Keith Brown Lumber Yard v. Silver Wheel Freightlines, Inc.
This text of 582 P.2d 45 (Keith Brown Lumber Yard v. Silver Wheel Freightlines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The issue in this case is whether Silver Wheel Freightlines is liable for damage to goods shipped by it from Portland to Salem, Oregon. The goods had originally been delivered to Republic Freight Systems, Inc. (Republic), a freight forwarder, in Alabama for shipment to Oregon. This action is brought under 49 USC § 20(11) (1970).1
Before trial, both parties moved for summary judgment pursuant to ORS 18.105. The trial court issued summary judgment in favor of plaintiff stating that "[t]he position of the defendant that the freight forwarder is liable is not sustained by the exhibits attached hereto.” Defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court’s decision as to defendant’s liability was error.
[634]*634The Supreme Court, in the case of Chicago Etc. R. Co. v. Acme Freight, 336 US 465, 467-78, 69 S Ct 692, 93 L Ed 817 (1949), described the characteristics of a freight forwarder in the following language:
"Freight forwarders consolidate less-than-carload freight into carloads for shipment by rail, truck, or water. Their charges approximate rail less-than-carload rates; their expenses and profits are derived from the spread between the carload and 1. c. 1. rates. Forwarders are utilized by 1. c. 1. shippers because of the speed and efficiency with which they handle shipments, the unity of responsibility obtained, and certain services which forwarders make available.2
[635]*63549 USC § 20(11) (1970) requires a common carrier to issue a bill of lading and imposes liability for damages occurring to goods on the common carrier which receives goods to transport in interstate commerce or on the common carrier which delivers such goods. Such receiving or delivering common carrier is liable to the holder of the bill of lading regardless of where the damage took place.
49 USC § 1013 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
"The provisions of section 20(11) [the Carmack Amendment] * * * shall apply with respect to freight forwarders, in the case of service subject to this part, with like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically applicable, and the freight forwarder shall be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company for the purposes of such section 20(11) and (12). * * *”
Defendant relies upon these statutes for the proposition that plaintiff’s claim must be made against Republic, the freight forwarder.
Plaintiff relies on the lack of a through bill of lading by Republic to indicate that Republic was not acting as a freight forwarder. However, plaintiff is bound by its allegation that a bill of lading was issued by the "originating carrier.”2
[636]*636Plaintiff also contends that, in spite of the fact that Republic is a freight forwarder, defendant should still be liable to plaintiff. Under 49 USC § 20(11) (1970), the Carmack Amendment, a shipper can recover only from the receiving or delivering transportation company. Arnold J. Rodin Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., All F2d 682 (5th Cir 1973). Since 49 USC § 1013 (1970) places a freight forwarder in the position of both the receiving and delivering transportation company, plaintiff can look only to the freight forwarder for recovery for damages to the goods.
Reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
582 P.2d 45, 35 Or. App. 631, 1978 Ore. App. LEXIS 2867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keith-brown-lumber-yard-v-silver-wheel-freightlines-inc-orctapp-1978.