Kelly Choi Ent., Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: CV0693-24
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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2026 APR -3 PH 2: 38 CLEfH{ OF COURT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM

KELLY CHOI ENTERPRISES, INC., CIVIL CASE NO. CV0693-24

Plaintiff,

vs.

TENJUDO, INC., dba TENJUDO SPA,

Defendant. DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY TENJUDO, INC., dba TENJUDO SPA, JUDGMENT Counterclaimant,

KELLY CHOI ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Counterclaim Defendant.

This matter came before the Honorable Dana A. Gutierrez upon a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment ("Motion") by Defendant Tenjudo, Inc. ("Defendant"). The Court held a

hearing on the Motion on January 6, 2026. Present at the hearing was Attorney Georgette

Concepcion on behalf of Plaintiff Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. ("Plaintiff') and Attorney Jon

Visosky on behalf of Defendant. Upon reviewing counsel's arguments, the record, and applicable

law, the Court issues the following Decision and Order. DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24; Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

BACKGROUND

The dispute arises from a commercial lease between Plaintiff, the owner of the property at

issue, and Defendant, which operated a therapeutic massage business on that property for

approximately ten years. See Compl. at 1 (Dec. 20, 2024).

The original lease term began on June 11, 2014 "for a term of five years with an option to

renew for an additional four years." See Compl. at 1. "On or about September 5, 2023, the [P]arties

entered a second lease for a term of eight months beginning June 11, 2023." See id. The Parties

agree that for the purposes of this Motion, the terms of the September 5, 2023 lease ("Lease")

control. See Min. Entry at 10:46:25 A.M. (Jan. 6, 2026) (Defendant is "moving [for partial

summary judgment] on the current lease."); id at 10:47:24 A.M. (The Lease and the former June

11, 2014 lease between the Parties "include[] the same clauses" that Defendant invoked in support

of its Motion.).

The Lease contains provisions governing the condition of the premises upon termination

of the tenancy. In particular, Section 9.1 of the Lease ("Section 9. l ") requires the tenant to

surrender the space at the end of the term and remove tenant improvements so that the premises

are restored to the "same and similar order" as they were before the tenant first improved or

occupied the premises, subject to exceptions for reasonable wear and tear or damage caused by

unavoidable casualty not capable of timely repair. See Mot. at 2.

Following the termination of the tenancy, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of

contract based on Defendant's alleged failure to restore the premises to the condition required

under the lease. See Compl. at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that Defendant caused substantial damage

to the leased space and the building itself and failed to repair or restore the premises before

2 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24; Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

vacating. See id. at 2. Plaintiff asserts that the damage included removed ceiling tiles and lighting,

alterations to walls and floors, plumbing and air-conditioning modifications, damage to exterior

walls and windows, removal of fixtures and equipment, and other alterations allegedly exceeding

normal wear and tear. See Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 1-2 ("Opp'n") (Aug.

29, 2025). Plaintiff further claims that the cost of repairing the premises exceeds $80,000. See id.

at 4.

Defendant filed the present motion seeking partial summary judgment on the portion of

Plaintiffs breach of contract claim alleging "substantial damage" to the leased premises. See Mot.

at 1. Plaintiff opposed the Motion on August 29, 2025. See Opp'n at 1. Defendant replied on

September 12, 2025. See Reply at 1 (Sep. 12, 2025). The Court took the matter under advisement

on January 6, 2026.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted if the moving party demonstrates that "there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Guam R. Civ. P. 56(a).

"In rendering a decision on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw

inferences and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Quijano v.

Atkins-Kroll, Inc., 2008 Guam 14 ,r 6 (citation omitted). "A genuine issue precluding summary

judgment exists if there is sufficient evidence which establishes a factual dispute requiring

resolution by a fact-finder." Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cyfred, Ltd., 2015

Guam 7 ,r 39 (citation and quotation omitted). Conversely, "[a] party is entitled to summary

3 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24; Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

judgment where 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."' DFS Guam L.P. v. A.B. Won

Pat Int'! Airport Auth., Guam, 2020 Guam 20135 (citing Guam R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

"The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show that undisputed

facts in the record support a prima facie entitlement to the relief requested. If the movant satisfies

this burden, the burden then shifts to the [non-movant] to show that there exists a material question

of fact that would preclude the grant of summary judgment. When a defendant moves for summary

judgment on the claims of a plaintiff, it satisfies its burden by either (1) presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the plaintiffs claim or (2) demonstrating that the plaintiffs

evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the claim." Cho v. Alupang Beach Club,

Inc., 2025Guam3128 (citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original).

II. Defendant Has Not Met Its Burden of Establishing a Prima Facie Entitlement to Partial Summary Judgment

Defendant argues it is entitled to partial summary judgment because Section 9.1 required

only that the premises be surrendered "to the same and similar order" as before Defendant first

improved or occupied the space, except for reasonable wear and tear, and Defendant's evidence

shows Defendant satisfied that standard when it vacated. See Mot. at 4-5 (citing the August 1,

2025 Declaration by Jing Hu and a "thumb drive video").

The Court finds that Defendant has not carried its burden of "presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the plaintiffs claim." See Cho, 2025 Guam 3 128. Specifically,

Defendant is seeking a "partial summary judgment on the 'substantial damage' part of [Plaintiffs]

breach of contract claim." In arguing that the premises did not incur "substantial damage" as

4 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24; Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

Plaintiff is claiming, Defendant submitted a video showing the current state of the premises. See

Deel. of Jon A. Visosky (Aug. 1, 2025). Jing Hu, President of Defendant, declared that "the

premises was restored to the same and similar order as it was before [Defendant] first improved or

occupied the premises .... " See Deel. of Jing Hu (Aug. 1, 2025). 1 This evidence does not suffice

to negate the alleged "substantial damage" because it only shows how the premises appeared at

the time Defendant vacated, without any meaningful comparison to the condition of the premises

prior to Defendant's occupancy or improvements. 2 Absent such a baseline, Defendant cannot

establish that the condition depicted reflects compliance with Section 9.1, which explicitly requires

Defendant to restore the premises to the "same and similar order as it was before [Defendant] first

improved or occupied it." See Mot. at 2. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet its initial

burden of demonstrating a prima facie entitlement to partial summary judgment.

Defendant further contends that, even if any damage to the premises existed, such damage

constituted "reasonable wear and tear or damage by unavoidable casualty not able to be repaired

in time." See Reply at 5. In support, Defendant relies on the thumb drive video purporting to show

the condition of the premises at the time it was vacated. See id. The Court has reviewed this

nineteen-second video and finds that it does not dispel all factual disputes as to whether any

damage fell within the scope of permissible "reasonable wear and tear." The video is brief, limited

in scope, and lacks sufficient detail or context to conclusively establish the extent or cause of any

1 The Court notes that Ms. Hu's Declaration largely tracks the language of the Lease and does not appear to offer any additional factual detail. Cf Mot. at 2 (Tenant agrees to "restore[] the premises to the same and similar order as it was before Tenant first improved or occupied it, with exceptions for reasonable wear and tear or damage by unavoidable casualty not able to be repaired in time.") (quoting Section 9.1). 2 Defendant itself agrees as much: "Essential to prove a breach of such a covenant, it is necessary that the condition of the property at the time of its possession was given to the tenant be shown, in order that the difference in its condition when given to the tenant as compared to that when returned can be determined as to whether it was 'usual wear, damage or injury,' or not." Reply at 2 (citing Poesy v. Closson, 374 P.2d 710, 711-12 (Idaho 1962)).

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DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24; Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

alleged damage. Moreover, without evidence of the premises' condition prior to Defendant's

occupancy or improvements, the Court cannot determine whether the observed condition falls

within the Lease's exception for "reasonable wear and tear." Accordingly, because Defendant's

proffered evidence does not suffice to negate Plaintiffs allegation that the premises incurred

"substantial damage," Defendant has not carried its burden of proof and partial summary judgment

is DENIED on this ground alone.

III. Plaintiff Has Presented Sufficient Evidence to Show a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact

Even assuming that Defendant has carried its burden of showing prima facie entitlement

to partial summary judgment, the Court finds that Plaintiff has produced enough evidence to

establish that a genuine dispute as to "substantial damage" exists. Specifically, Juanita Choi, the

President of Plaintiff, declares that she personally inspected the leased space before Defendant

moved in and that, at that time, the premises were clean, not in need of repairs, and fully ready for

occupancy, subject only to modifications made by Defendant to create private massage areas. Deel.

of Juanita Choi 'if'il 5-6 (Aug. 29, 2025) ("Choi's Deel."). She further identifies, with specificity,

numerous conditions that she contends did not exist at the outset of the tenancy, including removed

condenser units, damaged or missing ceiling tiles and fluorescent lights, wall and floor tile

installations, unrepaired floor sections, holes drilled through walls, altered drainage, a replaced

door, removed toilets and shelves, exposed sewer and water lines, and added interior walls. Id. ~

4. She also states that repair estimates for the claimed damages "exceed $80,000." Id. ~ 7. Taken

together, this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to the premises' original

condition and whether the condition on surrender reflected deterioration beyond reasonable wear

and tear.

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DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24,· Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

Nevertheless, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has provided the Court "with no direct,

objective or reliable evidence of the condition of the property at the time its possession was

delivered to Tenjudo." Reply at 3. In essence, this argument urges the Court to disregard Ms.

Choi's first-hand observations of the premises. However, such disregard is improper. See, e.g.,

Buehlman v. Ide Pontiac, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 305,312 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Indeed, a declaration

by an individual with personal knowledge is sufficient to support a motion for summary

judgment."); Smith v. Godinez, 2023 WL 358792, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2023) ("Personal

knowledge, especially when detailed and specific, is sufficient to rebut a motion for summary

judgment.").

Here, Juanita Choi declared from her personal knowledge of the condition of the premise

at the time that it was delivered to Defendant. See, e.g., Choi's Deel. at 1 ("I make this declaration

upon my own personal knowledge."); id. at 3 ("I personally inspected the Leased space before

Tenjudo moved in."). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted evidence that raises

a genuine dispute of material fact. Granting partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant is

therefore improper.

Defendant also contends that because "[Plaintiff] has had access to the premises for over

10 years, and never objected to any improvement or alteration done by [Defendant]," Plaintiff has

consented to "[a]ny improvement or alteration [done] to the premises." See Reply at 2. This

argument is problematic on two grounds. First, the Court is not persuaded that mere access to the

premises, without more, establishes that Plaintiff was aware of the specific improvements or

alterations at issue, let alone that Plaintiff consented to them. 3 Second, the damages identified by

3 The Court also notes that apart from this argument, Defendant has not submitted any evidence suggesting Plaintiff's consent to the alleged changes made to the premises.

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DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CV0693-24; Kelly Choi Enterprises, Inc. v. Tenjudo, Inc.

Plaintiff are not limited to "improvements" or "alterations," but include conditions requiring repair,

such as "damaged ceiling tiles," "damage to the wall where [Defendant] covered up holes drilled

for air conditioning units [Defendant] installed," and a malfunctioning "window lock." See Choi's

Deel. at 1-3. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant's argument that Plaintiff consented to all

complained-of conditions unavailing and does not warrant partial summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment. The Court shall hold a status hearing on May 12, 2026 at 9:15 A.M.

SO ORDERED this 3rd day of April, 2026.

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