Kelley v. State of Nevada

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedAugust 9, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00307
StatusUnknown

This text of Kelley v. State of Nevada (Kelley v. State of Nevada) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelley v. State of Nevada, (D. Nev. 2022).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 ROLAND W. KELLEY, Case No.: 2:22-cv-00307-RFB-DJA

4 Petitioner Order Dismissing Habeas Petition without 5 v. Prejudice and Closing Case

6 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

7 Respondent

8 Pro se petitioner Roland W. Kelley filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 9 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking emergency federal review related to his ongoing state criminal case and 10 pretrial detention (ECF No. 1). But on initial review under the Habeas Rules,1 the court finds that 11 Kelley’s claims are unexhausted and that federal abstention is required, so the petition is dismissed 12 without prejudice. 13 Background2 14 Based on the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County’s online docket, Kelley was 15 charged in 2016 with numerous counts of sexual assault and lewdness with a child under age 16 fourteen. Case No. C-18-330529-1. It appears that Kelley entered into a guilty plea agreement in 17 State of Nevada v. Roland Kelley on December 30, 2021, and was sentenced on February 22, 2022. 18 19 20

21 1 All references to a “Habeas Rule” or the “Habeas Rules” in this order identify the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 22 2 The procedural history in this section is derived from the petitioner’s allegations as well as his 23 criminal matters in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County (“state district court”). The court takes judicial notice of the online docket records of the state district court, which may be accessed by the public online at: https://www.clarkcountycourts.us. 1 In his petition for federal habeas relief, he alleges that he has an alibi defense to the state 2 charges, his bail is excessive and he has been subjected to prolonged pretrial detention, and his 3 public defender disclosed attorney-client privileged information to the state district attorney. 4 Discussion

5 Habeas Rule 4 requires federal district courts to examine a habeas petition and order a 6 response unless it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. This rule allows 7 courts to screen and dismiss petitions that are patently frivolous, vague, conclusory, palpably 8 incredible, false, or plagued by procedural defects. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 9 (9th Cir. 2019); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). Because 10 a federal habeas petitioner incarcerated by a state must give state courts a fair opportunity to act 11 on each of his claims before he presents them in a federal habeas petition, federal courts will not 12 consider his petition for habeas relief until he has properly exhausted his available state remedies 13 for all claims raised. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). A claim remains 14 unexhausted until the petitioner has given the highest available state court the opportunity to

15 consider the claim through direct appeal or state collateral-review proceedings. O’Sullivan 16 v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 (1999); Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 17 2003) (en banc). To properly exhaust state remedies on each claim, the habeas petitioner must 18 “present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal court.” Picard v. Connor, 19 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 20 The federal constitutional implications of a claim, not just issues of state law, must have 21 been raised in the state court to achieve exhaustion. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th 22 Cir. 2014); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (fair presentation requires both 23 the operative facts and federal legal theory upon which a claim is based). A claim is not exhausted 1 unless the petitioner has presented to the state court the same operative facts and legal theory upon 2 which his federal claim is based. Bland v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th 3 Cir. 1994). 4 Kelley admits in his petition that he has not sought relief from any Nevada state court, 5 much less appealed to the highest state court, as the exhaustion requirement mandates. This alone 6 bars this court’s consideration of his federal habeas petition. 7 But even if the court assumed that Kelley has exhausted his claims, his petition seeks 8 federal judicial intervention in a pending state criminal proceeding, which is simply not available 9 to him. Cf. e.g., Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983); Carden v. Montana, 626 10 F.2d 82, 83–85 (9th Cir. 1980). The comity-based Younger abstention doctrine prevents federal 11 courts from enjoining pending state court criminal proceedings, even if there is an allegation of a 12 constitutional violation, unless there is an extraordinary circumstance that creates a threat of 13 irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971). 14 The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “federal-court abstention is required” 15 when there is “a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 16 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (emphasis added); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004) 17 (federal courts generally abstain from granting any relief that would interfere with pending state 18 judicial proceedings). Injuries are only irreparable if the threat to a petitioner’s federally protected 19 rights cannot be eliminated through his defense of the criminal case. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. 20 21 This case does not present extraordinary circumstances. The petitioner challenges the 22 merits of the criminal case against him, the amount set for bail, the multiple times his trial was 23 postponed and alleges that his counsel is rendering ineffective assistance (ECF No. 1, pp. 6-8). Defendants in state criminal proceedings routinely allege that state criminal proceedings violate 1} their constitutional rights, including fundamental rights, which makes this a regular occurrence an extraordinary circumstance. Kelley’s situation is no different in substance from that of an 3|/criminal defendant facing the potential loss of constitutional rights—including the mos 4! fundamental right, to liberty—in a pending criminal prosecution. In addition, it appears that Kelle recently pleaded guilty and was sentenced, which clearly impacts the viability of at least some o his claims, including any allegations that he had an alibi or was held in pretrial detention too lon 7\| at an excessive rate of bail. He faces no extraordinary or irreparable injuries, so federal abstentio 8|| is required.

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Picard v. Connor
404 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1971)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Eric Allen Peterson v. Robert Lampert
319 F.3d 1153 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Dwayne Woods v. Stephen Sinclair
764 F.3d 1109 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Martin Valdez, Jr. v. W. Montgomery
918 F.3d 687 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Lehigh Valley R. v. Ciechowski
10 F.2d 82 (Second Circuit, 1925)
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs
134 S. Ct. 584 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Gilbertson v. Albright
381 F.3d 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Sherwood v. Tomkins
716 F.2d 632 (Ninth Circuit, 1983)

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Kelley v. State of Nevada, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelley-v-state-of-nevada-nvd-2022.