Kellaher v. Kozer

228 P. 1086, 112 Or. 149, 1924 Ore. LEXIS 48
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 30, 1924
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 228 P. 1086 (Kellaher v. Kozer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kellaher v. Kozer, 228 P. 1086, 112 Or. 149, 1924 Ore. LEXIS 48 (Or. 1924).

Opinion

RAND, J.

On July 3, 1924, an initiative petition, demanding that a proposed measure repealing the Public Service Commission law of the State of Oregon be submitted to the legal voters of the state for their adoption or rejection at the regular general election to be held on November 4, 1924, was presented to the Secretary of State for filing. To initiate this measure it was necessary, under the statute, that the petition should be filed not later than four months before the date of the election and that it should be signed by not less than 13,498 legal voters and that of these signatures to the petition not less than that number should be authenticated by the certificate of the county clerk or of a notary public in the manner directed by the statute. This statute, Section 4098, [152]*152Or. L., requires that each and every sheet of the petition containing signatures shall be verified on the face thereof by the affidavit of the person who circulated the sheet, to the effect that every person who signed the sheet signed his name in his presence, and that he believes that each has stated his name, post-office address and residence correctly and is a legal voter of the state and of the county named. The statute, in express terms, further provides that in addition to said affidavit the county clerk of each county in which such petition shall be signed shall compare the signatures of the electors signing the same with the signatures of the registration cards, books and blanks on file in his office and carefully examine the petition and attach to the sheets of the petition containing such signatures his certificate to the secretary of state certifying, in effect, that he had made said comparison and from the information he was able to obtain he believed that the signatures of the signers designated by him in his certificate are the genuine signatures of such electors, and as to the remainder of the signatures he believed that they are not genuine, except certain ones, naming them, whose names do not appear on the registration cards, books and blanks in his office. The statute further provides that this certificate of the county clerk shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and of the qualifications of the electors whose signatures are thus certified to be genuine, and directs that the Secretary of State shall consider and count only such signatures on such petitions as shall be so certified to be genuine by said county clerk. It then contains the proviso that the Secretary of State shall also consider and count such remaining signatures as shall be proved to be the genuine signatures of legal voters, [153]*153and directs that, to establish the fact that such signatures of the electors not so certified by the county clerk are the genuine signatures of legal voters, the official certificate of a notary public of the county in which the signer resides shall be required. The form of the certificate to be made by the notary public is prescribed by statute and provides that the notary public shall certify that he is personally acquainted with each of the following named electors, designating them by name, whose signatures are affixed to the annexed petition, and knows of his own knowledge that they are legal voters of the state and of the county written after their names in the petition, and that their residences and postoffice addresses are correctly stated therein.

The Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, directs that the Secretary of State, in submitting to the people petitions and orders for the initiative and for the referendum, “shall be guided by the general laws and the act submitting this amendment, until legislation shall be especially provided therefor.” Chapter 13 of Title XXVIII, of which Section 4098, Or. L., is a part, was enacted to carry into effect the amendment relating to the initiative and referendum, and furnishes the sole and exclusive guide which the Secretary of State must follow in the performance of his official duties pertaining to the filing and submission of initiative and referendum petitions. Under the provisions of the statute above referred to it was the duty of the Secretary of State to consider and count only those signatures upon the petition which had been certified, either by some county clerk or by some notary public, and those not so certified the statute expressly prohibited him from either considering or counting.

[154]*154The petition contained the signatures of 18,480 persons purporting to be legal voters of the state, all of which were certified by the affidavit of the circulator of the various sheets containing the signatures comprising the petition. Although 13,498 of these signatures were required to be certified either by the county clerk or by a notary public, only 10,247 thereof were authenticated in the manner directed by the statute. Because not so authenticated the Secretary of State refused to count the uncertified signatures or to file the petition. Upon his refusal to file the petition the relator filed a petition in this court for an alternative writ of mandamus, which was issued, and directed the Secretary of State to file the petition or to show cause for not having done so. The cause shown is by demurrer to the sufficiency of the alternative writ, which, on its face, shows the facts above stated. The affidavit of the circulator, unless accompanied by the certificate of a county clerk or of a notary public, under the clear, express, positive and mandatory directions of the statute, afforded no evidence to the Secretary of State upon which he was authorized to act. As to all signatures not so certified the Secretary of State was prohibited from considering or counting them. As a sufficient number of signatures was not certified to, the Secretary of State had no authority to file the petition or to submit the proposed measure to a vote of the people.

But it is contended upon the part of the relator that because the writ alleges that the petition was signed by more than 18,000 legal voters of the state, and since, for the purposes of the demurrer, the demurrer admits the truth of the allegation, the duty devolved upon the Secretary of State to disregard [155]*155these provisions of the statute and count all of said signatures and file the petition and submit the measure to a vote of the people. In support of this contention it is argued that because the Constitution provides that not more than eight per cent of the legal voters shall be required to propose an initiative measure the provisions of the statute above referred to are in violation of the constitutional provision and consequently are of no force or effect. The provisions of the Constitution above referred to direct that the Secretary of State and all other officers, in submitting measures to the people for their adoption or rejection at the polls, shall be guided by the general laws and the act submitting the amendment until legislation shall be especially provided therefor. This provision conferred upon the legislative assembly the power, and made it the duty of the legislature, to determine what evidence should be required to establish the qualifications of the signers to initiative petitions and the genuineness of the signatures appearing thereon. The Constitution itself provided no means by which those facts could be determined and consequently the duty necessarily devolved upon the legislature to provide a way by which those facts could be determined. The statute referred to provides the means for such determination, and, being a proper exercise of the legislative power of the state, is not subject to the objection urged.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
228 P. 1086, 112 Or. 149, 1924 Ore. LEXIS 48, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kellaher-v-kozer-or-1924.