Keith L. Nash v. Chuck Atkins

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedNovember 16, 2020
Docket81841-4
StatusUnpublished

This text of Keith L. Nash v. Chuck Atkins (Keith L. Nash v. Chuck Atkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keith L. Nash v. Chuck Atkins, (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

KEITH LENICHULAS NASH, ) No. 81841-4-I ) Appellant, ) DIVISION ONE ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) CHUCK ATKINS, in his individual and ) official capacity; MIKE COOK, in his ) individual and official capacity; RICHARD ) J. BISHOP, in his individual and official ) capacity; KEVIN SCHMIDT, in his ) individual and official capacity; RANDY ) TANGER, in his individual and official ) capacity; CYNTHIA BULL, in her individual ) and official capacity; PAUL DOUGHER, in ) his individual and official capacity; DEBBIE ) SCHMIERER, in her individual and official ) capacity; DAN PLOTNER, in his individual ) and official capacity; MICHELLE ADDIE, in ) her individual and official capacity; SCOTT ) GENTRY, in his individual and official ) capacity; CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, in ) his individual and official capacity, ) ) Respondents. ) )

HAZELRIGG, J. — Keith L. Nash seeks reversal of an order dismissing his

suit for negligence against employees of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office.

Although Nash filed his complaint within the allowable period, he did not serve the

defendants with the summons and complaint, thereby completing commencement

of the action, before the statute of limitations ran. We affirm.

Citations and pinpoint citations are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 81841-4-I/2

FACTS

On September 16, 2015, Keith Nash filed a complaint in Clark County

Superior Court against a number of Clark County Sheriff’s Office employees. In

January 2017, he sought voluntary dismissal of the suit because he had not filed

a tort claim with the County Office of Risk Management before commencing his

suit, as required by RCW 4.92.100 and .110. The court dismissed the complaint

without prejudice. Nash then filed a tort claim form with Clark County Risk

Management. The County denied indemnity and liability regarding his claims.

Nash moved to vacate the dismissal of his complaint, but the court denied the

motion.

On May 9, 2018, he filed another complaint in Clark County Superior Court

under the same case number, alleging that the defendants’ actions from August

30, 2014 through August 21, 2015 constituted negligence. The twelve defendants,

all employees of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office, were named in both their

individual and official capacity. Nash sought a waiver of civil fees and surcharges,

asserting that he had been incarcerated since August 9, 2016 and could not afford

the fees. The court found him indigent and granted the fee waiver.

Nash also filed a motion seeking permission to serve the defendants by mail

or waive the service rules entirely. He argued that such accommodation was

justified because he was incarcerated, indigent, and representing himself in the

action. He also sent to the clerk of the court a “NOTICE OF LAWSUIT AND

REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS” addressed to the

defendants. The court noted that “[t]he [m]otion/[r]equest to waive service is

-2- No. 81841-4-I/3

intended to be served on Defendants. No action to be taken by assigned

[department].” Nash filed the same motion a second time, which the court denied.

On August 2, 2018, the court assigned a new cause number to the 2018

complaint and transferred all documents filed after the complaint to the new case.

A month later, Nash requested an additional 60 days to accomplish proper service.

He argued that good cause existed to grant the extension because he believed

that “this case was current under former cause number 15-2-02580-9 which

previously obtained proper service” and because he was incarcerated and pro se.

The court denied the motion.

On April 16, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under

CR 12(b)(4) and (6), arguing that Nash had failed to serve the summons and

complaint and that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Nash

argued in response that he had served the county auditor and that the court should

allow equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he was “not at fault for

actual delays by the county failure to commence with [sic] plaintiff’s claims for

damages.” He asserted that he had served the summons and complaint on the

county auditor on November 18, 2018. He attached a copy of a letter addressed

to the auditor in which he stated, “I am and will send you copies of the civil

complaint, summons and notice of lawsuit for each named [defendant] as my

available remedy to properly serve the county separately from this letter,” and

requested “a copy of proof of service to each named [defendant] if appropriate.”

He sent another letter on February 21, 2019 in which he again requested “proof of

-3- No. 81841-4-I/4

service.” Nash asserted that the auditor told him over the phone that he had

received the copies of the summons and complaint.

The court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the matter with

prejudice. Nash moved for reconsideration under CR 59, which was denied. He

appealed the dismissal and the denial of reconsideration.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion for Service by Mail or Waiver of Service Requirements and Motion

for Extension of Time for Service

Nash contends that the court erred in denying his motion seeking

permission to serve the defendants by mail under CR 4(d)(4) or waiver of the

service rules. He also argues that the court erred in denying his request for an

extension of time to effectuate service of the summons and complaint under CR

6(b). However, the court’s orders denying these motions do not appear to be

included in the record before us. The party seeking review has the responsibility

to designate the clerk’s papers to be transmitted to the appellate court. RAP 9.6(a);

State v. Drum, 168 Wn.2d 23, 38 n.3, 225 P.3d 237 (2010). “The clerk’s papers

shall include, at a minimum: . . . any written order or ruling not attached to the

notice of appeal, of which a party seeks review.” RAP 9.6(b)(1)(D). We are not

able to review matters referred to in the briefing but not included in the record.

State v. Stockton, 97 Wn.2d 528, 530, 647 P.2d 21 (1982). Therefore, we cannot

consider these assignments of error.

-4- No. 81841-4-I/5

II. Dismissal

Nash contends that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion

to dismiss under CR 12(b). A party may move for dismissal on the grounds that

the plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. CR 12(b)(6).

If matters outside the pleading are presented to the court on a motion to dismiss

under CR 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them, “the motion shall be

treated as one for summary judgment.” CR 12(b). Where the trial court has

considered matters outside the pleadings, we review a trial court’s order on a CR

12(b)(6) motion as a grant of summary judgment. Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy,

Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909, 922, 296 P.3d 860 (2013).

A decision granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Id. Summary

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

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