Kelieher v. Gravois

26 So. 2d 304, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 428
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 27, 1946
DocketNo. 18437.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 26 So. 2d 304 (Kelieher v. Gravois) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So. 2d 304, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 428 (La. Ct. App. 1946).

Opinions

Mrs. Ruth Kelieher, the plaintiff, alleges that she was the former owner of the premises known as No. 2297 LaBarre Road, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and that she sold the property to the defendant, Denis Loup, on June 27, 1945, by act before Frank William Magne, Notary Public. There were seven apartments in the building and in the one occupied by Mrs. Homa Gravois were five Venetian blinds. Mrs. Kelieher contends that the blinds belong to her, having been left with Mrs. Gravois temporarily at her request. Denis Loup, the purchaser of the building, refused to permit Mrs. Kelieher to remove the blinds on the ground that they were immovable by destination. Mrs. Kelleher sought and obtained a writ of sequestration joining Mrs. Homa Gravois as party defendant. The defendant, Denis Loup, bonded the writ of sequestration and filed a motion to dissolve, averring that the blinds became his property when he acquired the realty to which they were attached. Mrs. Gravois answered denying the plaintiff's ownership of the blinds and reconvened claiming damages *Page 305 in the sum of $5,000 for illegal entry into her apartment.

The lower court dissolved the writ of sequestration and dismissed plaintiff's suit. The judgment also dismissed the reconventional demand of Mrs. Gravois and recognized Denis Loup as the owner of the Venetian blinds. Plaintiff alone has appealed.

The sole issue in the case is whether the Venetian blinds, when installed, became part of the realty as immovable by destination.

No case has been cited to us by either counsel which is directly in point and our own research has failed to reveal any.

The articles of our Civil Code, pertinent to the question under consideration, are Nos. 468 and 469, which read as follows:

468. "Things which the owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service and improvement, are immovable by destination.

"Thus the following things are immovable by destination when they have been placed by the owner for the service and improvement of a tract of land, to-wit:

* * * * * *

"All such movables as the owner has attached permanently to the tenement or to the building, are likewise immovable by destination."

469. "The owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster, or mortar, or such as can not be taken off without being broken or injured, or without breaking or injuring the part of the building to which they are attached."

In discussing these articles, the late Judge Parlange of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in an able and interesting opinion, observes:

"Those articles are taken textually from the Code Napoleon, except that as they now stand in the Louisiana Civil Code there is in article 468 (459) a serious error in the translation from the French text of the Louisiana Code of 1825 and from the Code Napoleon in rendering the French word 'exploitation' into the English word 'improvement' in the English text." Morton Trust Company v. American Salt Co., 5 Cir., 149 F. 540, 542.

Judge Parlange, after calling attention to the fact that where there is a conflict between the French and English text of the Louisiana Code of 1825, the French text must prevail, proceeds to point out that the word "exploitation" has quite a different meaning from the word "improvement." To quote further from his opinion:

"The first condition for the creation of an immovable by destination is that it be placed by the owner, and no other, upon realty. This realty, as must be clearly borne in mind, may be either land or a building erected upon land. This realty, under its double aspect just mentioned, is called by the French commentators 'fonds' from the Latin 'fundus.' No English word occurring to me which seems to render fully this word, I shall use the word 'fundus' for brevity.

"There are two, and only two, ways in which an immovable by destination may be created:

" '(1) Without any physical attachment to the fundus, but merely by the dedication of the movable to the service of the fundus. (See Civ. Code La. art. 468). (2) By means of a physical attachment affixing the movable permanently — a perpctuelle demeure. (See Civ. Code La., last paragraph of article 468).'

"The above is an extract from Planiol, Droit Civil (Paris Ed. 1904) vol. 1, p. 703.

"It should be noticed that in the last paragraph of Civ. Code La. art. 468 (459), it is said that 'all such movables as the owner has attached permanently, etc., are likewise immovables by destination.' And in the first part of Civ. Code La. art. 469 (460), it is said: 'The owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster,' etc. The words 'permanently' and 'forever' in the articles just cited are translations from the French phrase 'a perpetuelle demeure', which may be rendered as 'to remain perpetually.' It is important to consider this idea of permanency and perpetuity, and to clearly *Page 306 comprehend that it applies only to that kind of movables which are made immovables by destination by means of a physical attachment to the fundus, and that it has no bearing at all on the other kind. Baudry-Lacantinerie, Droit Civil, Des Biens (Paris Ed. 1890) vol. 5, p. 59, states his understanding of the law to be:

" '* * * All the objects attached to a fundus by the owner for its service and exploitation are by that fact alone immovables by destination, whether they are placed there forever or not. * * * All movable objects also become immovables by destination, which an owner has attached to his fundus forever in another interest (the author meaning an interest other than the service and exploitation of the fundus); such, for instance, as a purpose of utility to or ornamentation of the fundus. Therefore, perpetuity does not seem necessary except when the immobilization takes place in an interest other than the agricultural or industrial benefit of the fundus.'

"The same author, same work and volume (page 56) states the essentials of immobilization to be:

" '(1) That the movable was placed on a fundus, that is to say, an immovable by nature (either land or a building); for the movable can only become an immovable by destination as being an accessory to the fundus. (2) That the movable was placed there in the interest of the fundus, that is to say, for its service, its exploitation, its utility or its ornament. (3) That it was placed there by the owner of the fundus. Immobilization by destination necessarily supposes the act of the owner. It could not result from the act of a lessee, a renter, or even a usufructuary. The reason is that immobilization by destination takes place in the interest of the fundus, and the owner is the sole representative of that interest.'

"Planiol, in the work and volume cited, supra, at page 703, gives a test, which is that the movable in order to become immobilized must be employed in the service of the fundus, and not in the service of the person who owns the fundus. Thus, saddle. and carriage horses on a plantation, used for the pleasure and convenience of the person of the owner, are not immovables by destination, whereas a plantation horse owned by the owner of the plantation, and used by the overseer to superintend the plantation work, would unquestionably be an immovable by destination. Thus, again, in France, the horse used by a brewer to turn a mill or other machinery in the brewery is an immovable by destination; but, on the other hand, the horse used outside of the brewery to convey beer to the shopkeepers is not."

Chief Justice O'Niell in Straus v. City of New Orleans,166 La. 1035

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Bluebook (online)
26 So. 2d 304, 1946 La. App. LEXIS 428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelieher-v-gravois-lactapp-1946.