Keisha Belle v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 19, 2023
DocketSF-0752-17-0280-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Keisha Belle v. Department of the Air Force (Keisha Belle v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keisha Belle v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KEISHA BELLE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-17-0280-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: May 19, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Neil C. Bonney, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

Larry Pruitt, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the appellant’s removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review. We REVERSE the portion of the initial decision that sustained the removal, and we AFFIRM the administrative judge’s

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

findings on the appellant’s affirmative defense. The removal action is NOT SUSTAINED.

BACKGROUND ¶2 Effective May 29, 2016, the appellant was reassigned from her position as a Child and Youth Programs Training and Curriculum Specialist in Japan to the same position in Alaska as a resolution of her equal employment opportunity (EEO) case against agency officials in Japan. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 11, Tab 22, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) at 09:00-11:00 (testimony of Civilian Personnel Officer, Joint Base Elmerdorf-Richardson (CPO-JBER)). 2 The appellant reported for duty in Alaska on June 13, 2016, at which time she completed a statement of conviction form. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, Tab 19 at 62. That form required her to disclose any arrests, charges, or convictions for a crime involving a minor, drugs, or alcohol. IAF, Tab 5 at 4. Although the form advised that the agency “is required to request a State and Criminal History Repository Check as a condition of employment,” there is no indication that the agency completed a new background investigation or suitability adjudication for the appellant after her reassignment. IAF, Tab 5 at 4; HCD at 34:00-35:00 (testimony of CPO-JBER). ¶3 On August 4, 2016, the appellant’s first-line supervisor notified the appellant, and the rest of her team, that the a gency was replacing the “simpler” statement of conviction form with the Department of Defense (DD) Form 2981, Basic Criminal History and Statement of Admission. 3 IAF, Tab 4 at 34. The

2 According to the appellant’s deposition testimony, she was reassigned from Japan to Fort Myer, where she was terminated from her position for “[l]ying on [her] [F]ederal application.” IAF, Tab 19 at 61. However, due to a successful EEO case regarding her employment in Japan, the agency agreed to reassign her to Alaska. HCD at 10:00-18:00 (testimony of CPO-JBER). 3 The statute authorizing DD Form 2981 provides that “[a]ny conviction for a sex crim e, an offense involving a child victim, . . . a drug felony, . . . [or] a crime other than a sex 3

appellant’s first- and second-line supervisors explained to her that she was required to complete the form, instructed her to complete it, and warned her that failure to do so may negatively impact her background check. Id. at 30-34. However, the appellant refused. Id. at 31. On September 6, 2016, the appellant’s second-line supervisor detailed her from her “current position working with and around children” because of her failure to complete the form. Id. at 30. ¶4 On November 30, 2016, the appellant’s first-line supervisor proposed the appellant’s removal based on a single charge of failure to maintain a condition of employment. Id. at 12, 28. The charge was based on her refusal to complete a DD Form 2981. Id. at 28. The specification in support of the charge and the background information explained that she was required to meet the background check requirements at all times, as outlined in Department of Defense Instruction 1402.05, Enclosure 3, and Air Force Instruction 34-144, chapter 9.6 and 9.6.5, and her failure to complete a DD Form 2981 prevented her from satisfying that requirement. Id. The deciding official sustained the charge, as specified, and removed the appellant, effective March 3, 2017. Id. at 12-14. ¶5 The appellant filed this appeal of her removal, in which she disputed the agency’s charge. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. She argued that a background check was the condition of her employment, whereas completing a DD Form 2981 was not. IAF, Tab 18 at 5. She claimed that, to fail the actual condition of her employment, the agency needed to issue her a negative background check or a negative suitability determination, neither of which occurred . Id. She further argued that she was not required to complete a DD Form 2981 because it was a voluntary form used for “pre-employment screening,” and she already was employed by the agency. Id. She alleged that her removal was in retaliation for her prior EEO activity and claimed that the penalty of removal was unreas onable. IAF, Tab 1 at 6.

crime . . . if it bears on an individual’s fitness to have responsibility for the safety and well-being of children” is relevant to a criminal history check. 34 U.S.C. § 20351(c). 4

¶6 After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming her removal. IAF, Tab 23, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 17. In sustaining the agency’s charge of failure to maintain a condition of employment, the administrative judge found that a completed DD Form 2981 was a condition of the appellant’s employment because it was a necessary part of the background check process. ID at 10-11. She further found that the appellant failed to meet that condition, even though she was on notice of the consequences of that failure and had a reasonable opportunity to comply. ID at 11 -12. The administrative judge also concluded that the appellant did not prove her EEO reprisal affirmative defense. ID at 12-15. Finally, the administrative judge found that there was a nexus between the sustained charge and the efficiency of the service and that the penalty of removal was within the bounds of reasonableness. ID at 12, 16. ¶7 The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved its charge. 4 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-10. The agency has filed a response, to which the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

4 The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings as to her affirmative defense. In that regard, the initial decision reflects that the administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made accurate, well-reasoned findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb those findings. See Dunn v. Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 166, ¶ 9 (2004) (declining to disturb the administrative judge’s factual findings and determination that the agency failed to establish two of its specifications because the initial decision reflected that she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility), aff’d per curiam, 139 F. App’x. 280 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

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Keisha Belle v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keisha-belle-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2023.