Keith Brown v. Mary Monsalud

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-1555
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

CLD-207 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1555 ___________

KEITH S. BROWN, Appellant

v.

DR. MARY JOY MONSALUD; DR. NEWTON; KAREN HOLLY ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-0849) District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 September 4, 2025

Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 2, 2025) _________

OPINION* _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Keith S. Brown appeals from orders dismissing certain claims,

granting summary judgment on others, and denying him injunctive relief. For the

following reasons, we will summarily affirm.

I

We provide background information only as needed as we write primarily for the

parties who are familiar with the case. Brown is a state prisoner in Pennsylvania. Brown

initially filed a civil complaint in state court. Defendants Dr. Mary Joy Monsalud, Dr.

Newton, and Karen Holly removed Brown’s state court complaint to the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania as it raised federal questions.

Brown suffers from eye problems. He was prescribed eye drops for his use in his

prison cell to treat his ailments. Brown refused this arrangement because he had mental

health issues, claiming he would instead ingest the eye drops due to his suicidal

tendencies rather than use them properly to treat his eye ailments if he had such drops

available to use when needed.

Brown filed this civil action asserting multiple claims against the three Defendants

named above. Two were federal claims; namely: (1) an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs claim; and (2) an Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA) claim. He also raised a Pennsylvania state law claim against the Defendants

for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2 The Defendants each separately moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The District Court

granted Defendants’ motions in part. The District Court dismissed Brown’s ADA claims

against all three Defendants in their individual capacities. The District Court determined

that Brown could not proceed against the Defendants on such a claim because the ADA

does not recognize a claim for monetary damages against government employees in their

individual capacities. The District Court further dismissed Brown’s ADA claims against

Defendants Monsalud and Newton in their official capacities because they are not public

entities under Title II of the ADA. However, the District Court permitted Brown’s claim

under the ADA to proceed against Defendant Holly in her official capacity and permitted

Brown’s Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants and his state law claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed as well.

Following discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the

remaining claims. Brown also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or for a

temporary restraining order. The District Court granted Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment and denied Brown’s motion for a preliminary injunction or for a

temporary restraining order. Brown then filed this appeal.1

1 Our Clerk notified the parties that this appeal may be subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) or for summary action. Brown filed a brief in support of his appeal as well as a motion for the appointment of counsel.

3 II

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review

over the District Court’s dismissal of a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). To survive

dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116,

120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We

also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment decision in

favor of the Defendants. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d

Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is

sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may affirm on any basis

in the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question in the appeal. See 3d

Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.

III

4 We agree with the District Court’s resolution of Brown’s claims. Initially, as noted

above, the District Court dismissed several of Brown’s ADA claims against the

Defendants at the motion to dismiss stage. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA for

disability-based discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he is a qualified

individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or [other activities for which a public entity is

responsible, or was otherwise] subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by

reason of his disability.” Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018). A public

entity is defined as (a) any State or local government; (b) any department, agency, special

purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (c)

the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any other commuter authority (as

defined in section 24012(4) of Title 49). See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).

The District Court properly concluded that Brown could not move forward with

his claims for individual liability against the Defendants under the ADA. See Garcia v.

S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that

there is no individual liability for damages under the ADA).

We also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s Title II ADA claims

against Defendants Monsalud and Newton as well as its grant of summary judgment in

favor of Defendant Holly in their official capacities. His allegations against Defendants

5 Monsalud and Newton under Title II of the ADA amounted to his medical disagreement

with their decision to allow him access to his eye drops in his cell, given his mental

condition. This medical disagreement with Defendants Monsalud and Newton did not rise

to the level of a Title II ADA violation against those Defendants. See Fitzgerald v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[P]urely medical decisions . . . do

not ordinarily fall within the scope of the ADA”); Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882,

883 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (medical treatment decisions are not a basis for ADA

claims); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the [ADA]

would not be violated by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its

disabled prisoners”). The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Holly for the same reason.

Next, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on Brown’s

Eighth Amendment claim. A plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate

indifference by showing that: (1) a prison official was deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs; and (2) his medical needs were serious. See Pearson v. Prison Health

Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A medical need is serious if it “has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or if it “is so obvious that a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr.

Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and

6 citations omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if she knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to a prisoner’s health or safety. See Durham v. Kelley, 82

F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023). Deliberate indifference can manifest as “an intentional

refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of

prescribed medical treatment, or a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that leads to

suffering or risk of injury.” Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).

To reiterate, the thrust of Brown’s claims against the Defendants was that it

constituted deliberate indifference for him to be prescribed eye drops for his own use in

his cell to treat his eye ailments due to his suicidal tendencies as he might ingest the

drops rather than use them properly. In this case, the District Court meticulously went

through the facts set forth against each of the three named Defendants, including Brown’s

medical records. Upon review, this Court agrees with the District Court’s determination

that Brown’s issues with the Defendants’ actions regarding his eye drops amount to one

of a mere disagreement regarding the proper administration of his eye drops – namely

whether he could administer them himself. This disagreement did not constitute

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.

Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346.

The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on

Brown’s state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. A claim for

7 intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law requires four

elements: “(1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be

intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be

severe.” Bruffett v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1982).

Pennsylvania law defines outrageous or extreme conduct as going “beyond all possible

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized

society.” Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass’n, 866 A.2d 1115, 1122 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2004). In addition to showing outrageous conduct, a plaintiff must also suffer physical

harm. See id. at 1122-23.

We agree with the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of

the Defendants on this state law claim. Again, Brown was under the treatment and care of

medical professionals. He was examined and it was determined that he could maintain

eye drops in his cell. The record confirms no conduct by the Defendants that rose to the

level of outrageousness. While Brown may have disagreed with the treatment option he

was given, this does not mean that the Defendants were liable under Pennsylvania law for

intentional infliction of emotional distress.2

IV

2 Because the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, it also properly denied Brown’s motion for a preliminary injunction or for a temporary restraining order.

8 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question

presented by this appeal. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment. Brown’s

motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.