KELLY DANIEL, Personal Representative, & Another v. MARTA NOEMI DANIEL.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0791
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-791

KELLY DANIEL, personal representative,1 & another2

vs.

MARTA NOEMI DANIEL.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Clebert Daniel (decedent) and his wife (defendant) signed

an antenuptial agreement (agreement); twenty-eight months later,

he died. The plaintiffs, personal representatives of the

decedent's estate, brought this suit against the defendant to

enforce the agreement's terms. The defendant counterclaimed,

seeking a declaration that the agreement was not enforceable and

that she has an interest in the decedent's estate as his spouse.

A judge of the Middlesex Probate and Family Court issued a

judgment on the plaintiff's complaint and a judgment on the

1 Of the estate of Clebert Daniel.

2Robenson Daniel, personal representative of the estate of Clebert Daniel. defendant's counterclaim, denying enforcement of the agreement

and affirming the defendant's interest in the decedent's estate.

The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

"Contract principles apply to antenuptial agreements, and

the interpretation of an antenuptial agreement is a question of

law, which we review de novo." Rudnick v. Rudnick, 102 Mass.

App. Ct. 467, 470 (2023). "The Probate and Family Court judge's

findings of fact are reviewed for clear error." Id.

"For an antenuptial agreement to be enforceable, it must be

both (1) fair and reasonable at the time of execution (the

'first look'), and (2) conscionable at the time of enforcement

(the 'second look')." Rudnick, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 470,

citing DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18, 35-38 (2002). Here,

the probate judge determined the agreement was not fair and

reasonable at the time of execution. Because we discern no

abuse of discretion in this determination, we need not address

whether the agreement was conscionable at the time of attempted

enforcement. See Austin v. Austin, 445 Mass. 601, 607 (2005).

On the first look, we examine whether "(1) [the agreement]

contains a fair and reasonable provision as measured at the time

of its execution for the party contesting the agreement; (2) the

contesting party was fully informed of the other party's worth

prior to the agreement's execution, or had, or should have had,

independent knowledge of the other party's worth; and (3) a

2 waiver by the contesting party is set forth." Rosenberg v.

Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 672 (1979). "In determining whether an

agreement was fair and reasonable at the time of execution,

'reference may appropriately be made to such factors as the

parties' respective worth, . . . intelligence, literacy,

business acumen, and prior family ties or commitments.'"

Austin, 445 Mass. at 604, quoting Rosenberg, supra at 672.

For an agreement to pass muster on the first look, there

must have been a "meaningful informed waiver of marital rights."

Eyster v. Pechenik, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 783 (2008). "[I]t is

not enough to know that marriage confers some undefined rights.

A practical understanding of those rights is essential." Id. at

786. We consider "whether each party was represented by

independent counsel, the adequacy of the time to review the

agreement, the parties' understanding of the terms of the

agreement and their effect, and a party's understanding of his

or her rights in the absence of an agreement." DeMatteo, 436

Mass. at 29.

There was no error in the probate judge's conclusion that,

at the time of execution, there was not a meaningful informed

waiver of marital rights. As the judge found, there were

"significant differences in parties' wealth and literacy in

English." The original signed agreement was in English. The

defendant had a ninth grade education and "spoke virtually no

3 English." At the time of execution, she had been in the United

States "just short of a month" on a fiancée visa that "required

that the parties' marriage take place in 90 days." She "had no

independent legal advice as to her legal rights upon death or

divorce" and her ability to retain counsel prior to signing "was

somewhat doubtful." The defendant was informed, in Spanish,

that she could consult an attorney before signing the agreement,

but the record is devoid of evidence that the terms of the

agreement were communicated to her in Spanish at that time. The

defendant and the decedent signed the same agreement in Spanish

two weeks after the execution of the original, but the probate

judge found that there was "no discussion about what would

happen at either party's death or what legal rights were being

waived."

The judge's findings are supported by the record and show

that the agreement was not fair and reasonable at execution.

There is no evidence that the defendant was informed of or

meaningfully understood the agreement, the rights she was giving

up, or her rights in the absence of the agreement, given her

limited education, her inability to speak or understand English,

and the timing of execution. See Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 73 Mass.

App. Ct. 588, 600-601 (2009); Eyster, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 785-

786. See also Austin, 445 Mass. at 603; DeMatteo, 436 Mass. at

28-29.

4 The judge also supportably found that the defendant did not

have adequate notice of the decedent's assets. The judge found

that "[n]o schedules of assets were appended to the agreement

filed with the Court" and credited the defendant's testimony

that she did not review the asset disclosure documents

associated with her visa proceedings. The factual findings

demonstrate that the decedent's disclosure at execution was not

"such that a decision by [the defendant] may reasonably [have

been made] as to whether the agreement should go forward."

DeMatteo, 436 Mass. at 27. See Rosenberg, 377 Mass. at 670

("The burden is not on either party to inquire, but on each to

inform, for it is only by requiring full disclosure of the

amount, character, and value of the parties' respective assets

that courts can ensure intelligent waiver of the statutory

rights involved"). The plaintiffs' assertions to the contrary

amount to unpersuasive factual challenges. Because the probate

judge credited the testimony of the defendant, who was the sole

5 witness, and otherwise grounded her findings in the evidence

before her, those findings were not clearly erroneous.

Judgments dated April 22, 2025, affirmed.

Order dated June 11, 2025, affirmed.

By the Court (Singh, Hershfang & Wood, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: March 24, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.