1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 KEIRON M. ELIAS, Case No. 2:21-cv-06052-MWF-JC 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DISMISSING THIRD v. AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 13 LEAVE TO AMEND AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO ORDER 14 C/O ROSAS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 On July 27, 2021, Plaintiff Keiron M. Elias, who is in state custody, is 19 proceeding pro se, and has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of 20 filing fees (“IFP”), filed a Civil Rights Complaint (“Original Complaint”) pursuant 21 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). On November 11, 2021, the Court screened 22 and dismissed the Original Complaint with leave to amend. (Docket No. 8). 23 Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint on April 26, 2022, and the Court 24 screened and dismissed it with leave to amend on October 31, 2022. (Docket Nos. 25 15, 16). A Second Amended Complaint then followed on March 23, 2023, and the 26 Court screened and dismissed it with leave to amend on July 3, 2023. (Docket 27 Nos. 20, 21, 23). 28 1 On September 29, 2023, the Court granted a motion to stay the case because 2 Plaintiff had been moved to the county jail in connection with a pending 3 resentencing proceeding and had no access to her1 case files and other materials 4 related to this case. (See Docket Nos. 24-25). Plaintiff proceeded to file periodic 5 status reports. (See Docket Nos. 26-28). On June 18, 2024, because Plaintiff had 6 been returned to state custody at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD) 7 and was again in possession of her files, and no further extension was warranted, 8 the Court lifted the stay and ordered Plaintiff to respond by filing either a Third 9 Amended Complaint, a voluntary notice of dismissal, or a notice of Plaintiff’s 10 intent to stand on the Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 31). 11 On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (alternatively, 12 “TAC”)2 against the following employees at California State Prison, Los Angeles 13 County (“CSP-LAC”): Correctional Officer (“C/O”) Rosas, Lt. Martinez, and 14 Associate Warden Williams and/or Warden Hor[n].3 (Docket No. 33). Warden 15 Horn is sued in is his individual and official capacities (see TAC 17, 19), while the 16 other Defendants appear to be sued in their individual capacities only. Liberally 17 construed, the Third Amended Complaint asserts claims for violations of 18 Plaintiff’s religious rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use 19 and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. 20 21 1As Plaintiff’s recent filings employ female pronouns to refer to Plaintiff, the Court does 22 so here as well. 23 2Citations to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and supporting exhibits refer to the 24 page numbers from the Court’s official Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system. 25 3Plaintiff’s reference to “Warden Hor” is construed to refer to Pat Horn, a former warden 26 of CSP-LAC. Associate Warden Williams is not named in the caption of the Third Amended 27 Complaint, but he is referenced in the claims and allegations. As discussed below, Plaintiff sometimes indicates that Warden Horn has replaced Williams as a Defendant, but Plaintiff’s 28 intentions on that point remain unclear. 2 1 || § 2000cc et seq.,* and her Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and 2 || unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.” 3 | (TAC at 5, 8-21). Plaintiff seeks $5 million in damages. (TAC at 24). 4 As the Third Amended Complaint is deficient in multiple respects, 5 | including those detailed below, it is dismissed with leave to amend. THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 7 The Third Amended Complaint, construed liberally, alleges the following:° 8 Plaintiffs religious beliefs are grounded in being “God in flesh as one.” 9 || (TAC at 6). On June 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint giving 10 || notice of her religious belief and “mental therapy.” (TAC at 6). On July 16, 2018, 11 || Plaintiff submitted an administrative request form seeking relief from prison 12 || staff's disruptions and burdens upon her religious exercise. (TAC at 6). 13 || Administrative officials granted Plaintiff's request for the right to live in peace 14 || and to use Plaintiff's religious sacraments to ensure her “mental stability and 15 || safety” after Plaintiff had suffered two prior suicide attempts, and they assertedly 16 || did not dispute the $5 million “civil liability” that Plaintiff has placed on “any 17 || hinderence [sic] or punishment for the exercise of free will, peace and love,” so 18 || long as Plaintiff did not harm anyone or disrupt the day-to-day operations of the 19 || prison. (TAC at 6). The prison psychologist understood that Plaintiffs 20 71 “Plaintiff also cites RFRA — i.e., the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. — but that Act is applicable only to the federal 22 || government, as it was held unconstitutional as applied to the states. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 3 U.S. 709, 714-16 (2005) (discussing these Acts). Plaintiff's references to RFRA are therefore construed under RLUIPA. 24 "In addition, as addressed below, the Third Amended Complaint makes several references 25 || to Plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process and to be free from retaliation, though it is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to assert claims on these grounds. 27 *Plaintiff’s account of the factual background of the case is largely copied from one of the Court’s prior screening orders, but with some edits and additions. (Compare TAC at 6-8 with 28 || Docket No. 16 at 2-4).
1 perspective on death lends her a “strong likelihood” of committing suicide in 2 prison whenever the “evils of this world” make her depression unbearable. (TAC 3 at 6). 4 When Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-LAC, she immediately placed all 5 staff and institutional officials on notice of her severe depression, past suicide 6 attempts, and need “to be left alone in peace.” (TAC at 6). She also put them on 7 notice of the $5 million liability for violating her rights. (TAC at 6). 8 On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff was running “wind sprints” back and forth along 9 the fence with headphones on “a little too loud” when she “realized inmates were 10 getting down” and an alarm was sounding. (TAC at 6). At this realization, 11 Plaintiff stopped running and got down “in a squat[t]ing position.” (TAC at 6). 12 Defendant C/O Rosas had the guard tower announce that all inmates needed to get 13 down, but Plaintiff ignored this announcement because she was already down. 14 (TAC at 6). C/O Rosas then approached Plaintiff and ordered her to “cuff up.” 15 (TAC at 6). Plaintiff peacefully complied and was taken to the “make shift police 16 station in the gym” where she was forced to submit to an unclothed body 17 inspection and was told by Rosas that she needed to be “all the way down on the 18 ground” during alarms. (TAC at 6-7). Plaintiff was receptive to the counseling. 19 (TAC at 7). Nonetheless, Rosas cited Plaintiff for violating a prison rule – title 15, 20 section 3005, of the California Code of Regulations – by “willfully delaying a 21 peace officer in the performance of duty.” (TAC at 7). 22 On May 15, 2019, Defendant Lt. Martinez found Plaintiff guilty of the rule 23 violation and punished Plaintiff with the loss of both yard and dayroom privileges 24 for ninety days, depriving Plaintiff of outdoor physical activity for that period, 25 even though prison regulations assertedly prohibit depriving inmates of outdoor 26 exercise for longer than ten days “absent extreme circumstances.” (TAC at 7). 27 Defendant Williams, an Associate Warden, approved this decision. (TAC at 7). 28 /// 4 1 Plaintiff was not present at the disciplinary hearing. (TAC at 7). Although 2 Lt. Martinez claimed that another officer had informed him that Plaintiff refused to 3 be present, Martinez did not provide any written waiver from Plaintiff, nor did he 4 mention such officer in his report.” (TAC at 7). When Plaintiff questioned 5 Martinez about who this other officer was, Martinez became evasive. (TAC at 7). 6 Martinez also did not deny that Plaintiff did not receive twenty-four-hour notice to 7 prepare for the hearing. (TAC at 7). 8 Being confined to the cell for so long caused Plaintiff’s depression, anxiety, 9 and suicidal thoughts to “skyrocket,” making Plaintiff unable to practice her “daily 10 prayers and rituals” or obtain any relief from her sacraments. (TAC at 7). She had 11 difficulty sleeping and would not clean up for herself, which caused three fights 12 with her cellmate. (TAC at 7). Plaintiff asked Lt. Martinez for the restriction to 13 be removed from her door, but he refused, even when assertedly told that he would 14 be liable if he did not do so. (TAC at 7). 15 Although, as discussed below, it is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to 16 claim, based on the foregoing allegations, that Defendants Rosas, Martinez, and 17 Williams and/or Horn violated her religious rights under the First Amendment (see 18 TAC at 5, 8-14); that Defendants Rosas, Martinez, and Williams and/or Horn 19 violated her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 20 punishment and deliberate indifference to her “serious medical need for peace and 21 tranquility in treatment of her vulnerability to suicide” (see TAC at 8, 14-19; and 22 that Defendant Williams and/or Horn violated her religious rights under RLUIPA 23 (see TAC at 5, 19-21). 24 III. PERTINENT LAW 25 A. The Screening Requirement 26 As Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against 27 governmental defendants, the Court must screen the Third Amended Complaint, 28 and is required to dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous 5 1 || or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks 2 || monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 3] U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); Byrd v. Phoenix Police 4 || Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 5 When screening a complaint to determine whether it states any claim that is 6 || viable, the Court applies the same standard as it would when evaluating a motion 7 || to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 8 | 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is 9 || read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 || Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 8, each 11 |) complaint filed in federal court must contain a “short and plain statement of the 12 | claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While 13 || Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum a complaint 14 || must allege enough specific facts to provide both “fair notice” of the particular 15 || claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] rests.” Bell 16 || Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and 17 || quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 18 || (Rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 19 | unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 20 To avoid dismissal on screening, a complaint must “contain sufficient 21 || factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 22 || face.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. City of 23 || Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (Twombly and Iqbal instruct that 24 || plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that [plaintiff's] claim has 25 || substantive plausibility”). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged in the 26 || complaint would support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to 27 || relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 28 || (citation omitted); see also Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242 (9th Cir. 2018)
1 || CA] [Section 1983] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, 2 || through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”’) 3 || (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676); Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 4 || (N.D. Cal. 1988) (complaint “must allege the basis of [plaintiff's] claim against 5 || each defendant” to satisfy Rule 8 requirements (emphasis added)). Allegations 6 || that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, or reflect only “the mere 7 || possibility of misconduct” do not “show|] that the pleader is entitled to relief” (as 8 || required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), and thus are insufficient to state a claim that is 9 || “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and quotation marks 10 || omitted). 11 At this preliminary stage, “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint 12 || are assumed true, while “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” 13 || and “legal conclusion|s] couched as a factual allegation” are not. Id. (citation and 14 || quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) 15 || (‘mere legal conclusions ‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth’” (quoting 16 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). In addition, the 17 || Court is “not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 18 || contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” Steckman v. Hart 19 || Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and 20 || “need not [] accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 21 || judicial notice or by exhibit,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 22 || 988 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 23 || omitted). 24 In general, civil rights complaints are interpreted liberally in order to give 25 || pro se plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations and 26 || internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must still follow 27 || the rules of procedure that govern all litigants in federal court, including the 28 | Rule 8 requirement that a complaint minimally state a short and plain statement of
1 || acclaim that is plausible on its face. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 2 || 1995) (per curiam) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro 3 || se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 4 | 516 US. 838 (1995); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 5 || 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] liberal interpretation of a... civil rights 6 || complaint may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially 7 || pled.” (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)) (quotation 8 | marks omitted; ellipses in original)). 9 If a pro se complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court must 10 | “freely” grant leave to amend. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 11 | 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 12 | 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 || Nonetheless, courts have the discretion to deny leave to amend in cases of undue 14 || delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, “repeated failure to cure 15 || deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” and futility. See Foman v. 16 || Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted). 17 || Courts have “particularly broad” discretion where a plaintiff “has previously 18 || amended the complaint.” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (citation and quotation marks 19 || omitted); see also Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999) 20 || (‘The trial court’s discretion . . . is particularly broad where . . . a plaintiff 21 || previously has been granted leave to amend.” (citations omitted)). 22 B. —_ Section 1983 Claims 23 To state a Section 1983 claim, a complaint must allege that a defendant, 24 || while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiffs federal 25 || rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations 26 || omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 27 || There is no vicarious liability in Section 1983 lawsuits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 28 || (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
1 || 658, 691 (1978)). Hence, a government official may not be held liable under 2 || Section 1983 unless the particular official’s own actions caused the alleged 3 || constitutional deprivation. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 4 || (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 819 (2013). 5 | A Section 1983 plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate (i.e., 6 || legal) causation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th 7 || Cir. 2008). Allegations regarding Section 1983 causation “must be individualized 8 | and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose 9 || acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. 10 || Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “Sweeping 11 | conclusory allegations [regarding causation] will not suffice ....” Id. (citation 12 || omitted). 13 An individual “causes” a constitutional deprivation basically when he 14 | (1) “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 15 || perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation”; or 16 || (2) “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or 17 || reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” 18 || Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting 19 | Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)) (quotation marks 20 || omitted). 21 Similarly, a government official acting in a supervisory capacity “causes” a 22 || deprivation to the extent he (1) personally participates in or directs a subordinate’s 23 || constitutional violation; or (2) was not “physically present when the [plaintiffs] 24 | injury occurred,” but the constitutional deprivation can, nonetheless, be “directly 25 || attributed” to the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 26 || 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 566 U.S. 982 (2012); see also OSU 27 || Student Alliance, 699 F.3d at 1069 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Under the 28 || latter theory, even absent “overt personal participation,” a supervisor may be liable
1 || under Section 1983 if he created, promulgated, implemented, advanced, or was 2 || otherwise responsible for the continued operation of a policy that “requires 3 || subordinates to commit constitutional violations,” and enforcement of the policy 4 || (either by the defendant-supervisor or his subordinates) proximately caused the 5 || Plaintiff's constitutional injury. OSU Student Alliance, 699 F.3d at 1076 (citing 6 || Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 7 || 960 (2011)); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) 8 || (supervisory officials may be held liable “even without overt personal 9 || participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so 10 | deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the 11 || moving force of a constitutional violation’” (citation and internal quotation marks 12 || omitted)). 13 | IV. DISCUSSION 14 The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for 15 || violation of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, among other 16 || deficiencies addressed below. 17 A. The Third Amended Complaint Violates Rules 8 and 10 of the 18 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 Rule 8(a), as noted above, requires a complaint to provide “fair notice” of 20 || who is being sued, for what particular conduct, and in what particular claim. See 21 || Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3 (Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to give “fair 22 || notice” of the particular claims being asserted against them and “the grounds upon 23 || which [the claims] rest[]’’) (citation and quotation marks omitted); McHenry v. 24 || Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (purpose of Rule 8(a) is to ensure that a 25 || complaint “fully sets forth who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, 26 || with enough detail to guide discovery’’); see also Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 (a 27 || complaint violates Rule 8 if a defendant would have difficulty understanding and 28 || responding to the complaint). 10
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 because it fails to give 2 || adequate notice as to who 1s being sued and on what grounds. First, as indicated 3 || above, it 1s unclear whether Plaintiff intends to sue Associate Warden Williams, 4 || Warden Horn, or both. For example, the caption of the Third Amended Complaint 5 || includes Horn and not Williams, but some later statements of Plaintiff's claims 6 || reference Williams but not Horn. (See TAC at 1, 5, 7-8). At multiple points, 7 || Plaintiff states that Williams has been “repla[c]ed” by Warden Horn, the 8 | “repla[ce]ment defendant.” (See TAC at 7,11). Yet, if that is indeed the case, 9 || then it is unclear why Williams is sometimes referenced as a Defendant in the 10 | claims. (See TAC at 5). Additionally, although Plaintiff appears to indicate that 11 | her only claims are for violation of her religious rights under the First Amendment 12 | and RLUIPA and her Eighth Amendment rights to be free from excessive force 13 || and deliberate indifference (see TAC at 5), the Third Amended Complaint also 14 || later alludes to Plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process (see TAC at 8) and 15 || to be free from retaliation (see TAC at 10-11, 15, 24), making it unclear whether 16 | Plaintiff intends to assert independent claims on these grounds.’ As a result of 17 || these discrepancies, among others, Defendants are unable to clearly discern which 18 || claims and allegations are being asserted against them. 19 The Third Amended Complaint also appears to violate Rule 10(a) of the 20 || Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that “all the parties” be named in 21 || the caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“Every pleading must have a caption 22 | with...atitle.... The title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]’’). As 23 || noted above, the caption on the first page of the Third Amended Complaint omits 24 || Associate Warden Williams, despite that Williams is later referenced (albeit 25 || inconsistently) as a Defendant in Plaintiff's claims. (See TAC at 1, 5). 26 27 ’As discussed below, Plaintiff's allegations fail at least to support a viable retaliation 28 claim. 11
1 Accordingly, dismissal with leave to amend is warranted for violation of 2 || Rules 8 and 10. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) 3 || (violations of Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirements “warrant 4 || dismissal”), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 815 (2014); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178; 5 || Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir.), as amended (May 22, 1992) 6 || (affirming dismissal of action based on failure to comply with court order that 7 || complaint be amended to name all defendants in caption as required by Rule 8 | 10(a)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). The Court will nevertheless highlight 9 || some other deficiencies in the Third Amended Complaint.* 10 B. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim for 11 Violation of Plaintiff's Religious Rights under the First 12 Amendment or RLUIPA 13 Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment” including 14 || the right to “the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 15 || 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds, 16 || 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. However, as a consequence of incarceration, a 17 || prisoner’s First Amendment rights are necessarily “more limited in scope than the 18 || constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 19 | U.S. 223, 229 (2001). An inmate retains only “those First Amendment rights that 20 || are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological 21 || objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 22 To state a First Amendment free exercise claim, an inmate must allege that a 23 || prison official’s actions (1) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate’s exercise of a 24 || sincerely held religious belief; and (2) did so in an unreasonable manner — i.e., the 25 | official’s actions were not “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” 26 7 *While the Third Amended Complaint as a whole warrants dismissal with leave to amend for violation of Rules 8 and 10, dismissal at this juncture is not predicated on a failure to state an 28 || Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Martinez and Williams and/or Horn. 12
1 || See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348-50; Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033 2 || (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th 3 || Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “[G]overnment action places a substantial burden 4 || on an individual’s right to free exercise of religion when it tends to coerce the 5 || individual to forego [his or] her sincerely held religious beliefs or to engage in 6 || conduct that violates those beliefs.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d at 1031-33 7 || (citations omitted). 8 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Rosas, Martinez, and Williams and/or Horn 9 || violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights by punishing her for disobeying 10 || Rosas’s order for all inmates to “get down on the ground,” as Plaintiff's religious 11 || beliefs assertedly forbid obedience to anyone other than herself, who is “God in 12 || flesh.” (See TAC at 5, 8-12). She asserts, moreover, that “getting down in the dirt 13 || at the command of someone else equates to being dethroned,” and she allegedly 14 || cannot “allow [her]self to sit in the dirt at the command of another man, and be 15 || dethroned.” (TAC at 8 (brackets omitted)). Plaintiff alleges that she had given all 16 || Defendants sufficient notice of these rights. (See TAC at 6, 8-11). She further 17 || contends that because she was in a squatting positing at the time, there was no 18 || legitimate penological interest in requiring her to go further down on the ground 19 || or for punishing her refusal to do so. (See TAC at 10). 20 Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any First Amendment violation here. 21 || Correctional officers obviously have a strong and legitimate penological interest in 22 || requiring inmates to obey their orders and in punishing inmates’ failure to do so. 23 | In particular, there is certainly nothing unreasonable about an order to get down on 24 || the ground when an alarm is triggered to preserve order and safety during an 25 || inmate fight, no matter how unnecessary Plaintiff may believe this was. 26 || Moreover, even if having to obey any officers’ rules and commands conflicts in 27 || general with Plaintiff's religious belief in her personal sovereignty as “God” on 28 | /// 13
1 || her “throne,” Plaintiff cannot plausibly show that the command at issue imposed a 2 || substantial burden on her religious exercise. 3 Plaintiff further claims that her First Amendment religious rights were 4 || violated when Defendant Rosas subjected her to a strip search. (TAC at 13-14). 5 || However, Plaintiff's vague, conclusory assertion that her “belief forbid[]s [her] 6 || getting naked in front of or by Men” (TAC at 13) does not plausibly show that the 7 || search actually conflicted with — and substantially burdened — a belief that was 8 | “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” See Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 9 || 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (for First Amendment claim, belief “must be sincerely 10 || held” and “must be rooted in religious belief, not in ‘purely secular’ philosophical 11 || concerns” (citations omitted)); see also White v. Davenport, 2024 WL 5237438, at 12 | *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2024) (“While courts will not second-guess the 13 || reasonableness of a plaintiff's assertion that a requirement conflicts with her 14 || religious beliefs, a plaintiff still must allege what the conflict is.” (citing 15 || Bolden-Hardge v. Office of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 16 || 2023))), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 268850 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 17 || 2025). 18 Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a First 19 | Amendment free exercise claim. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348-50. Plaintiff also 20 || fails to state a claim under RLUIPA, which similarly requires pleading a 21 || substantial burden on her religious exercise.” See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 22 || F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (under RLUIPA, plaintiff bears initial burden to 23 || demonstrate that defendant’s actions substantially burden the exercise of his 24 || religious beliefs (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). In sum, Plaintiff's allegations 25 || do not establish a substantial burden, or a “significantly great restriction or onus 26 | ——__ 27 *Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim is predicated solely on the 28 disciplinary matter (and resulting sanctions) regarding Plaintiff's failure to obey Rosas’s order to get on the ground, not the strip search. (See TAC at 5, 19-20). 14
1 || upon [religious] exercise,” to support a violation of her religious rights under 2 || RLUIPA or the First Amendment. New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of 3 || Salinas, 29 F.4th 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 567 (2023). 4 C. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to State a First Amendment 5 Retaliation Claim 6 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison 7 || officials ....” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation 8 | omitted). Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment right 9 || to seek redress/access the court is an independent constitutional violation. 10 || Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). To prevail on a First 11 | Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must prove that (1) the plaintiff/inmate 12 || engaged in conduct that is protected under the First Amendment; (2) a prison 13 || official took “adverse action” against the inmate; (3) the inmate’s protected 14 || conduct was the “substantial or motivating factor” behind the prison official’s 15 || action; (4) the official’s retaliatory action “would chill or silence a person of 16 || ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities”; and (5) the action “did 17 || not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution” because it was either 18 || “arbitrary and capricious” or “unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the 19 || institution.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15 (citations and internal quotation marks 20 || omitted). A complaint that does not allege a “chilling effect” may still state a 21 || viable retaliation claim if it alleges that the plaintiff “suffered some other harm... 22 || that is more than minimal... .” Id. at 1114 (citations and internal quotation marks 23 || omitted). 24 To satisfy the causation element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, an 25 || inmate/plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a specific causal link between the 26 || defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct and the inmate’s exercise of a 27 || constitutional right. See generally Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006) 28 || (citations omitted); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1995). A 15
1 || plaintiff may do so either with direct evidence of a defendant’s retaliatory motive, 2 || or with circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the protected 3 || conduct at issue plus some other evidence probative of retaliatory intent, such as 4 || “(1) proximity in time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; 5 || (2) [that] the [defendant] expressed opposition to the speech; [or] (3) other 6 || evidence that the reasons proffered by the [defendant] for the adverse .. . action 7 || were false and pretextual.” McCollum v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 8 | 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted; alterations in 9 || original); see generally Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (direct evidence of retaliatory 10 || intent “rarely” available). 11 Here, to the extent that Plaintiff intends to assert a First Amendment 12 || retaliation claim, such claim fails at least because Plaintiff's allegations do not 13 || establish causation. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rosas, by issuing the RVR, 14 || acted “in retaliation for grievances and civil complaints filed against several 15 || officers just 60 days previously.” (TAC at 10). However, absent any facts to 16 || suggest that Defendant actually knew about Plaintiff's protected conduct, the 17 || alleged sixty-day proximity is insufficient to raise a plausible inference that the 18 || protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” behind any Defendant’s 19 || actions against her. 20 D. The Third Amended Complaint Fails to State an Eighth 21 Amendment Claim Against at Least Defendant Rosas 22 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 23 || protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. 24 | Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 25 || U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Prison officials therefore have a “duty to ensure that 26 || prisoners are provided with adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical 27 || care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), 28 || cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 16
Nevertheless, “a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 2 || two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 3 || ‘sufficiently serious,’” in that the official’s act or omission resulted “in the denial 4 || of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities[.]’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 5 || (citations omitted); Norbert v. City & County of San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 927 6 | (9th Cir. 2021). “This requires the inmate to demonstrate ‘conditions posing a 7 || substantial risk of serious harm’ that present an ‘excessive risk to [his] health or 8 || safety.’” Norbert, 10 F.4th at 928 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837). The 9 || second requirement is subjective — a prison official is not liable for denying an 10 || inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official acted with a 11 || deliberately indifferent state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Norbert, 12 | 10 F.4th at 928 (“The subjective requirement, relating to the defendant’s state of 13 || mind, requires deliberate indifference.” (citation omitted)). 14 Deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment exists when a 15 || prison official knows an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm to his 16 || health and fails to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 17 || 847; Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); see 18 || also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have repeatedly 19 || recognized that prison officials are constitutionally prohibited from being 20 || deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a 21 || substantial risk of serious harm.”). “Under this standard, the prison official must 22 || not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 23 || substantial risk of harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” 24 | Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); Castro v. County of 25 || Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 580 26 || U.S. 1099 (2017). “Ifa [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but 27 || was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how 28 | /// 17
1 severe the risk.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (citation omitted); Peralta v. Dillard, 2 744 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1073 (2015). 3 Plaintiff claims her Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants 4 Rosas, Martinez, and Williams and/or Horn when Plaintiff was deprived of any 5 outdoor exercise for ninety days as punishment for disobeying C/O Rosas’s order 6 to get on the ground during the alarm. (See TAC at 5, 14-19). This claim fails to 7 meet the subjective requirement, at least with respect to Defendant C/O Rosas, 8 because Rosas had no apparent role in deciding (or approving) the punishment that 9 resulted from the RVR she issued. Plaintiff acknowledges this, but insists that 10 Rosas still should be held liable because he opted to issue a “serious” RVR, 11 allegedly while knowing this would result in a “far more severe punishment” than 12 would an RVR based on a lesser offense that might instead have been warranted 13 by the circumstances. (TAC at 15). Plaintiff asserts that this “set into motion the 14 ability of [D]efendant Martinez to issue the harsher punishment . . . .” (TAC at 15 15). That is not enough, however, as there is nothing here to show that Rosas 16 actually knew the RVR would subject Plaintiff to a serious risk of harm. 17 Accordingly, the Third Amended Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment 18 claim against at least Defendant Rosas. 19 E. Plaintiff’s Challenges to Disciplinary Proceedings Appear to Be 20 Barred by Heck 21 Under the “favorable termination doctrine” set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 22 the district court must dismiss a state prisoner’s Section 1983 claim for damages if 23 “judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 24 conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction 25 or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 26 486-87 (1994). This doctrine has been extended to apply in the prison disciplinary 27 context where the “defect complained of by [Plaintiff] would, if established, 28 necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits[,]” 18 1 || Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 2 || 875 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004), and if the restoration of 3 || those credits “necessarily” would “affect the duration of time to be served.” 4 || Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004) (per curiam); see also Nettles v. 5 || Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 929 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Heck applies only to 6 || administrative determinations that ‘necessarily’ have an effect on ‘the duration of 7 || time to be served[,]’” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1063 (2017). 8 Here, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks a speedier release from custody, or a 9 || favorable determination on Plaintiffs claim(s) would necessarily accomplish this, 10 || such claims are barred, and a petition for habeas corpus is Plaintiff's exclusive 11 || remedy. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 929 n.4. 12] V. ORDERS’ 13 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Third 14 || Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend."' 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within twenty-one (21) days of the date of 16 || this Order, Plaintiff must do one of the following: 17 /// 18 /// 19 20 '°The Magistrate Judge’s orders herein constitute non-dispositive rulings on pretrial 21 || matters. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1991) (magistrate judges can dismiss complaints with leave to amend; dismissal of complaint with leave to amend is 22 || non-dispositive matter). To the extent a party disagrees with such non-dispositive rulings, such party may file a motion for review by the assigned District Judge within fourteen (14) days. See Local Rule 72-2.1. To the extent a party believes the rulings to be dispositive, rather than non- 24 || dispositive, such party has the right to object to this Court’s determination that the rulings are non-dispositive within fourteen (14) days. A party will be foreclosed from challenging the 25 rulings herein if such party does not seek review thereof, or object thereto. 26 '' As indicated above, the Third Amended Complaint as a whole is dismissed with leave 27 || to amend against all Defendants because it violates Rules 8 and 10, but the Court does not deem 28 it appropriate, at this juncture, to predicate such dismissal on the failure to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Martinez and Williams and/or Horn. 19
1 1. File a Fourth Amended Complaint which cures the pleading defects 2 set forth herein;12 or 3 2. Sign and file the attached Notice of Dismissal which will result in 4 the voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice; or 5 3. File a Notice of Intent to Stand on Third Amended Complaint, 6 indicating Plaintiff’s intent to stand on the Third Amended Complaint despite the 7 pleading defects set forth herein, which may result in the dismissal of this action in 8 its entirety based upon such defects. 9 Plaintiff is cautioned that Plaintiff’s failure timely to file a Third 10 Amended Complaint, a Notice of Dismissal, or a Notice of Intent to Stand on 11 Third Amended Complaint may be deemed Plaintiff’s admission that 12 amendment is futile, and may result in the dismissal of this action with or 13 without prejudice on the grounds set forth above, on the ground that 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 19 12The Clerk is directed to provide Plaintiff with a Central District of California Civil 20 Rights Complaint Form, CV-66, to facilitate Plaintiff’s filing of a Fourth Amended Complaint if 21 Plaintiff elects to proceed in that fashion. Any Fourth Amended Complaint must: (a) be labeled “Fourth Amended Complaint”; (b) be complete in and of itself and not refer in any manner to the 22 prior complaints – i.e., it must include all claims on which Plaintiff seeks to proceed (Local Rule 15-2); (c) contain a “short and plain” statement of each of the claim(s) for relief (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 8(a)); (d) make each allegation “simple, concise and direct” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)); (e) set forth 24 clearly the sequence of events giving rise to the claim(s) for relief in sequentially “numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 10(b)); (f) allege specifically what the Defendant did and how that individual’s conduct 26 specifically violated Plaintiff’s civil rights; (g) state the names of all Defendants in the caption and not include in the body of the Fourth Amended Complaint any Defendants who are not also 27 named in the caption (Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)); (h) be signed by Plaintiff who is proceeding pro se (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Local Rule 11-1); and (i) not add Defendants or claims that are not 28 reasonably related to the claim asserted in the previous complaints. 20 1 amendment is futile, for failure diligently to prosecute and/or for failure to 2 comply with this Order. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 DATED: April 7, 2025 6 ________________/s/______________________ 7 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 Attachments 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21