Keith Sequeira v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-3262
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

BLD-067 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-3262 ___________

In re: KEITH P. SEQUEIRA and HELEN D. SEQUEIRA, Petitioners ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 3:21-cv-20618) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 21 February 8, 2024

Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: March 4, 2024) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) filed a residential foreclosure

action in the Superior Court of New Jersey against Keith and Helen Sequeira. After the

Sequeiras removed the foreclosure action, the District Court granted MetLife’s motion to

remand, concluding that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking. Concomitant with the

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. remand ruling was an entry on the federal docket indicating that the Clerk of the District

Court mailed a certified copy of the remand order to the state court.

Over one month post-remand, the Sequeiras filed a motion to extend the time to

appeal the District Court’s order, under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). The District Court entered

an order denying that motion, and we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Sequeiras’

appeal therefrom. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Keith Sequeira, et al. v. Washington

Mut. Bank, et al., C.A. No. 23-1324, Doc. 14 (3d Cir. July 27, 2023) (order).

The Sequeiras have now filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. They argue that

there is no evidence the state court ever received the certified copy of the District Court’s

remand order, which, they contend, means jurisdiction was never effectively divested from

the District Court and returned to the state court. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A certified copy

of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State

court may thereupon proceed with such case.”). The Sequeiras primarily request an order

from this Court directing the District Court to ask the state court: “Did you receive a

certified copy of the Remand Order? and, if so, when?” Pet. at 9. 1

The Sequeiras made the same jurisdictional argument when they were last in this

Court. In support of their argument then, they disputed the state court judge’s statement on

the record that he had received via email a certified copy of the remand order. See, e.g.,

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., C.A. No. 23-1324 at Doc. 9, p. 9. The Sequeiras also supported

their argument with a copy of the state court docket, which did not contain an

1 The Sequeiras also request that their foreclosure action be “remanded” from the District Court to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

2 administrative entry confirming the state court clerk’s receipt of the remand order, but

which did contain a May 23, 2022 entry indicating that one of the parties had filed a

certification related to remand. 2

Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances. See

In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). “Before a writ of

mandamus may issue, a party must establish that (1) no other adequate means [exist] to

attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and

indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Hollingsworth v.

Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

A corollary to the “no other adequate means” prong of the mandamus standard is

that mandamus proceedings must not be used as an appeal substitute or do-over, the

Sequeiras’ possible strategy here. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26

(1943); see also Oracare DPO, Inc. v. Merin, 972 F.2d 519, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Of course,

we will not hold that Fortunato now lacks adequate alternative means to obtain the relief

he seeks simply because he allowed the time for an appeal to expire.”). In any event, the

Sequeiras have failed to clearly establish § 1447(c) error—let alone a right to relief

connected to such an error—as their allegations run counter to the statement on the District

Court’s docket that a certified copy of the remand order was sent. See DC ECF No. 28; see

also Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 729 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 2013) (“According to our

precedent, the mailing of a certified copy of the remand order to state court is the event that

2 We take judicial notice of the fact that the certification filing attached a copy of the District Court’s remand order.

3 formally transfers jurisdiction from a district court within this Circuit to a state court.”). 3

Furthermore, it is also a rule in mandamus cases that the writ “must be ‘in aid

of’ our jurisdiction,” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,

1422 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), a trait that is conspicuously absent from a request

that a federal appellate court direct a federal district court in a closed case to correspond

with a state court.

The Sequeiras’ right to relief being neither “clear” nor “indisputable,” they have

failed to satisfy the standard for mandamus relief and their petition will, as a result, be

denied.

3 None of the district court cases relied on by the Sequeiras provides solid support for their position, even if those cases were binding on this Court (which they are not).