Supreme Court
No. 2022-316-Appeal. (PP 22-2078)
Kelly Maltais :
v. :
Michael Maltais. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme
Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The appellant, Kelly
Maltais (Kelly), has appealed from an order of the Superior Court dismissing her
probate appeal in favor of the appellee, Michael Maltais (Michael), on the basis that
her appeal was untimely.1 After considering the parties’ written and oral
submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown
and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the
reasons set forth herein, we vacate the order of the Superior Court.
1 Throughout the opinion, the parties are referred to by their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. -1- Facts and Travel
The appellant, Kelly, is the daughter of the decedent, Laurent E. Maltais. The
Cranston Probate Court entered an order on March 10, 2022, admitting the last will
and testament of the decedent and appointing his son, Michael, as executor of his
estate. The will was executed on September 6, 2016.
Kelly filed a claim of appeal from the probate court order on March 30, 2022.
The probate court certified the record to the Superior Court on April 11, 2022, and
Kelly filed her reasons of appeal with the Superior Court that same day. Kelly
alleged that her father’s will “was executed as a result of * * * fraud, duress, and/or
undue influence” and that he lacked the testamentary capacity to execute it.
Shortly thereafter, Michael filed a motion to dismiss Kelly’s probate appeal
as untimely, because she filed her reasons of appeal thirty-two days after the court’s
order. Michael argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on G.L. 1956 § 33-
23-1(a)(2), which requires a party aggrieved by an order of the probate court to file
their reasons of appeal within thirty days.
Kelly objected, arguing that the thirtieth day from the probate order was
Saturday, April 9, 2022, and that under Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure,2 she had until Monday, April 11, 2022, to file her appeal. Michael
2 In relevant part, Rule 6(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when calculating a period of time under the rules, “[t]he last day of the period is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event -2- responded that Rule 81 exempts probate appeals from the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure and asked the court to dismiss Kelly’s appeal with prejudice because
it was not filed within thirty days. Even if Rule 6 did not apply, Kelly insisted, there
was excusable neglect because the probate court did not certify the record until April
11, 2022.
After a hearing, the motion to dismiss was granted. The hearing justice
reasoned that Rule 6 does not apply to the calculation of time when filing a probate
appeal due to Rule 81’s provision that the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply “during the process and pleading stages” of probate appeals. The
hearing justice explained that he was “not sure what else there is in a case other than
the process and pleading stages, and certainly the process could be looked at as the
filing of the [probate] appeal itself.” The hearing justice relied on this Court’s
holding in Griggs v. Estate of Griggs, 845 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2004), wherein weekend
days were included when counting the thirty-day time frame for appeal, and
ultimately concluded that Kelly’s appeal was not timely because it was filed thirty-
two days after the order. 3 Griggs, 845 A.2d at 1009-10. On July 14, 2022, an order
the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday.” Super. R. Civ. P. 6(a). 3 The petitioners in Griggs v. Estate of Griggs, 845 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2004), sought an extension of the initial deadline to perfect their appeal from the probate court to allow additions to be made to the record. Griggs, 845 A.2d at 1009-10. We held that the Superior Court lacked authority to grant the extension as the deadlines for appealing an order of the probate court to the Superior Court are jurisdictional and -3- was entered dismissing Kelly’s probate appeal. Thereafter, Kelly filed a timely
notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
“The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint.” Jenkins v. City of East Providence, 293 A.3d 1267, 1270 (R.I. 2023)
(brackets omitted) (quoting Narragansett Electric Company v. Minardi, 21 A.3d
274, 277 (R.I. 2011)). This Court has previously held that the same standard that
applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will apply to a motion to dismiss a
probate appeal. Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1000 (R.I. 2012). “In passing on a
Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice.”
Jenkins, 293 A.3d at 1270 (quoting Narragansett Electric Company, 21 A.3d at
278). “We thus are confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume
all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (quoting
Narragansett Electric Company, 21 A.3d at 278). “A motion to dismiss may be
granted only ‘if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be
entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting
Narragansett Electric Company, 21 A.3d at 278).
may not be extended, except for purposes of extending the time to file a transcript. Id. The issue before us concerns whether the computation of time for the thirty-day deadline is tolled when the last day for filing falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. -4- Nevertheless, “[t]his Court considers questions involving the timing of
appeals brought under § 33-23-1 as statute of limitations questions.” Estate of
Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 1258 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Estate of Hart v. LeBlanc, 853
A.2d 1217, 1218 (R.I. 2004)). “Thus, our review is also de novo for such questions
of ‘statutory interpretation, including the question of whether a statute of limitations
has run against a plaintiff’s claim.’” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Jepson, 811 A.2d 119,
121 (R.I. 2002)). “When a statute is ‘clear and unambiguous, this Court must
interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and
ordinary meanings.’” In re Estate of Chelo, 209 A.3d 1181, 1184 (R.I.
2019) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v.
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Supreme Court
No. 2022-316-Appeal. (PP 22-2078)
Kelly Maltais :
v. :
Michael Maltais. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme
Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The appellant, Kelly
Maltais (Kelly), has appealed from an order of the Superior Court dismissing her
probate appeal in favor of the appellee, Michael Maltais (Michael), on the basis that
her appeal was untimely.1 After considering the parties’ written and oral
submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown
and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the
reasons set forth herein, we vacate the order of the Superior Court.
1 Throughout the opinion, the parties are referred to by their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. -1- Facts and Travel
The appellant, Kelly, is the daughter of the decedent, Laurent E. Maltais. The
Cranston Probate Court entered an order on March 10, 2022, admitting the last will
and testament of the decedent and appointing his son, Michael, as executor of his
estate. The will was executed on September 6, 2016.
Kelly filed a claim of appeal from the probate court order on March 30, 2022.
The probate court certified the record to the Superior Court on April 11, 2022, and
Kelly filed her reasons of appeal with the Superior Court that same day. Kelly
alleged that her father’s will “was executed as a result of * * * fraud, duress, and/or
undue influence” and that he lacked the testamentary capacity to execute it.
Shortly thereafter, Michael filed a motion to dismiss Kelly’s probate appeal
as untimely, because she filed her reasons of appeal thirty-two days after the court’s
order. Michael argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on G.L. 1956 § 33-
23-1(a)(2), which requires a party aggrieved by an order of the probate court to file
their reasons of appeal within thirty days.
Kelly objected, arguing that the thirtieth day from the probate order was
Saturday, April 9, 2022, and that under Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure,2 she had until Monday, April 11, 2022, to file her appeal. Michael
2 In relevant part, Rule 6(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when calculating a period of time under the rules, “[t]he last day of the period is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event -2- responded that Rule 81 exempts probate appeals from the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure and asked the court to dismiss Kelly’s appeal with prejudice because
it was not filed within thirty days. Even if Rule 6 did not apply, Kelly insisted, there
was excusable neglect because the probate court did not certify the record until April
11, 2022.
After a hearing, the motion to dismiss was granted. The hearing justice
reasoned that Rule 6 does not apply to the calculation of time when filing a probate
appeal due to Rule 81’s provision that the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply “during the process and pleading stages” of probate appeals. The
hearing justice explained that he was “not sure what else there is in a case other than
the process and pleading stages, and certainly the process could be looked at as the
filing of the [probate] appeal itself.” The hearing justice relied on this Court’s
holding in Griggs v. Estate of Griggs, 845 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2004), wherein weekend
days were included when counting the thirty-day time frame for appeal, and
ultimately concluded that Kelly’s appeal was not timely because it was filed thirty-
two days after the order. 3 Griggs, 845 A.2d at 1009-10. On July 14, 2022, an order
the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday.” Super. R. Civ. P. 6(a). 3 The petitioners in Griggs v. Estate of Griggs, 845 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2004), sought an extension of the initial deadline to perfect their appeal from the probate court to allow additions to be made to the record. Griggs, 845 A.2d at 1009-10. We held that the Superior Court lacked authority to grant the extension as the deadlines for appealing an order of the probate court to the Superior Court are jurisdictional and -3- was entered dismissing Kelly’s probate appeal. Thereafter, Kelly filed a timely
notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
“The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint.” Jenkins v. City of East Providence, 293 A.3d 1267, 1270 (R.I. 2023)
(brackets omitted) (quoting Narragansett Electric Company v. Minardi, 21 A.3d
274, 277 (R.I. 2011)). This Court has previously held that the same standard that
applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will apply to a motion to dismiss a
probate appeal. Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1000 (R.I. 2012). “In passing on a
Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice.”
Jenkins, 293 A.3d at 1270 (quoting Narragansett Electric Company, 21 A.3d at
278). “We thus are confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume
all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (quoting
Narragansett Electric Company, 21 A.3d at 278). “A motion to dismiss may be
granted only ‘if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be
entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting
Narragansett Electric Company, 21 A.3d at 278).
may not be extended, except for purposes of extending the time to file a transcript. Id. The issue before us concerns whether the computation of time for the thirty-day deadline is tolled when the last day for filing falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. -4- Nevertheless, “[t]his Court considers questions involving the timing of
appeals brought under § 33-23-1 as statute of limitations questions.” Estate of
Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 1258 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Estate of Hart v. LeBlanc, 853
A.2d 1217, 1218 (R.I. 2004)). “Thus, our review is also de novo for such questions
of ‘statutory interpretation, including the question of whether a statute of limitations
has run against a plaintiff’s claim.’” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Jepson, 811 A.2d 119,
121 (R.I. 2002)). “When a statute is ‘clear and unambiguous, this Court must
interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and
ordinary meanings.’” In re Estate of Chelo, 209 A.3d 1181, 1184 (R.I.
2019) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223,
1226 (R.I. 1996)).
Discussion
On appeal, Kelly argues that, although Rule 81 exempts probate appeals from
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure during the process and pleading stages,
the filing of a probate appeal may not fall into that category. In support of her
argument, Kelly relies on this Court’s holding in McAninch v. State of Rhode Island
Department of Labor and Training, 64 A.3d 84 (R.I. 2013). In McAninch, we held
that “Rule 6(a) applies to the Superior Court’s review of administrative decisions.”
McAninch, 64 A.3d at 89. Kelly argues that under Rule 6 she had until Monday,
April 11, 2022, to file because the thirtieth day was Saturday, April 9, 2022.
-5- For his part, Michael argues that this Court should affirm the hearing justice’s
dismissal of Kelly’s probate appeal because her failure to proceed in a timely fashion
cannot be overlooked by a sympathetic judge. Michael insists that Rule 81
specifically exempts probate appeals from the application of Rule 6.
When appealing a probate court order or decree to the Superior Court pursuant
to § 33-23-1, the claim of appeal must be filed with the probate court within twenty
days of the execution of the order or decree. Section 33-23-1(a)(1). The appellant
then has thirty days after the entry of the order or decree to file a certified copy of
the claim and the reasons of appeal with the Superior Court. Section 33-23-1(a)(2).
“This Court has long interpreted the procedural requirements for filing a probate
appeal as mandating strict compliance.” Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d at 1258; see also
Dugdale v. Chase, 52 R.I. 63, 64, 157 A. 430, 430-31 (1931) (holding that, “the
statutory procedure authorizing an appeal from the probate court to the [S]uperior
[C]ourt must be strictly complied with”). The deadlines in § 33-23-1(a)(1) and (2)
are jurisdictional and may not be extended “by a sympathetic trial justice,” nor may
the court overlook an appellant’s noncompliance. Ims v. Audette, 40 A.3d 236, 238
(R.I. 2012) (quoting Griggs, 845 A.2d at 1009). This Court has stated that “the
purpose of requiring a party to file the reasons of appeal is, first, to provide notice to
the opposing party of what is at issue, and second, to restrict the appellant during his
-6- or her appeal to only the issues listed within the reasons for appeal.” Estate of Garan,
249 A.3d at 1259 (brackets omitted) (quoting Mendes, 41 A.3d at 1002).
This appeal centers on whether the computation of time for the thirty-day
deadline is tolled when the last day for filing falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday. Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he
last day of the period is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither
a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday.” Super. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Nevertheless, Rule 81
specifically exempts probate appeals from the application of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure. Super. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1)(A) (“These rules do not apply
during the process and pleading stages to * * * [p]robate appeals[.]”).
This Court has long recognized some measure of flexibility in the context of
probate appeals.
“The rule is this: Whenever by a rule of court or an act of the legislature a given number of days are allowed to do an act, or it is said an act may be done within a given number of days, the day in which the rule is taken or the decision made is excluded, and if one or more Sundays occur within the time they are counted unless the last day falls on Sunday, in which case the act may be done on the next day.” Barnes v. Eddy, 12 R.I. 25, 26 (1878) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, the rule is applicable to legal holidays. Cook v. Greenlaw, 58 R.I. 402,
404, 193 A. 494, 495 (1937).
-7- Therefore, it is appropriate to toll the time period when the last day falls on a
weekend or legal holiday in order to give appellants “the full benefit of all the time
allowed, even though it may be necessary to that end to give an additional day.”
Barnes, 12 R.I. at 26. The thirtieth day for filing Kelly’s probate appeal fell on
Saturday, April 9, 2022. As such, the hearing justice’s decision afforded Kelly only
twenty-nine days to file her appeal because the Superior Court clerk’s office is closed
on weekends. Under the clear and unambiguous language of § 33-23-1(a)(2), Kelly
was entitled to thirty days to file her appeal to the Superior Court. 4
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the order of the Superior
Court. The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court with our decision
endorsed thereon for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
4 Other jurisdictions agree. See Wade v. Dworkin, 407 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska 1965) (“At common law it was established if the last day on which an act was to be performed fell on a Sunday, then that Sunday was excluded and the time was extended to the following day.”); see also Pettigrove v. Parro Construction Corp., 194 N.E.2d 521, 523-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (excluding Saturdays from the final day of a time period because most clerks’ offices are closed on the weekends). -8- STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Kelly Maltais v. Michael Maltais.
No. 2022-316-Appeal. Case Number (PP 22-2078)
Date Opinion Filed January 11, 2024
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kevin F. McHugh
For Appellant:
Edward R. McCormick, III, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Appellee:
Stephen P. Levesque, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)