Keith Dean v. D. Samuels, Warden, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEITH DEAN, Case No.: 25cv2296-RSH-JLB CDCR #AD-6708, 12 ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) D. SAMUELS, Warden, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 On August 28, 2025, Plaintiff Keith Dean, a state inmate incarcerated at the Richard 19 J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se, filed 20 a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in 21 forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1; 2. On December 12, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff 22 leave to proceed IFP and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend pursuant to 28 23 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff has now 24 filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 8. 25 I. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 26 A. Standard of Review 27 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer 28 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte 1 dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails 2 to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 3 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 4 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 5 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 6 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 7 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 8 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 9 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 10 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”) Rule 11 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 12 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), 13 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Determining whether 14 a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 15 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 16 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 17 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 18 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 19 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 20 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quote 21 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation 22 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 23 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 24 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 B. Allegations in the FAC 26 Plaintiff alleges that while housed at RJD from April 9, 2024, to June 21, 2025, 27 defendants RJD Warden Samuels, his replacement RJD Warden Acevedo, and RJD Chief 28 Medical Officer Roberts received notice through an administrative appeal that Plaintiff’s 1 symptoms of a heart attack were not being adequately treated. ECF No. 8 at 4–6. He claims 2 that but for these Defendants’ failure to intervene, he would not have suffered a heart attack 3 on May 3, 2024, resulting in heart surgery, a pacemaker, weight loss and extreme pain and 4 suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. 5 Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2023, December 29, 2023, January 3, 2024, and 6 January 9, 2024, Defendant Dr. Luu observed that Plaintiff was exhibiting symptoms of 7 heart disease, including reduced energy level with light headedness, shortness of breath, 8 chest pains and tingling pain throughout his arms, and on each of those occasions 9 acknowledged Plaintiff had Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome heart disease, a history of 10 heart attacks, a previous medical ablation procedure, and a family history of heart disease. 11 Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims Dr. Luu violated the Eighth Amendment by denying Plaintiff’s 12 “demands for elevated health care to prevent heart attack,” but instead choosing to leave 13 his “low level of medical care unchanged” and instructing him to return to the prison 14 grounds on each occasion, which caused his May 3, 2024, heart attack. Id. at 7–8. Plaintiff 15 attaches excerpts of his medical records and administrative appeal as exhibits to the 16 Complaint in support of his claims. Id. at 13–32. 17 C. Discussion 18 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual 19 punishment “establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom 20 it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101–03 (1976). 21 “Deliberate indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally 22 interfere with medical treatment.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 23 2014), quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 24 “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. 25 First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. 26 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Second, Plaintiff must allege the prison official he 27 seeks to hold liable had a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ . . . [T]hat state of mind is 28 one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. A prison official can be held 1 liable only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;” 2 he “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 3 risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 4 The Complaint plausibly alleges a serious medical need in that Plaintiff alleges he 5 suffered a heart attack which required surgery and a pacemaker. See Doty v. County of 6 Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]ndicia of a ‘serious’ medical need include 7 (1) the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and worthy of 8 comment or treatment, (2) the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 9 individual’s daily activities, and (3) the existence of chronic or substantial pain.”). 10 However, the Complaint as drafted fails to plausibly allege any Defendant was deliberately 11 indifferent to that serious medical need. 12 Deliberate indifference can be shown where the chosen course of medical treatment 13 was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and chosen “in conscious disregard 14 of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th 15 Cir. 2004). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060, 16 and requires “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical 17 need” which caused the alleged injury. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 18 Plaintiff alleges Dr. Luu examined him on four occasions and observed symptoms 19 which, in conjunction with his history, should have caused Dr. Luu to alter the course of 20 the medical treatment Plaintiff was receiving, but Dr. Luu instead continued that course of 21 treatment and sent Plaintiff back to the prison grounds each time. ECF No. 8 at 7-8. 22 Plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Luu’s decision was chosen in conscious disregard of an 23 excessive risk to his health or that it was medically unacceptable under the circumstances 24 are entirely conclusory, in that he claims Dr. Luu should have altered the course of 25 treatment he was receiving but does not identify what different treatment he should have 26 received or how it would have prevented his heart attack. See Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1068 27 (“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner - or between medical 28 professionals - concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 1 indifference.”); Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[A] difference of 2 opinion between a prisoner patient and prison medical authorities as to what treatment is 3 proper and necessary does not give rise to a claim under [§ 1983].); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 4 (the “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting the plausibility standard). 5 Allegations of inadequate medical treatment, medical malpractice, or even gross 6 negligence by themselves do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See 7 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“negligen(ce) in diagnosing or treating a medical condition” does 8 not amount to deliberate indifference); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (inadvertent failure to 9 provide medical care, negligence or malpractice and differences of opinion over proper 10 treatment, do not state an Eighth Amendment claim). 11 Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against defendants Samuels, Acevedo or 12 Roberts for failing to adequately supervise Dr. Luu or intervene in his treatment decision. 13 “A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 only if ‘there exists either (1) his 14 or her personal involvement in the constitutional violation, or (2) a sufficient causal 15 connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” 16 Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018), quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 17 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). “In a section 1983 claim, a supervisor is liable for the acts of 18 his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 19 violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent them.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 20 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quote marks omitted). Because Plaintiff has failed to 21 plausibly allege a constitutional violation arising from Dr. Luu’s treatment, he has 22 necessarily failed to state a claim against Defendants Samuels, Acevedo or Roberts for 23 failing to adequately supervise Dr. Luu or intervene to prevent a violation. 24 The FAC is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 25 for failure to state a claim. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 26 D. Leave to Amend 27 In light of his pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint 28 in order to attempt to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order. See Rosati 1 || v. [gbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro 2 ||se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of 3 complaint could not be cured by amendment.) (internal quote marks omitted). 4 CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, good cause appearing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First 6 || Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant 7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)ii) & 1915A(b)(1) and GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) 8 ||days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Second Amended Complaint 9 || which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 10 be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not 11 ||named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. 12 || See S.D. CAL. Civ LR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546 (“[A]n amended 13 || pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 14 |}2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 15 |}amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”’) 16 If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint within the time provided, the 17 || Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff's failure 18 || to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(11) 19 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 20 ||amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 21 take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 22 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 6, 2026 fekut C / ,

Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 27 28 6