Keith Jerome Wright v. Sandoval

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 23, 2026·No. 1:22-cv-01082·Unknown

Opinion

KEITH JEROME WRIGHT, Case No. 1:22-cv-01082-JLT-CDB (PC)

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PARTIES’ CROSS v. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SANDOVAL, (Docs. 37 & 41)

Defendant.

Plaintiff Keith Jerome Wright is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court issued its Discovery and Scheduling Order on September 13, 2024. (Doc. 28.) Relevant here, the deadline for filing dispositive motions was July 24, 2025. (Id.) On June 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 37.) On July 17, 2025, Defendant Sandoval filed his opposition brief to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 39.) On July 24, 2025, Defendant filed his motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 41.) On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed his reply brief in support of his motion for summary judgment in a document titled “Opposition to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary The Court granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file an opposition brief to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45), and on August 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition brief (Doc. 46). On August 29, 2025, Defendant filed his reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 47.) Motions for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of their pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists or shows that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, the opposing party must also demonstrate that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments). In resolving the summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, “inferences are not drawn out of thin air,” and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The Equal Protection Clause does not, however, require that “all prisoners must receive identical treatment and resources.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). An incarcerated adherent of a minority religion has an equal protection right to “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).). There is no requirement that “every sect or group within a prison” have “identical facilities or personnel.” Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568 (1987) (citing Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2); accord Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123-24 (finding Wiccan inmates did not have equal protection right to paid chaplain when they had access to a volunteer chaplain). To demonstrate a plausible equal protection claim, an inmate plaintiff must show either: that Defendant intentionally discriminated against him based upon membership in a protected class, see Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005), or that he received disparate treatment compared to adherents of other religions, see Rouser v. White, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2009). If proceeding under the disparate treatment theory, plaintiff must show the following: (1) he

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