NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 24-2384 _____________
KEITH SEVICK, Appellant
v.
LIFETIME INC; LFT CONSTRUCTION CO LLC, doing business as Lifetime Construction; AGL SPRAY FOAM LLC
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (District Court No. 3:21-cv-02122) District Judge: Honorable Robert Kirsch _____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to �ird Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 16, 2025
(Filed: September 18, 2025)
Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, RENDELL, Circuit Judges. _________ O P I N I O N* _________
* �is disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Keith Sevick sued Appellees Life Time, Inc. and LFT Construction
Company, LLC (collectively “Life Time”) for negligence that resulted in serious injuries
sustained while applying paint onto foam insulation in Life Time’s building. �e District
Court granted summary judgment to Life Time because it concluded Life Time owed no
duty to protect against the hazard that caused Sevick’s injury. We will affirm.
I.
Sevick’s employer, AGL Foam Spray, LLC (“AGL”), was a subcontractor at Life
Time’s construction site responsible for installing foam insulation. Sevick’s job was to
spray fireproof paint on top of the insulation using a “spray machine.” Sevick v. Life Time
Inc., No. 21-cv-2122, 2024 (RK) (JTQ), WL 3219615, at *1 (D.N.J. June 28, 2024).
Electric heaters were on site to keep the paint warm.
Sevick and his coworker, Steven Appenzeller, had been experiencing problems
with the building’s electrical system. When the spray machine was plugged into a
building outlet, a breaker would trip. Eventually, Appenzeller was able to make the spray
machine work by plugging it into one of the electric heaters. Doing so apparently allowed
the spray machine’s power to “ ‘bypass’ the circuit breaker in the outlets.” Sevick, 2024
WL 3219615, at *3.
At some point, the hose of the spray machine was placed “on top of the heater,”
although the record does not reveal who placed it there. Id. at *4. Heat from the heater
then created a rupture in the hose, from which paint sprayed out. Life Time employee
Wilhelm Haeger, noticing the situation from several feet away, waved his arms and
2 pointed at the spray machine. Sevick approached the machine but was unable to reach the
button to turn it off, as the spraying paint blocked his path. Instead, Sevick grabbed the
hose—causing extensive injuries to his hand and arm. He was then able to turn off the
machine by kicking the power button.
�e spray machine was AGL’s own equipment. �e parties dispute who supplied
the heater, but there is evidence (albeit conflicting) that it was supplied by Life Time. �e
contract between AGL and Life Time “required AGL to supply temporary power and heat
(to the extent not provided by Life Time) to complete AGL’s work.” Id. at *10 (citation
modified). �e contract also generally obligated AGL to assume responsibility for the
safety of its own employees, although there was testimony that, in practice, Life Time’s
supervisors monitored the entire job site for safety issues.
II. 1
�e District Court granted summary judgment to Life Time because it concluded
Life Time owed no duty to guard against the hazard that caused Sevick’s injury.
�e parties agree that Life Time stood in the position of a general contractor in
charge of the worksite. Under traditional negligence principles, a general contractor is
obligated “to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition” but need not eliminate “known hazards which are part of or incidental to the
very work the [sub]contractor was hired to perform.” Wolczak v. Nat’l Elec. Prods. Corp.,
1 �e District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 168 A.2d 412, 415, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). �e District Court reasoned that
Sevick’s injury fell into the latter category because it was caused by AGL’s own
equipment and AGL routinely worked near heaters when needed to keep its paint warm.
Sevick, 2024 WL 3219615, at *7. �e District Court rejected Sevick’s argument that
Appenzeller’s decision to power the spray machine in an unusual way—i.e., from a
heater—should change that result. Life Time had no involvement in that decision, which
reflected, instead, the “subcontractor’s choice to carry out its task in an abnormally
hazardous way.” Id. at *8.
�e District Court also determined that Life Time owed no duty under the modern
negligence principles stated in Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 723 A.2d 960 (N.J. 1999). In
that case, an employee of a subcontractor was injured when she attempted to work around
a mechanical flaw in her truck, and the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned the facts
could support imposing a duty on the general contractor based on its awareness of the
hazard (and unfulfilled offer to repair it), its control over the plaintiff’s work, and its
possible violation of OSHA regulations. Id. at 965–69. But as the District Court here
explained, this case was different: Life Time had no awareness that Appenzeller would
plug the spray machine into a heater, that an unidentified person would place the hose
over it, or that Sevick would reach for the damaged hose. Nor did Life Time have control
over AGL’s equipment or how that equipment would be used, other than general
supervisory control over the worksite. Sevick, 2024 WL 3219615, at *11. Notably, AGL
was supposed to supply its own “temporary power” if needed, leaving “no basis to
conclude that it was foreseeable to Life Time that AGL’s employees would plug their
4 equipment (the spray machine) into a heating unit . . . , let alone that doing so would lead
to the hose being laid on top of the heating unit and a leak forming.” Id. at *10.
As for OSHA regulations, Sevick’s expert had opined that Life Time violated two
regulations, but the District Court found them inapplicable. A regulation requiring
sufficient clearance and ventilation around heaters to prevent fires bore no relation to how
Sevick’s injury occurred. Id. at *12 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1926.154). �e other regulation
merely defined the word “[b]arricade” but did not require barricades to be placed around
heaters. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.203 (effective prior to July 15, 2019).
Finally, the District Court was “quite dubious” of Sevick’s theory that Haeger, in
pointing at the ruptured hose and waving his arms, negligently performed a “service[]” to
Sevick as provided in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). Sevick, 2024 WL
3219615, at *13.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 24-2384 _____________
KEITH SEVICK, Appellant
v.
LIFETIME INC; LFT CONSTRUCTION CO LLC, doing business as Lifetime Construction; AGL SPRAY FOAM LLC
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (District Court No. 3:21-cv-02122) District Judge: Honorable Robert Kirsch _____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to �ird Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 16, 2025
(Filed: September 18, 2025)
Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, RENDELL, Circuit Judges. _________ O P I N I O N* _________
* �is disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Keith Sevick sued Appellees Life Time, Inc. and LFT Construction
Company, LLC (collectively “Life Time”) for negligence that resulted in serious injuries
sustained while applying paint onto foam insulation in Life Time’s building. �e District
Court granted summary judgment to Life Time because it concluded Life Time owed no
duty to protect against the hazard that caused Sevick’s injury. We will affirm.
I.
Sevick’s employer, AGL Foam Spray, LLC (“AGL”), was a subcontractor at Life
Time’s construction site responsible for installing foam insulation. Sevick’s job was to
spray fireproof paint on top of the insulation using a “spray machine.” Sevick v. Life Time
Inc., No. 21-cv-2122, 2024 (RK) (JTQ), WL 3219615, at *1 (D.N.J. June 28, 2024).
Electric heaters were on site to keep the paint warm.
Sevick and his coworker, Steven Appenzeller, had been experiencing problems
with the building’s electrical system. When the spray machine was plugged into a
building outlet, a breaker would trip. Eventually, Appenzeller was able to make the spray
machine work by plugging it into one of the electric heaters. Doing so apparently allowed
the spray machine’s power to “ ‘bypass’ the circuit breaker in the outlets.” Sevick, 2024
WL 3219615, at *3.
At some point, the hose of the spray machine was placed “on top of the heater,”
although the record does not reveal who placed it there. Id. at *4. Heat from the heater
then created a rupture in the hose, from which paint sprayed out. Life Time employee
Wilhelm Haeger, noticing the situation from several feet away, waved his arms and
2 pointed at the spray machine. Sevick approached the machine but was unable to reach the
button to turn it off, as the spraying paint blocked his path. Instead, Sevick grabbed the
hose—causing extensive injuries to his hand and arm. He was then able to turn off the
machine by kicking the power button.
�e spray machine was AGL’s own equipment. �e parties dispute who supplied
the heater, but there is evidence (albeit conflicting) that it was supplied by Life Time. �e
contract between AGL and Life Time “required AGL to supply temporary power and heat
(to the extent not provided by Life Time) to complete AGL’s work.” Id. at *10 (citation
modified). �e contract also generally obligated AGL to assume responsibility for the
safety of its own employees, although there was testimony that, in practice, Life Time’s
supervisors monitored the entire job site for safety issues.
II. 1
�e District Court granted summary judgment to Life Time because it concluded
Life Time owed no duty to guard against the hazard that caused Sevick’s injury.
�e parties agree that Life Time stood in the position of a general contractor in
charge of the worksite. Under traditional negligence principles, a general contractor is
obligated “to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition” but need not eliminate “known hazards which are part of or incidental to the
very work the [sub]contractor was hired to perform.” Wolczak v. Nat’l Elec. Prods. Corp.,
1 �e District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 168 A.2d 412, 415, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). �e District Court reasoned that
Sevick’s injury fell into the latter category because it was caused by AGL’s own
equipment and AGL routinely worked near heaters when needed to keep its paint warm.
Sevick, 2024 WL 3219615, at *7. �e District Court rejected Sevick’s argument that
Appenzeller’s decision to power the spray machine in an unusual way—i.e., from a
heater—should change that result. Life Time had no involvement in that decision, which
reflected, instead, the “subcontractor’s choice to carry out its task in an abnormally
hazardous way.” Id. at *8.
�e District Court also determined that Life Time owed no duty under the modern
negligence principles stated in Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 723 A.2d 960 (N.J. 1999). In
that case, an employee of a subcontractor was injured when she attempted to work around
a mechanical flaw in her truck, and the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned the facts
could support imposing a duty on the general contractor based on its awareness of the
hazard (and unfulfilled offer to repair it), its control over the plaintiff’s work, and its
possible violation of OSHA regulations. Id. at 965–69. But as the District Court here
explained, this case was different: Life Time had no awareness that Appenzeller would
plug the spray machine into a heater, that an unidentified person would place the hose
over it, or that Sevick would reach for the damaged hose. Nor did Life Time have control
over AGL’s equipment or how that equipment would be used, other than general
supervisory control over the worksite. Sevick, 2024 WL 3219615, at *11. Notably, AGL
was supposed to supply its own “temporary power” if needed, leaving “no basis to
conclude that it was foreseeable to Life Time that AGL’s employees would plug their
4 equipment (the spray machine) into a heating unit . . . , let alone that doing so would lead
to the hose being laid on top of the heating unit and a leak forming.” Id. at *10.
As for OSHA regulations, Sevick’s expert had opined that Life Time violated two
regulations, but the District Court found them inapplicable. A regulation requiring
sufficient clearance and ventilation around heaters to prevent fires bore no relation to how
Sevick’s injury occurred. Id. at *12 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1926.154). �e other regulation
merely defined the word “[b]arricade” but did not require barricades to be placed around
heaters. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.203 (effective prior to July 15, 2019).
Finally, the District Court was “quite dubious” of Sevick’s theory that Haeger, in
pointing at the ruptured hose and waving his arms, negligently performed a “service[]” to
Sevick as provided in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). Sevick, 2024 WL
3219615, at *13. Even assuming that merely “pointing out a danger to a person” could
“trigger[] a duty to do anything further,” nothing Haeger did harmed Sevick: the spraying
hose was the same both before and after Haeger pointed and waved his arms. Id. at *13-
14. Haeger never instructed Sevick to grab the hose, and, since it was not Haeger’s
machine, he had no reason to suspect that Sevick would do so.
III.
We agree with the District Court’s reasoning and find Sevick’s contrary arguments
unpersuasive. Sevick’s injury was incidental to the manner in which the subcontractor,
AGL, performed its work. While Sevick points to the building’s faulty electrical system,
he offers no evidence that that condition was either unusual or hazardous, and the only
evidence on either point is that AGL was contractually obligated to supply its own
5 temporary power. As for Haeger’s act of pointing and waving his arms, that did not
increase the danger to Sevick for the reasons the District Court explained. We also agree
with the District Court that Life Time had no reason to foresee the unusual chain of
events running from Appenzeller’s plugging the spray machine into a heater, the hose
ending up on top, the hose rupturing, and Sevick grabbing it. Life Time’s general
supervision of the worksite, without more, would not create a duty to guard against such
an unforeseeable injury related to the use of the subcontractor’s own equipment. See
Alloway, 723 A.2d at 964 (describing foreseeability as the “major consideration” in
whether to impose a duty). Sevick’s additional arguments regarding OSHA violations and
the Restatement of Torts lack merit.
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.