Kelley v. Mayor

6 Misc. 516, 27 N.Y.S. 164, 56 N.Y. St. Rep. 845
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 6 Misc. 516 (Kelley v. Mayor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelley v. Mayor, 6 Misc. 516, 27 N.Y.S. 164, 56 N.Y. St. Rep. 845 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1894).

Opinion

Dykman, J.

The water supply of the city of New York is derived entirely from the valley of the Croton river. The watershed embraces an area of about 300 square miles in extent, and is drained by the three branches of the Croton, designated as the eastern, middle and western. These branches unite in the upper part of Westchester county, and the river runs on for several miles until it receives the Muscoot river, which brings the water from Lake Mahopae, and then it flows into Croton lake.

When it had been determined that the valley of the Croton should be utilized for the procurement of water for the. municipality, the legislature passed a law authorizing the city to acquire title to land by right of eminent domain for the construction of a dam and reservoir at the southerly end of the shed, for the impounding of the water, and an aqueduct to convey the water to the city. Under that legislative, authority the dam, aqueduct and reservoir were constructed, and the title to the land covered by water was acquired. The reservoir* is known as Croton lake. It is a narrow, crooked body of water, about four miles in length. The different branches of the Croton are augmented by numerous smaller streams, and Upon their banks and along the sides of the three branches are barnyards, privies, pigsties, and other places where filth is collected and washed into the streams.

• These places for the collection and deposition of filth and putrefaction became so numerous and so extensive, and so polluted the water, as to cause great alarm and anxiety among the inhabitants of the city.

Scientific and medical skill united in declaring the danger to health and life very great and very imminent, and- in answer to the demand for the adoption of some measure which might avert the peril by the removal of the cause, the legislature of the state, in March, 1893, passed an act entitled “ An act to provide for the sanitary protection of the sources [518]*518of the water supply of the city of ISTew York.” Chapter 189, Laws of 1893.

By section 1 of that act it was made lawful for the commissioner of public works of the city of Hew York to acquire or take, in the manner thereinafter set forth, title to all real estate, and acquire or extinguish any interest therein, of which the acquisition, taking or extinguishment may be necessary for the sanitary protection of all rivers and other watercourses, lakes, ponds and reservoirs in the counties of Westchester, Putnam and Dutchess, so far as they then were or thereafter might be used for the supply of water for the city of Hew York. The mode of acquiring titles and the extinguishment of interests. is prescribed in the law from section 2 to section 26 inclusive, and they are the usual constitutional methods. By section 27 of the act the commissioner of public works is authorized to take such measures as may be necessary to preserve from pollution and defilement all the sources of the water supply in the three counties already mentioned, and to enter upon all lands near, adjacent or contiguous to any of the sources of water supply, and to abate and remove the cause of any such pollution or defilement. All damage and injuries to property occasioned by any act under that section were to be ascertained and paid in accordance with the provision of the previous section of the act.

The plaintiff in this action owns about 100 acres of land in the town of Carmel, and the middle branch of the Croton runs through the westerly portion of her farm from north to south. Her barn and horse stable are on the east side of the. stream, in close proximity to the bank, and her mansion is on the west side of the stream, a short distance from it. The drainage of her dwelling house, including that of the water closet, is let into the stream by a soil' pipe, and is emptied there, and has been for many years. ' Upon the ascertainment of such facts, the commissioner of public works directed the removal of the barnyard, stables, pigsties and outside privies upon the premises of the plaintiff, and caused a?cesspool to be constructed upon her land and the soil pipe to be conducted [519]*519into the cesspool, so that the drainage from the house would run into it, and not into the stream of water. Thereupon the plaintiff commenced this action for the purpose of restraining the defendant and its officers from further interference with her property.

The action is based upon the theory of the unconstitutionality of the act of 1893 already mentioned. It will be profitable to ascertain the rights of these parties prior to that statute. It is the legal right of every riparian proprietor to have a stream of water which passes through his land flow in its natural condition, with its channel unchanged and its purity unimpaired. Such a right was vested in and pertained to the defendant as the owner of the bed of .Croton lake and the banks by which it was environed. That lake is, in fact, a running stream, through which 100,000,000 of gallons of water run daily in its onward progress to the city. The pollution of the water by the sewage from the plaintiff’s house and the wash from the outbuildings was an invasion of the rights of the defendant and also constituted a nuisance.

Nuisances are of three kinds, public, private and mixed. They are public wrhen they violate public rights and produce a common injury; when they injure or annoy that portion of the public which necessarily comes in contact with it. They are private when the injury resulting from them violates only private rights and produces damage to a few persons only. Mixed nuisances are those which are both public and private in their effects : public, because they injure many persons or all the community, and private in that they also produce special injury to private rights. Wood’s Law of Nuisance, 22.

It is not always easy to determine the class to which any given injury is to be designated. In this case it is plain that the injury is not amere private nuisance. Its injurious effects and fatal consequences fall upon all who use the polluted water, and that may include not only the million and a half of inhabitants of the city, but also all who visit there.

The nuisance created and continued by the plaintiff is either public or mixed, and, in my judgment, it is public, because it cor[520]*520rupts and poisons water which all have a right to use. It is, in its nature and consequences, an injury to ail who come within the sphere of its operation, and that may be millions of human beings. The question is only important in reference to the right of the plaintiff to prescribe for the nuisance, for in this state no person can obtain a prescriptive right to maintain a public nuisance. Wood’s Law of Nuisance, 743. It is presumed the same rule applies to a mixed nuisance, as that ■is in one sense public. I think, therefore, that the plaintiff cannot acquire a right by prescription to drain into this stream. But, even if she can, she has not introduced proof sufficient to establish the same. To do that it was necessary for her to show that her use of the stream has actually invaded the rights of the defendant, and that the use and invasion of the right have produced an injury equal to and of the character complained of. Wood’s Law of Nuisance, 726. The fact that a noxious trade, or a harmful use, has been continued for twenty years does not establish a prescriptive right to its exercise.

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Related

Kelley v. Mayor of New York
35 N.Y.S. 1109 (New York Supreme Court, 1895)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Misc. 516, 27 N.Y.S. 164, 56 N.Y. St. Rep. 845, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelley-v-mayor-nysupct-1894.