Kellar v. Baird

52 Tenn. 39
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedMay 17, 1871
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 52 Tenn. 39 (Kellar v. Baird) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kellar v. Baird, 52 Tenn. 39 (Tenn. 1871).

Opinion

NigtiolsoN, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Complainants are the administrator, and half brothers and sisters, of Andrew R. Baird, who died in Mississippi in August, 1865, unmarried, without issue and intestate. Defendants are his whole brothers and sisters, and are in possession of the personal estate of which he died possessed. Complainants insist, that although Andrew R. died in Mississippi, yet that Tennessee was his domicil; and that his personal effects are subject to distribution under the laws of Tennessee, by which the half brothers and sisters are distributees. Defendants insist that his domicil was in Mississippi, by the laws of which the half brothers and sisters take no interest in his personal estate. The only question in the case is, whether Andrew R. Baird had his domicil in Tennessee or in Mississippi at the time of his death ? . *

A careful examination of the proof leaves no doubt in our minds as to the following facts: Andrew R. Baird was born and raised in Tennessee, and had his domicil here until 1859, when he removed to Arkansas, and settled there as a lawyer. He remained in Arkansas until the breaking out of the war in 1861. He then returned to Tennessee for the purpose of entering the Confederate army, but being disappointed in procuring a quartermaster’s position, he abandoned his purpose to join the army, and remained for some time in Tennessee.

We are satisfied, that after his settlement in Arkansas as a lawyer, he had abandoned and lost his [41]*41domicil in Tennessee, and that when be returned to Tennessee to join the arrny^ his domicil was in Arkansas. But when he gave up his purpose to join the army, he abandoned the idea of returning to Arkansas, ordered his books and movables to be sent to Memphis, and there held out as a lawyer and speculated in cotton. This was an abandonment of his domicil in Arkansas. At an early day, after returning from Arkansas to Tennessee, he was seized with the mania for speculation, and from that time until the close of the war he was actively, constantly and successfully engaged in all kinds of speculations which promised to be profitable. We see in the evidence nothing that indicates that he then regarded Tennessee, or any other specific place, as his domicil. Upon abandoning his domicil in Arkansas and returning to Tennessee, the law would make Tennessee his domicil, until he might' change it by removing to and settling animo manendi in some other State.

We are satisfied, that when he left Memphis and went to St. Louis, under the pressure of threatened draft into the Federal army, he did not go there with any fixed purpose of making Missouri his permanent home. His residence at St. Louis was temporary, and his purpose was to seek some other r locality at the close of the war. During his stay in St. Louis he indulged his passion for speculations .extensively, his field of operations being up and down the Mississippi liver, dealing in cotton, tobacco, and any other southern product that would pay. Although while in Missouri he spoke of Tennessee as his home, and of [42]*42returning there after the war, we can not regard these expressions in any other light than indicating that his family were in Tennessee, and that he claimed his home there on that account; but not that he meant thereby to indicate any purpose to make Tennessee his future permanent home. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact- that he was negotiating arrangements, while in St. Louis, for engaging in speculations outside of Tennessee, and by the fact, that while living in St. Louis he told his mother and sisters that he never intended to make Tennessee his home. But during his stay in St. Louis his domicil was in Tennessee, by operation of law, and not by any definite and fixed purpose of his to make it his permanent home. This conclusion is demonstrated by the fact that when the war closed and he finally consummated his future arrangements and plans, he did not select Tennessee, but Mississippi, for the field of his operations and .speculations.

The proof is satisfactory, that, when Andrew B,. Baird effected his arrangement with Frank Holtzclaw, at St. Louis, to carry his money and a stock of goods to Mississippi, and to engage in business as merchants and cotton dealers, he had formed no fixed purpose to make Mississippi his future permanent home. He had $10,000 in' gold, and Holtzclaw had a stock of goods. His object was to unite the mercantile business with his cotton speculations, and from their joint operations to realize early and large profits. He was striking out for a quick fortune without any definite idea as to how long he would remain in Mississippi, [43]*43or as to where he would go for his next venture. We are satisfied that Holtzelaw states the case truly in his deposition when in answer to the question, “was it the intention of yourself and partner to remain there (Mississippi) permanently?” he says: “It was our intention to remain there so long as we could make it pay profitable.”

The proof shows that, while Andrew it. Baird was in Memphis on his way to Mississippi to carry out his arrangement with Holtzelaw, he spoke of returning to Tennessee after he should have accomplished his object in Mississippi. We attach but little weight to the conversation detailed by the witness, Mitchell. He says Baird proposed to him to go with him and take charge of the stock of goods, and sell them, while Baird would operate on his $10,000 in gold in cotton speculations, that they would divide the profits, return to Memphis and vest their money in real estate, and practice law in partnership. It is certain that, at the very time this witness represents Baird as making this proposition, Baird and Holtzelaw had formed a partnership, and Holtzelaw had bought the goods, and probably was then on his way to Mississippi to meet Baird. It is incredible that, under the circumstances, he would have made such a proposition with any idea that Mitchell would accept it. We infer that, if any such conversation occurred, Baird was merely amusing Mitchell by building airy castles for the future. It is manifest that at that time Baird was confirmed in his passion for speculation. He was warned of the danger of the enterprise, but he was completely under the do[44]*44minion of his passion for speculation, and determined to indulge it at the risk of his life. This proves how confident he was of success, and under that anticipation he may have indulged his imagination as to the investment of his large profits in Tennessee. J. McHenry proves that he conversed with Baird while at Memphis on his way to Mississippi. He and Baird agreed to form a partnership to practice law in Memphis when Baird should finish his speculations in Mississippi. 'Witness warned Baird of the danger of his enterprise.

Another witness, E. P. Bates, who details Baird’s declarations, while in Memphis on his way to Mississippi, as to his purpose to return to Tennessee, when asked if he thought from Baird’s declarations that he would have returned from Mississippi if he had been successful in money, he answered: “I believe if he had lived and been making money enough to have satisfied him,. he would have remained there always, although he always claimed that this (Memphis) was to be his future permanent home.” This witness comprehended the character of Baird, and understood that to make money was his predominant passion, and that his future permanent residence at Memphis was a secondary and contingent idea with him.

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Bluebook (online)
52 Tenn. 39, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kellar-v-baird-tenn-1871.