Kelleher v. Galindo
This text of 796 A.2d 306 (Kelleher v. Galindo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Pamela KELLEHER, Plaintiff
v.
Anthony GALINDO, Defendant.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Family Part.
*307 No appearance by Plaintiff.
No appearance by Defendant.
KASSEL, J.S.C.
This case presents an issue of first impression concerning whether an "indefinite" temporary restraining order (TRO) can be issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (N.J.S.A 2C:25-17 to 33) (the Act), where the plaintiff has requested dismissal of the TRO, but had previously obtained eight TROs against the defendant in the past five years, with each of those prior TROs having been dismissed shortly after their issuance, usually based upon plaintiff's failure to appear for the hearing to determine whether a final restraining order (FRO) should be issued. While there are several reported cases concerning the dismissal of an FRO, there are no reported cases concerning the dismissal of a TRO pursuant to the Act, particularly involving the type of tortured domestic violence history involved in this case[1].
*308 In order to understand the nature of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant the court will set forth the history of domestic violence TROs that plaintiff has obtained against defendant:
1. On December 3, 1996 plaintiff obtained her first TRO against defendant. Plaintiff alleged in her compliant in support of the TRO that defendant had pushed her up against a wall, was telephoning her at least 20 times a day, and was banging on her door. The TRO was dismissed on January 8, 1997 because plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing date to determine whether an FRO should be issued.
2. On March 26, 1998 plaintiff obtained her second TRO against defendant. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint in support of the TRO that defendant had punched and broken the drivers' side window of plaintiff's car and in doing so had struck plaintiff in the face as she sat in her car. The TRO was dismissed, in an undated order, which conditioned the dismissal on the defendant undergoing anger management counseling. There is no indication in the file that in fact defendant ever completed any type of anger management counseling.
3. On December 10, 1998 plaintiff obtained her third TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that defendant repeatedly assaulted plaintiff about the head. The TRO was dismissed on December 21, 1998 based on plaintiff calling the Family Division's domestic violence unit five days earlier, wherein she advised that she wanted the TRO dismissed.
4. On January 23, 1999 plaintiff obtained her fourth TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that defendant "continues to harass and stalk plaintiff". The TRO was dismissed by order dated February 22, 1999 based on plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing to determine whether an FRO should be issued.
5. On June 15, 1999 plaintiff obtained her fifth TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that defendant had telephoned plaintiff at work and advised that he was going to "... get her, and that she would be dead". The TRO was dismissed on June 29, 1999 because plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing to determine whether an FRO should be issued.
6. On March 11, 2000 plaintiff obtained her sixth TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that defendant had pushed plaintiff and had bit her hand. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant subsequently phoned plaintiff and threatened to kill her if the criminal charges resulting from said incident where not dropped. The TRO was dismissed by order dated March 30, 2000 because plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing to determine whether an FRO should be issued.
7. On October 16, 2000 plaintiff obtained her seventh TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that over the past weekend defendant telephoned plaintiff approximately 50 times and advised that he would do bodily injury to plaintiff. The TRO was dismissed on November 9, 2000 because plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing to determine whether an FRO should be issued.
8. On January 14, 2001 plaintiff obtained her eighth TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that defendant had called plaintiff *309 and threatened plaintiff and her mother with physical harm and also to break into their house. The TRO was dismissed by order dated January 30, 2001 because plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing to determine whether an FRO should be issued.
9. On January 3, 2002 plaintiff obtained her ninth TRO against defendant. Plaintiff's complaint in support of the TRO alleged that during a verbal argument defendant punched plaintiff in the chest and face, and that defendant also threatened to kill plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to appear at the January 10, 2002 hearing that had been scheduled to determine whether an FRO should be issued, but the TRO was not dismissed as per this court's prior instruction to the Family Division's domestic violence unit. A domestic violence unit team leader spoke with plaintiff on January 11, 2002, and plaintiff advised that she could not find a babysitter and wanted to dismiss the TRO. The team leader advised plaintiff at that time that she would have to appear before this court on January 22, 2002 at 10 am, and at that time this court would hear plaintiff's motion to dismiss the TRO. Plaintiff failed to appear on January 22, 2002.[2] Plaintiff has not provided any explanation for her non-appearance. The court then read its oral opinion into the record, and entered an "indefinite" TRO[3]. The indefinite TRO provides, inter alia, that the defendant is barred from having any type of contact or communication with the plaintiff.
The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was enacted to address the fact that domestic violence is a serious crime against society, to ensure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse that the law can provide, and explicitly provides that it is the responsibility of the courts to protect victims of violence that occurs in the family or family-like setting by providing access to both emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies and sanctions. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18.
There is only one provision in the Act that makes explicit reference to the dismissal of a restraining order, and that provision relates only to final restraining orders. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29d. See also I.J. v. I.S., 328 N.J.Super. 166, 173, 744 A.2d 1246 (Ch.Div.1999). That provision provides, in pertinent part, that an FRO may be dissolved upon "good cause shown". There is a split in authority concerning whether that provision applies to both plaintiffs and defendants, or to just defendants. Compare I.J. v. I.S. supra with Stevenson v. Stevenson, 314 N.J.Super. 350, 714 A.2d 986 (Ch.Div.1998).
In regard to the dismissal of a TRO, as opposed to an FRO, the only relevant language contained in the Act provides that "An order for emergency ex parte relief shall be granted upon good cause shown and shall remain in effect until a judge of the Family Part issues a further order." (emphasis added) N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28i. The Domestic Violence Procedures Manual (rev. ed Nov. 1998) issued jointly under the authority of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Attorney
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796 A.2d 306, 350 N.J. Super. 570, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelleher-v-galindo-njsuperctappdiv-2002.