Keith Dougherty v. Jonathan Snyder

469 F. App'x 71

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 21, 2012
• Docket: 11-2631
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

On December 2, 2011, we granted the motion for summary affirmance filed by defendants/appellees Dustin Grove, William Tollinger, Robert Barclay, Kerrie Ebaugh and North Hopewell Township. Those defendants argued that summary affirmance was appropriate as to all other defendants as well. Three more groups of defendants have since filed their own motions for summary affirmance. The motion filed by defendant Darrell N. Vanormer, Jr., also requests that we summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment in its entirety. Appellant Keith Dougherty has filed numerous responses to all of these motions.

On consideration of the parties’ filings, we agree that summary affirmance of the District Court’s judgment is appropriate as to all defendants. Accordingly, we will now affirm the judgment of the District Court in its entirety. We do so primarily for the reasons thoroughly and adequately explained by the District Court in its relevant orders and opinions, including those entered November 5, 2010 (dismissing claims of unrepresented plaintiffs), May 16, 2011 (dismissing the amended complaint), and July 12, 2011 (denying reconsideration).

We write to address only one issue. Appellant Keith Dougherty, who is not a lawyer, purported to assert claims pro se on behalf of his single-member Pennsylvania limited liability company, Docson Consulting LLC (“Docson Consulting”). The District Court dismissed those claims on November 5, 2010, on the ground that Docson Consulting must be represented by counsel in federal court. Dougherty once again purports to represent Docson Consulting pro se on appeal. On August 5, 2011, we issued an order provisionally permitting him to file briefs on Docson Consulting’s behalf but reserving decision on whether he may properly represent Docson Consulting in this appeal (and thus on whether he should have been permitted to do so in the District Court). We now conclude that he may not.

“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries ... that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993); see also Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373-74 (3d Cir.1966) (so holding). The same applies to LLCs, even those with only a single member, because even single-member LLCs have a legal identity separate from their members. See United States v. Hagerman, 545 F.3d 579, 581-82 (7th Cir.2008); Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir.2007).

Dougherty argues that such is not the case here because he asked the Internal Revenue Service to disregard Docson Consulting’s separate legal identity for federal tax purposes. That issue is not determinative. “[T]he right to conduct business in a form that confers privileges, such as the limited personal liability of the owners for tort or contract claims against the business, carries with it obligations one of which is to hire a lawyer if you want to sue or defend on behalf of the entity.” Hagerman, 545 F.3d at 581-82. Dougherty, not surprisingly, has not argued that Docson Consulting’s federal tax election has divested him of the limited personal liability otherwise afforded by Pennsylvania law. See generally 15 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 8922. Docson Consulting remains a separate legal entity, and thus must be represented by counsel. Dougherty’s numerous filings and many of his other arguments — such as his argument that Rowland is “[c]learly the worst decision in the modern era”— serve only to demonstrate the wisdom of that requirement.

For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal of Docson Consulting and will otherwise affirm the judgment of the District Court. Dougherty has filed a number of motions directed at our order of December 2 summarily affirming in part. To the extent that those motions seek reconsideration of the order, they are denied. To the extent that they seek rehearing of the order, they are premature and no action will be taken on them. If Dougherty wishes, he may seek rehearing of our final judgment in accordance with the applicable rules. Dougherty’s other requests, including his unwarranted requests for sanctions and a default judgment, are denied as well.