Kelley v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor

9 Ct. Int'l Trade 646, 626 F. Supp. 398, 9 C.I.T. 646, 1985 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 1502
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedDecember 30, 1985
DocketCourt No. 85-03-00437
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 646 (Kelley v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kelley v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 646, 626 F. Supp. 398, 9 C.I.T. 646, 1985 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 1502 (cit 1985).

Opinion

Restani, Judge:

Plaintiffs, former employees of the American Thread Company’s (American Thread) plant in Tallapoosa, Georgia (Tallapoosa plant), challenge the Secretary of Labor’s determination denying eligibility of former employees of the Tallapoosa plant to apply for trade adjustment assistance under section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Act), 19 U.S.C. § 2273 (1982).1 Certification for eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance requires an affirmative determi[647]*647nation by the Secretary of Labor under the three-part test of section 222.2 The Secretary of Labor determined that the nexus between increased imports and worker separations required by the third element of Section 222 was lacking and thus the workers in question were denied eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance.

This court has authority to review a decision of the Secretary of Labor denying a petition for eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance. 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) (1982). The court is bound by findings of fact by the Secretary of Labor supported by substantial evidence. 19 U.S.C. § 2395(b) (1982). The issue before the court is, therefore, whether there is substantial evidence on the administrative record to support the Secretary’s determination that there was lacking the requisite causal nexus between increased imports of "like or directly competitive articles” and worker separations.3

Before addressing this issue, however, the court must consider defendant’s jurisdictional challenge. Workers may challenge the Secretary of Labor’s final determination on a petition for adjustment assistance by filing an action with this court within sixty days after notice is given. 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) (1982). 29 CFR § 90.19(a) (1984) provides that the notice referred to in 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) is notice via publication in the Federal Register. Notice of denial of eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance was published in the Federal Register on January 4, 1985, and plaintiffs’ summons and complaint were not deemed filed until March 28, 1985. Defendant argues that plaintiffs thereby failed to comply with the sixty day statute of limitations and that this court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ substantive cause of action. Normally, in accordance with regulations and under case law, the sixty day period would run from the time constructive notice is given; the date of the Federal Register publication. Section 2395(a), however, is not so specific in its definition of notice. The court concludes, therefore, that the statute requires a consideration of whether notice was proper in the context of other applicable statutes and regulations. Section 223 of the Act provides that the Secretary of Labor must act on a petition for trade adjustment assistance within sixty days after such petition is filed.4 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a) (1982). The Secretary of Labor’s final determina[648]*648tion was published in the Federal Register approximately four months after plaintiffs’ petition was filed, far exceeding the sixty day statutory provision. Although failure to comply with this deadline does not make the Secretary of Labor’s determination ultra vires, Katunich v. Donovan, 8 CIT 156, 594 F. Supp. 744, 748-49 (1984), the court determines that certain consequences flow from a late determination. As previously recognized by this court,

It is well settled that "essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (quoting Frankfurter, J., concurring in Joint Anti-Facists Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)) (emphasis added). It is also true that "because of the ex parte nature of the certification process, and the remedial purpose of the trade adjustment assistance program, the Secretary is obliged to conduct his investigation with the utmost regard for the petitioning workers.” Local 167, International Molders and Allied Workers’ Union v. Marshall, 643 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1981).

Estate of William Finkel v. Donovan, 9 CIT 374, Slip Op. 85-80 at 9-10 (July 31, 1985).

Particularly where, as here, a party is proceeding pro se before the Secretary of Labor, the court finds that the Secretary’s failure to comply with the statutory time constraints regarding issuance of a final determination makes it inappropriate to hold that publication in the Federal Register places plaintiffs on constructive notice and thereby marks the beginning of the sixty day statute of limitations. Congress could not have intended a pro se party to constantly search the Federal Register for the final determination of the Secretary of Labor for months beyond the sixty days within which such determination is due under the statute. Under the circumstances of this case, actual notice should have been provided and constructive notice will not mark the running of the statute of limitations. In a somewhat similar situation the court noted, "[t]he cost and administrative burden of conveying the additional information is minimal when compared with the benefits reaped by the parties and the court in devoting their efforts to the merits of the case rather than to procedural issues.” Tyler v. Donovan, 3 CIT 62, 66, 535 F. Supp. 691, 694 (1982).5 Plaintiffs did not receive actual notice of the negative determination until February 18, 1985. By filing a summons and complaint on March 28, 1985, plaintiffs were well within the sixty day statute of limitations.6

[649]*649As indicated, the court must review the Secretary’s decision to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is characterized as "more than a mere scintilla.’ ” Dan Stipe v. U.S. Department of Labor, 9 CIT 543, Slip Op. 85-112 at 3 (October 25, 1985) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance (OTAA), is charged with conducting investigations of petitions for adjustment assistance. 29 C.F.R. § 90.12

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9 Ct. Int'l Trade 646, 626 F. Supp. 398, 9 C.I.T. 646, 1985 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 1502, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelley-v-secretary-us-department-of-labor-cit-1985.