Keith Edward Smith v. James R. Metts

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: February 8, 2010
• Docket: 2010-UP-111
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Keith Edward Smith, Appellant,

v.

James R. Metts, "Sheriff" Lexington County, Respondent.

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Appeal From Lexington County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-111
Submitted February 1, 2010 – Filed February 8, 2010   

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AFFIRMED

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Keith Edward Smith, pro se, for Appellant.

Andrew F. Lindemann and Daniel C. Plyler, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Keith Smith appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff James R. Metts.  Smith seeks to recover various items of property seized during the Lexington County Sheriff Department's (the Department) investigation concerning Smith's criminal activity. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities.

1. As to whether the plea court lacked jurisdiction to accept and sign Smith's forfeiture consent order during Smith's guilty plea hearing:  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530(d) (Supp. 2008) ("Any forfeiture may be effected by consent order approved by the court without filing or serving pleadings or notices provided that all owners and other persons with interests in the property . . . consent to the forfeiture."); Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 251, 481 S.E.2d 706, 707 (1997) ("Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating in a subsequent suit an issue actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.").

2. As to whether Smith was denied due process during the summary judgment hearing before the trial court: S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530(d) (Supp. 2008) ("Any forfeiture may be effected by consent order approved by the court without filing or serving pleadings or notices provided that all owners and other persons with interests in the property . . . consent to the forfeiture."); State v. Loftin, 278 S.C. 618, 620, 300 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1983) (holding the objection to the judge's prejudice came too late when raised after the matter was decided); Chastain v. Hiltabidle, 381 S.C. 508, 517, 673 S.E.2d 826, 831 (Ct. App. 2009) ("To demonstrate prejudice in a matter involving allegedly insufficient notice, an appellant must establish if he or she had received appropriate notice, he or she would have done something different, thereby affecting the decision of the trial court and advancing his or her case."); Butler v. Sea Pines Plantation Co., 282 S.C. 113, 122-23, 317 S.E.2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Generally, where bias and prejudice of a trial judge is claimed, the issue must be raised when the facts first become known and, in any event, before the matter is submitted for decision.").

3. As to whether the trial court erred in granting Metts's motion for summary judgment: Folkens v. Hunt, 290 S.C. 194, 205, 348 S.E.2d 839, 846 (Ct. App. 1986) ("An alternative ruling of a lower court that is not excepted to constitutes a basis for affirming the lower court and is not reviewable on appeal.").  

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

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[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.