attract attorneys who are sufficient 19 to the cause,” their out-of-town Los Angeles rates are reasonable. (Mot. at 17 (citing 20 132 Cal. App. 4th at 399.)) Horsford is distinguishable, however, as the plaintiff in that 21 case diligently and unsuccessfully sought local counsel before hiring a more 22 expensive San Francisco attorney to litigate significant claims involving racial 23 discrimination by a local public entity. In reversing the trial court in Horsford, the 24 California Court of Appeal explicitly highlighted plaintiff’s extensive efforts to secure 25 more affordable counsel and found that “in the absence of any realistic indication 26 plaintiff could find local counsel, it is an abuse of discretion to fail to consider an 27 hourly rate based on counsel’s ‘home’ market rate.” 132 Cal. App. 4th at 399; see also 28 Nichols v. City of Taft, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1243 (2007) (applying Horsford and 1 explaining “a court’s use of reasonable rates in the local community, as an integral part 2 of the initial lodestar equation, is one of the means of providing some objectivity to 3 the process of determining reasonable attorney fees.”) While a plaintiff’s threshold 4 showing of impracticability of obtaining local counsel is “not onerous,” Horsford, 132 5 Cal. App. 4th at 399, here, the record is silent regarding Plaintiffs’ efforts, if any, to 6 secure local counsel. Moreover, unlike in Horsford, a case involving weighty racial 7 discrimination claims, this case is a straightforward lemon law matter under the Song- 8 Beverly Act, which is “not complex and do[es] not require a significant amount of legal 9 analysis or novel pleading.” Meeks v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:22-cv-0761 JLT CDB, 2024 10 WL 4437098, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2024). Therefore, Horsford does not assist 11 Plaintiffs in establishing that their out-of-town rates are reasonable. 12 Considering all the evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested rates are 13 too high. The Southern California cases provided by Plaintiffs do not establish the 14 prevailing rate appropriate for Solano County or the Eastern District of California. 15 Several of Plaintiffs’ exhibits are decisions from the Central District, which includes Los 16 Angeles County, where the rates are higher. Because Plaintiffs “do[ ] not report that 17 local counsel was unwilling to prosecute [their] claims or are unavailable, rates from 18 outside the forum may not be applied.” Meeks, 2024 WL 4437098, at *5; see also 19 Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500–02 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the court’s decision to 20 decline to award out-of-district billing rates). 21 Recent awards of attorneys’ fees in the Eastern District range from $200 to 22 $750, with rates exceeding $600 reserved for attorneys who have practiced 23 approximately 30 years. See, e.g., Meeks, 2024 WL 4437098, at *8 (setting a range of 24 rates in lemon law action between $300 for 5–6 years of legal experience and $525 for 25 20+ years of legal experience); Owen v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 2:22-cv-00882-KJM- 26 CKD, 2024 WL 3967691, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2024) (collecting cases, and 27 finding the hourly rates in cases arising under the Song-Beverly Act range from $200 28 to approximately $600); Davis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:21-cv-0174-KJM- 1 KJN, 2022 WL 16529527, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022) (reducing rate in lemon law 2 action to $250 for attorneys who practiced law for less than ten years); Siafarikas v. 3 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-01784-JAM-AC, 2022 WL 16926265, at *3 (E.D. 4 Cal. Nov. 14, 2022) (approving rate in lemon law action of $250 for an attorney who 5 practiced law for three years and $500 for an attorney who practiced law for 21 years); 6 Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-cv-02797-TLN-CKD, 2022 WL 956949, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 7 2022) (observing that “$450 an hour [was] a reasonable rate for an attorney with 8 fifteen years of experience”); Garybo v. Leonardo Bros, No. 1:15-cv-01487-DAD-JLT, 9 2021 WL 449350, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2021) (adopting in class action the hourly 10 rate of $500 for attorneys admitted to practice for 20 years); Mostajo v. Nationwide 11 Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00350-DAD-AC, 2023 WL 2918657, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 12 2023) (approving of “hourly rates ranging from $650 through $750” for “attorneys with 13 over thirty years of experience” for purposes of calculating a lodestar in complex class 14 action); Seebach v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-00109-KJM AC, 2020 WL 15 4923664, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (setting rates of $200 for 1.5 years of legal 16 practice and $505 for 20 years of legal practice). Against this backdrop, Ford’s 17 requested blended rate of $350 per hour is too low. Accordingly, the hourly rates for 18 counsel will be adjusted to align with rates in the Eastern District. 19 Sephehr Daghighian’s rate is adjusted to $525 for his almost 20 years of legal 20 practice and his partner status; Michael Rosenstein’s rate is adjusted to $600 for his 30 21 years of legal practice and partner status; Alastair Hamblin’s rate is adjusted to $450 22 for his 13 years of legal practice; Bill Oppenheim’s rate is adjusted to $300 for his 5 23 years of legal practice; and Miguel Ortiz’s rate is adjusted to $500 for his almost 20 24 years of legal practice. The chart below reflects the Court’s adjustments: 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 Attorney Years in Position Adjusted 2 Practice Rate 3 Sepehr 19+ Partner $525.00 4 Daghighian 5 Alastair 13 Associate $450.00 6 Hamblin 7 Bill 5 Associate $300.00 8 Oppenheim 9 Miguel Ortiz 19 Associate $500.00 10 Michael 30+ Partner $600.00 11 Rosenstein 12 13 2. Reasonableness of Hours Expended 14 “A trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must 15 determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” Morris v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 16 41 Cal. App. 5th 24, 38 (2019) (citation omitted). In evaluating the fees, the trial court 17 should consider “whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys 18 spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” Id. 19 The court must exclude “duplicative or excessive” time from its fee award. Graciano v. 20 Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 161 (2006) (cleaned up); see also 21 Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132 (explaining “inefficient or duplicative efforts [are] not 22 subject to compensation”). 23 Ford requests the Court strike 24.5 hours from Plaintiffs’ invoice and raises 24 three objections to Plaintiffs’ billed hours. First, that Plaintiffs cannot recover fees 25 incurred to negotiate prevailing party language; second, that Plaintiffs cannot recover 26 fees incurred after Ford’s settlement offer; and third, that Plaintiffs cannot recover fees 27 for time spent drafting a motion to remand or conducting discovery. (Opp’n at 8–11.) 28 //// 1 i. Time Billed for Negotiating Prevailing Party Language 2 Ford contends that Plaintiffs’ fees incurred to negotiate prevailing party 3 language should be stricken as it unreasonably prolonged settlement. (Opp’n at 9.) 4 Moreover, Ford objects that the fees incurred to draft a meet and confer letter and 5 reply brief in support of a motion for remand were “post settlement” and should be 6 stricken. (Id.) 7 The record reflects that the parties engaged in mediation on February 5, 2025. 8 (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 40; Invoice (ECF No. 21-2) at 8.) The mediator sent an email to 9 counsel that same day stating that the parties settled for a statutory buyback in the 10 amount of $38,000 with fees to be determined by motion. (Douglas Decl. ¶ 6 and 11 Ex. J (ECF No. 23-11) at 2.) However, a notice of settlement was not filed until 12 March 12, 2025, more than a month later. (See generally Notice of Settlement.) 13 A settlement in principle “is not a settlement at all because, like all contracts, it 14 is not binding until the parties agree on all its material terms.” Levitz v. The Warlocks, 15 148 Cal. App. 4th 531, 534–35 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Weddington Prods., 16 Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (1998) (“Consent [to a compromise settlement] 17 is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.” 18 (citation omitted)). As the parties did not agree on certain material terms following 19 mediation, there was no settlement before March 12, 2025, the date when the notice 20 of settlement was filed on the docket. Accordingly, billing related to settlement 21 discussions is appropriate. 22 As to the number of hours billed during the negotiation period following 23 mediation, Plaintiffs’ reply brief to the pending motion to remand was due on 24 February 15, 2025, only ten days after mediation. It was appropriate for Plaintiffs to 25 bill for drafting the brief. Nor does the Court find 6.2 hours to analyze an opposition 26 and draft a reply brief to be unreasonable. Similarly, the remaining billing entries 27 prior to the filing of the notice of settlement were appropriate as they related to the 28 1 motion for remand and settlement discussions. The Court declines to reduce any time 2 related to this objection. 3 ii. Time Billed Following Settlement Offer 4 Ford next contends that all of Plaintiffs’ fees following the February 5, 2025, 5 offer should be stricken as they were not necessary to the prosecution of the case. 6 (Opp’n at 9.) Given the foregoing discussion, the Court will evaluate hours incurred 7 only after March 12, 2025, when the parties filed the notice of settlement. 8 Plaintiffs’ billing invoice after March 12, 2025, encompasses the following eight 9 entries: 10 1. May 22, 2025: .90 hours (54 minutes) by Bill Oppenheim for “telephone 11 conference with paralegals re status of settlement and release and 12 attorneys’ fees; prepare declaration re settlement status; direct paralegal 13 to file same for case management”; 14 2. May 27, 2025: .10 hours (6 minutes) by Bill Oppenheim (.10 hours) for 15 “receive and read Court’s Order granting stipulation to retain 16 jurisdiction; calendar same for case management”; 17 3. June 12, 2025: .30 hours (18 minutes) by Michael Rosenstein for “[e]mail 18 correspondence with opposing counsel re: resolution of Plaintiff’s fees 19 and costs under CC 1794(d)”; 20 4. June 27, 2025: 1.30 hours (78 minutes) by Alastair Hamblin for “[a]nalyze 21 file, audit invoices and begin drafting motion for attorney fees”; 22 5. June 30, 2025: 1.60 hours (96 minutes) by Alastair Hamblin for 23 “[c]ontinue drafting declaration”; 24 6. July 7, 2025: 2.80 hours (168 minutes) by Alastair Hamblin for “[f]inished 25 drafting motion for attorney fees and related documents”; 26 7. August 15, 2025: 5 hours (anticipated) by Alastair Hamblin to analyze 27 “opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees and draft [reply]”; and 28 1 8. August 29, 2025: 2.50 hour (anticipated) by Bill Oppenheim to 2 “[p]repare for and attend hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees.” 3 (Invoice at 8–9.) 4 “The provision for recovery of costs and attorney fees in section 1794(d) is an 5 important aspect of [ ] consumer protection, and without it many would not be able to 6 pursue a remedy.” Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1262 (Cal. 7 Ct. App. 2012). The Court finds that the hours spent by Plaintiffs in effectuating the 8 settlement and drafting the fee motion are reasonable. In addition, the anticipated 9 time set aside for analyzing the opposition and drafting the reply to the fee motion is 10 also reasonable. As to the final entry, the hearing on the fee motion was vacated 11 pursuant to the Court’s order taking the matter under submission under Local Rule 12 230(g). (See ECF No. 25.) Accordingly, the anticipated 2.50 hours for Bill Oppenheim 13 to “[p]repare for and attend the hearing” (Invoice at 9), are stricken from the Invoice. 14 To summarize, the Court reduces the Invoice by 2.50 hours for billing incurred 15 to prepare for the hearing on the fee motion.3 16 iii. Time Billed for Drafting Motion to Remand and Conducting 17 Discovery 18 Last, Ford contends that the hours billed for Plaintiffs’ work in analyzing the 19 notice of removal, drafting the motion to remand, and conducting discovery are 20 excessive. (Opp’n at 10.) Plaintiffs explain that two of the attorneys who reviewed the 21 notice of removal are the partner and associate assigned to the case and that the third 22 attorney who stepped in to handle the motion to remand only did so when the 23 assigned attorneys were unavailable. (Reply at 9; Suppl. Daghighian Decl. ¶ 6 (ECF 24 No. 24-1).) Thus, Plaintiffs assert, “it was necessary for Mr. Hamblin to also review the 25 removal documents [and] [t]he remaining hours were spent researching the issues 26

27 3 A chart reflecting the Court’s final modifications to Plaintiffs’ billed hours is in subsection iv: “Final 28 Calculation of Lodestar.” 1 presented by removal and drafting the motion to remand and related documents.” 2 (Suppl. Daghighian Decl. ¶ 6.) 3 The Court finds these tasks were necessary to the prosecution of the matter, as 4 the removal to federal court occurred nearly a year after litigation commenced and a 5 third attorney was asked to step in. The hours billed for drafting the motion to 6 remand do not appear unnecessarily duplicative, and the Court declines to reduce 7 any of these hours related to the motion for remand. 8 As to the remaining objections regarding the amount of discovery conducted in 9 this case, the various May 17, 2024, entries by Bill Oppenheim regarding discovery 10 each pertain to a different discovery device and are not duplicative. Similarly, the 11 July 16, 2024, entry by Miguel Ortiz to review and respond to Ford’s discovery 12 responses does not appear excessive or duplicative. The Court declines to reduce the 13 hours billed toward discovery. 14 iv. Final Calculation of Lodestar 15 In light of the analysis explained above, the lodestar amount is as follows: 16 17 Attorney Adjusted Rate Requested Adjusted Lodestar 18 Hours Hours 19 Sepehr $525.00 5.2 5.2 $2,730.00 20 Daghighian 21 Alastair Hamblin $450.00 32.0 32.0 $14,400.00 22 Bill Oppenheim $300.00 26.7 24.2 $7,260.00 23 Miguel Ortiz $500.00 5.8 5.8 $2,900.00 24 Michael $600.00 5.7 5.7 $3,420.00 25 Rosenstein 26 27 Accordingly, the total lodestar amount is $30,710.00. 28 1 C. Lodestar Multiplier 2 A lodestar fee award “may be adjusted by the court based on factors 3 including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill 4 displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation 5 precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the 6 fee award.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. “A contingent fee agreement only favors an 7 upward departure when there is an ‘uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of 8 establishing eligibility for the award.’” Seebach, 2020 WL 4923664, at *6 (citation 9 omitted). 10 This case did not involve any novel or unusually challenging issues. The 11 amount of time and skill required to properly resolve this litigation, counsel’s success 12 in resolving the matter, and the case’s novelty or complexity are reflected in the 13 number of billable hours recorded and the reasonable hourly rate. Nor was counsel 14 precluded from taking other work. See Nagesh v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 2:18-cv- 15 00839-KJM-JDP, 2021 WL 1060357, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021). Although counsel 16 completed this work on a contingent fee basis, the court finds an enhancement to the 17 lodestar award is not warranted in this case. See Seebach, 2020 WL 4923664, at *6 18 (“Given that plaintiff's counsel “regularly undertakes this type of work,” the Court does 19 not find counsel faced such uncertainty of prevailing on the merits that a multiplier is 20 warranted.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for a lodestar multiplier is denied. 21 D. Costs 22 The parties do not dispute the amount of costs, thus, the Court awards Plaintiffs 23 $1,050.69 in costs. 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 ORDER 2 | Forthe reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 3 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED IN PART and 4 DENIED IN PART, as described above; 5 2. Plaintiffs are awarded $30,710.00 in attorneys’ fees, and $1,050.69 in costs. 6 3. Defendant shall file a certificate of service regarding payment of fees and 7 costs immediately following remittance to Plaintiffs. 8 4. The parties shall file dispositional documents pursuant to E.D. Cal. □□□ 9 160(b) within fourteen (14) days thereafter. 10 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 | Dated: _ October 8, 2025 “Daal A CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta "3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ng | 2208 silva24cv03674.mot.attomeystees