Kehinde Olatunji Adedeji v. Auditor of the Commonwealth.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedDecember 11, 2025
Docket25-P-0106
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kehinde Olatunji Adedeji v. Auditor of the Commonwealth. (Kehinde Olatunji Adedeji v. Auditor of the Commonwealth.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kehinde Olatunji Adedeji v. Auditor of the Commonwealth., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-106

KEHINDE OLATUNJI ADEDEJI

vs.

AUDITOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Kehinde Adedeji, filed a pro se complaint in

the Superior Court against his former employer, the Auditor of

the Commonwealth. He sought reinstatement, lost wages, and

damages. After filing the complaint, the plaintiff filed an

emergency motion for relief, which a judge treated as a motion

for a preliminary injunction and denied. Nearly two months

later, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from that order.

Thereafter, the judge allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss

the complaint, and the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from

that judgment. We dismiss the appeal from the order denying

preliminary injunction and affirm the judgment dismissing the

complaint. Our review of the docket entries shows that the plaintiff

did not preserve his appeal from the denial of the preliminary

injunction. An appeal from the denial of a preliminary

injunction "shall be taken within thirty days of the date of the

entry of the interlocutory order." G. L. c. 231, § 118, second

par. The order denying an injunction entered on November 20,

2024, and more than forty days later, on January 2, 2025, the

plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Because the appeal period

set by G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par., cannot be enlarged by

court action and establishes a "jurisdictional prerequisite to

our authority to consider" the claim that is now being raised,

DeLucia v. Kfoury, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 169-170 (2018), we

lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the denial of the

preliminary injunction. The plaintiff's pro se status provides

no procedural advantage because he is held to the same standards

as represented parties. Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30,

35-36 (2000). We also note that the judgment dismissing the

complaint rendered this claim moot. See Judge Rotenberg Educ.

Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Retardation, 424

Mass. 471, 472 (1997) ("preliminary injunction lapses when a

final decree is entered" and renders appeal moot). Therefore,

we must dismiss the appeal from the order denying preliminary

injunction.

2 Turning to the appeal from the judgment dismissing the

complaint, we affirm. As a preliminary matter, we note that the

plaintiff's brief does not include any legal authority to

support his arguments and does not contain any citations to the

record. Such bare "[a]ssertions of error that lack legal

citation do not rise to the level of appellate argument and will

not be reviewed by this court." Adoption of Zak, 90 Mass. App.

Ct. 840, 842 n.4 (2017). See Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement

Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 6 n.4 (1996) ("Conclusory statements in

a brief do not rise to the level of appellate argument"); Mass.

R. A. P. 16 (a) (6)-(7), (9) (A)-(B), (e), as appearing in 481

Mass. 1628 (2019). Time-tested appellate rules of procedure are

"more than a mere technicality" (quotation and citation

omitted). Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86

(1995). Parties to an appeal have a "duty . . . to assist the

court with argument and appropriate citation" to legal and

factual authorities supporting their claims. Lolos v. Berlin,

338 Mass. 10, 14 (1958). This duty is not discharged by simply

asserting an error and electronically filing documents that were

previously filed in the trial court.

Even the most generous view of the plaintiff's submissions

does not countenance a basis for appellate relief. We apply de

novo review to the granting of a motion to dismiss, accept as

true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and draw all

3 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Lanier v.

President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint cannot rely on

speculation, labels, and conclusions, and must set forth factual

allegations that plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.

See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008);

Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974) (complaint must

contain "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief"). The allegations in the

complaint here consisted of two handwritten sentences that

alleged the plaintiff was forced to resign due to lies, slander,

defamation, discrimination, and hate. The factual bases for

these assorted grievances are not further described, fitting the

assertions squarely within the inadequate categories of

speculation, labels, and conclusions, such that the complaint

does not set forth "factual allegations" plausibly suggesting an

entitlement to relief (quotation omitted). Iannacchino, supra

at 636. The bare assertions of grievances also fail to provide

"fair notice of the claim" to the defendant, Bank v. Thermo

Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 665 (2008), and fail to state a

cognizable claim for "a violation of a legal right which belongs

4 to the plaintiff." Donnelly v. Suffolk Univ., 3 Mass. App. Ct.

788, 788 (1975), cert. denied, 425 Mass. 955 (1976).

Accordingly, the judge properly dismissed the complaint.

Appeal from order denying preliminary injunction dismissed.

Judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

By the Court (Hershfang, Hodgens & Smyth, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: December 11, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Lolos v. Berlin
153 N.E.2d 636 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1958)
Adoption of Zak
65 N.E.3d 1248 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2017)
DeLucia v. Kfoury
100 N.E.3d 748 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2018)
Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
665 N.E.2d 998 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1996)
Mains v. Commonwealth
739 N.E.2d 1125 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2000)
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co.
451 Mass. 623 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2008)
Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc.
451 Mass. 638 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2008)
Donnelly v. Suffolk University
337 N.E.2d 920 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1975)
Cameron v. Carelli
653 N.E.2d 595 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1995)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)

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Kehinde Olatunji Adedeji v. Auditor of the Commonwealth., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kehinde-olatunji-adedeji-v-auditor-of-the-commonwealth-massappct-2025.