Keily v. Board of Supervisors

58 Ill. 494
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1871
StatusPublished

This text of 58 Ill. 494 (Keily v. Board of Supervisors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keily v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Ill. 494 (Ill. 1871).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Sheldon

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This ivas a suit brought by the appellees, against the appellant and his sureties on his bond, as treasurer of Sangamon county, and only two questions are presented in the case, in relation to two several claims for commissions. The case was tried by the court below, a jury having been waived, upon an agreed statement of facts.

It was agreed between the parties, as follows •.

“ That, in order to raise the sum of $200,000, with which to pay for the old State House in said county, the board of supervisors of said county, on the 6th day of December, A. D. 1867, appointed A. B. McConnell, H. W. Matheny and said R. C. Keily, as a committee to raise the sum of $100,000 on the bonds of said county, to make one payment on said purchase; that said committee raised said sum of $100,000, by negotiating the bonds of the county, and that they paid the said sum into the State treasury; that afterward, on the 5th day of March, A. D. 1869, the said board appointed William M. Warren, Jacob J. Weber, members of said board, and K. W. Matheny, county clerk of said county, a special committee to raise the further sum of $100,000, to complete the payment of the purchase aforesaid ; that they did raise said sum by negotiating the bonds of said county, and paid the said sum into the State treasury.”

“All this was done while said Keily was the legal and acting treasurer of said county, and willing to perform said servicesthat said Keily, as treasurer, has retained and kept, of the ordinaiy county revenue, the sum of three per cent on both said sums—claiming to be entitled to retain the said sums as his commission, lawfully accruing to him thereon, and to recover which percentage this suit has been brought.”

In support of this claim, the case of Fell v. The Board of Supervisors of McLean County, 43 Ill. 216, is referred to as an authority.

In that case, the board of supervisors of McLean county had assessed a special war fund tax, and made an order directing-the township collectors to pay over this special tax when collected, directly to a disbursing agent whom they had appointed, which was done; and this war tax never went into the hands of the county treasurer. That was a county tax ; the statute required, that the ivarrant to the town collectors should direct them to pay over the county tax collected by them, to the county treasurer, and it gave to the county treasurer a commission of one per cent for receiving, and one per cent for paying out the county tax '; and the court there held, that the board of supervisors had no legal power to direct the town collectors to pay that tax directly to the disbursing agent, and that it was constrained to say, that under the letter of the law the treasurer was entitled to two per cent commissions.

No such constraint is felt in this case ; no law directed this money, specifically, to be paid to the county treasurer, nor gave him a commission for receiving and paying it out, specifically.

In the case of The People v. Moon et al., 3 Scam. 123, it was decided by this court, that the sureties on the official bond of Moon, as treasurer of Putnam count)7, were not liable for the failure of Moon to account for money received by him while treasurer, being part of the sum of $200,000, appropriated by the “Act to establish and maintain a general system of internal improvement,” approved February 27, 1837, to counties through which no railroad or canal was provided to be made, on the ground that Moon had received the money as the special agent of Putnam county, and not in his character as treasurer; he had signed his receipt for the money as agent for the county, and the decision was put upon the further ground that the money did not arise from the ordinary sources of revenue, and that it was only in reference to such moneys that the sureties contracted.

It was again held, in the case of Kitchens et al. v. Greene County, 4 Scam. 485, in reference to another portion of that same fund which the county of Greene was entitled to, that the county commissioners’ court of that county might lawfully appoint an agent to keep and loan out the money.

We do not perceive why the appointment by the county authorities, of special agents to raise, receive, and pay over to the State the special fund involved in this case, was not equally lawful here, as in the last two cases cited. It is true, that the following provision of the statute was enacted subsequent to those decisions:

Section 4, article 15, township law, Gross’ Stat. 3 ed. p. 759: “ That it shall be the duty of the county treasurer to receive all money belonging to the county, from whatever source derived.”

But the following provision was then in force:

Section 10, chap. 28, Gross’ Stat., p. 154: “ That no claim of any county for revenue, costs, tie., or from any other source whatever, shall be considered as having been paid * * * until the money or other funds shall have been paid to the (county) treasurer, and his duplicate receipts had therefor,” &c.

We do not think the first provision essentially affects the bearing of those decisions upon the present question, however it might be as to the liability of sureties, where such a special fund has actually been paid into the county treasuiy.

This money, then, not having been raised by taxation, nor derived from any ordinary source of county revenue, it never having come into the hands of the treasurer, and he never having performed any service nor incurred any responsibility in respect to it, we regard his claim of compensation, by Avay of commissions for receiving and paying out this money, as not Avell founded.

The other claim of the appellant, is one of $5,369.14, for commissions as county collector,, on the county taxes of the county of Sangamon, collected by the various toAvn collectors of said county, for the years 1867 and 1868, and paid over to the appellant, at the rate of one per cent for receiving, and one per cent for paying over the said taxes to the county treasury of said county.

It is agreed by the parties, that on such amounts Avhereon the appellant claims commissions as county collector, he, as county treasurer, received the folloAving commissions : five per cent on the first $1,000, and three per cent on the residue.

The following statute provisions" bear upon this claim, and are relied upon in support of it:

Sec. 72 of the act of February 12,1853, provides that “Collectors shall be allowed a commission of five per cent on the first $8,000, and three per cent on all additional sums collected by them, to be paid by the State and county, in proportion to the amount of State and county tax collected by collectors.” Laws 1853, p. 88, Gross’ Stat., 3d ed. p. 610, see. 203. .

Said section 72 further provides, that “ County treasurers shall be allowed a commission of one per cent on all moneys, county orders and jury certificates received by them for county purposes, and one per cent on all moneys paid out by them.”

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Related

Fell v. Board of Supervisors
43 Ill. 216 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1867)

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58 Ill. 494, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keily-v-board-of-supervisors-ill-1871.