Kelley v. King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedSeptember 2, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-01105
StatusUnknown

This text of Kelley v. King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention (Kelley v. King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelley v. King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention, (W.D. Wash. 2022).

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE

8 JASON PAUL KELLEY,

9 Plaintiff, Case No. C22-1105-LK-MLP

10 v. ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE 11 KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMPLAINT AND GRANTING ADULT AND JUVENILE DETENTION, et LEAVE TO AMEND 12 al.,

13 Defendants.

15 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION 16 Plaintiff Jason Paul Kelley is a pretrial detainee who is confined at the Maleng Regional 17 Justice Center (“RJC”) in Kent, Washington. He has submitted to the Court for filing a prisoner 18 civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See dkt # 3-1.) The Court, having reviewed 19 Plaintiff’s proposed complaint, concludes that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a viable claim 20 for relief in his pleading. The Court therefore declines to order that Plaintiff’s complaint be 21 served on Defendants, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint correcting the 22 deficiencies identified below. 23 ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE COMPLAINT

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND - 1 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that on October 16, 2021, while confined at the RJC, he 3 sought medical care when his left leg began to swell. (Dkt. # 3-1 at 6.) A nurse examined 4 Plaintiff’s leg and then sent him to Harborview Medical Center (“HMC”) for evaluation. (Id.)

5 HMC staff ran a test and advised that more tests were needed in order to determine a treatment 6 plan. (Id.) Plaintiff was apparently scheduled for another appointment at HMC on November 5, 7 2021, but that appointment was cancelled. (Id. at 4.) On November 24, 2021, Plaintiff was 8 transported from the RJC to HMC for another appointment, but HMC staff merely repeated the 9 same test that had been conducted the month prior. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff appears to assert that the 10 King County Jail Health Services staff set up the wrong appointment as it was his understanding 11 that he should have received a different test. (Id.) 12 Plaintiff asserts that after returning to the RJC, it took over two months before he was 13 able to speak to a medical provider, despite submitting repeated kites explaining that he needed

14 to have his thigh measured per instructions received from HMC. (Dkt. # 3-1 at 6.) Plaintiff 15 appears to assert that when he finally spoke to a nurse, she indicated he had been seen by a 16 provider on December 18, 2021, but, according to Plaintiff, no providers were available that day 17 because it was a weekend. (Id.) 18 On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff’s left leg was examined again by an RJC nurse who saw 19 that Plaintiff’s leg was black and blue. (Dkt. # 3-1 at 6-7.) Plaintiff asserts he was immediately 20 transported to HMC where another test was performed, and he was told he would need to see 21 three different specialists. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff claims the RJC medical staff advised him that the 22 three referrals had been made and that it may take up to six months to be seen. (Id.) He further 23 claims that HMC has been sending letters and emails to his home address in an attempt to set up ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE COMPLAINT

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND - 2 1 the appointments, but he has been unable to reply because he is incarcerated. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff 2 suggests that these communications from HMC indicate the RJC medical staff has not been 3 communicating with HMC about his medical care and has made no effort to provide him 4 treatment for his leg. (Id.) Plaintiff claims his leg is not getting better, and he asserts that the RJC

5 is willfully neglecting his medical needs causing his physical and mental health to decline. (Id.) 6 Plaintiff identifies the King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention 7 (“DAJD”) and Jail Health Services (“JHS”) as the only Defendants in his complaint. (Dkt. # 3-1 8 at 1, 3.) He requests relief in the form of an order directing Defendants to treat his leg properly 9 and he also seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 10.) 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Screening Standards 12 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to 13 screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or

14 employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 15 complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 16 may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 18 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 19 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order for a pleading to 20 state a claim for relief it must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 21 jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, 22 and a demand for the relief sought. The statement of the claim must be sufficient to “give the 23 defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE COMPLAINT

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND - 3 1 v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The factual allegations of a complaint must be “enough to 2 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 3 555 (2007). In addition, a complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible 4 on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

5 In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that 6 he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and 7 (ii) that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See 8 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff 9 must allege facts showing how individually named defendants caused, or personally participated 10 in causing, the harm alleged in the complaint. See Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 11 1981). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 12 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused 13 a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).

14 A local government unit or municipality can be sued as a “person” under § 1983. Monell 15 v. Dept. of Soc. Servs.

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Kelley v. King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelley-v-king-county-department-of-adult-and-juvenile-detention-wawd-2022.