Kelley v. Quiros

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedFebruary 8, 2023
Docket3:22-cv-01425
StatusUnknown

This text of Kelley v. Quiros (Kelley v. Quiros) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelley v. Quiros, (D. Conn. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT TROY KELLEY, ) CASE NO. 3:22-cv-1425 (KAD) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ANGEL QUIROS, et al., ) FEBRUARY 8, 2023 Defendants. ) INITIAL REVIEW ORDER Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge: Preliminary Statement Plaintiff, Troy Kelley, filed this complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while he was confined at New Haven Correctional Center. Plaintiff names five defendants in the case caption: Commissioner Angel Quiros, Warden Stephen Brunell, Deputy Warden Whitingham, Deputy Warden Robles, and Administrative Nurse Jane Doe. In the body of the complaint, Plaintiff includes a sixth defendant, Nurse Paul. All defendants are named in their individual and official capacities. Kelley contends that Defendants Doe and Paul provided inadequate medical treatment after he contracted COVID-19 and that the remaining Defendants failed to take adequate precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-19. He seeks damages and asks that any damages awarded be exempt from attachment for costs of incarceration. Standard of Review Under Section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code, the Court must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations, and interpret them liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[].” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants). Although detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate

a right to relief. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Allegations At an unspecified time, Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 while confined at New Haven Correctional Center. He alleges he was inadequately treated for COVID-19 by Nurse Supervisor Doe and Nurse Paul. See Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 5. Plaintiff further alleges that the facility failed to adequately protect the inmates because the number of inmates housed in the dorm—over 124— was not limited; there was no social distancing; and cleaners were not used to “kill” the virus. As

a result, Plaintiff suffered severe pain and respiratory complications from contracting the virus. Plaintiff filed three administrative remedies seeking medical treatment but received no responses. In over six months, he did not receive a receipt or grievance number for any administrative remedy, and none were returned to him. See id. at 6. Discussion As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Complaint is not signed. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) requires that all pleadings must be signed by the party personally if the party is not represented. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he must sign the Complaint.

2 Plaintiff describes his claims as gross negligence and willful neglect, but to proceed under Section 1983, he must assert a federal constitutional violation. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court construes the allegations as a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was a sentenced inmate or a pretrial detainee at the

time he contacted COVID-19,1 but as he alleges that he waited six months for a response after filing his administrative remedies, the Court assumes that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. Thus, the Court considers his deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (deliberate indifference claims of sentenced inmates are considered under the Eighth Amendment while deliberate indifference claims of pretrial detainees are considered under the Fourteenth Amendment). Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Paul and Nurse Supervisor Doe failed to adequately treat his pain and respiratory complications from COVID-19. To establish a claim for deliberate

indifference to medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish that “the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the right to due process,” and that “the officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. The “serious medical need standard contemplates a condition of urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.”

1 Information on the Department of Correction website shows that Plaintiff was admitted to custody on March 21, 2022 and sentenced on August 12, 2022. He currently is confined at Willard-Cybulski Correctional Institution. See www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv/asp?id_inmt_num=224948 (last visited Feb. 7, 2023). The Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. See, e.g., Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Rivera, 466 F. Supp. 3d 310, 313 (D. Conn. 2020) (taking judicial notice of BOP inmate location information); Ligon v. Doherty, 208 F. Supp. 2d 384, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (taking judicial notice of state prison website inmate locator information). 3 Charles v. Orange Cty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019). “In most cases, the actual medical consequences that flow from the denial of care are highly relevant in determining whether the denial of treatment subjected the detainee to a significant risk of serious harm.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered respiratory complications “almost causing his death.” Compl. at 6. Thus, the Court assumes that Plaintiff had a serious medical need.

Plaintiff must also allege facts which demonstrate the requisite mens rea—deliberate indifference. Specifically, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. Negligence, however, “does not, without more, engender a constitutional claim.” Sanders v. Laplante, No. 3:19-cv-01151 (CSH), 2019 WL 5538188, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2019); see also Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36 (“[A]ny § 1983 claim for a violation of due process requires proof of a mens rea greater than mere negligence.”).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Tracy v. Freshwater
623 F.3d 90 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Ligon v. Doherty
208 F. Supp. 2d 384 (E.D. New York, 2002)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Charles v. Orange County
925 F.3d 73 (Second Circuit, 2019)
Tangreti v. Bachmann
983 F.3d 609 (Second Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
Kelley v. Quiros, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelley-v-quiros-ctd-2023.