Keffler Bridge Co. v. State

656 N.E.2d 1374, 102 Ohio App. 3d 270, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1306
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 30, 1995
DocketNo. 94APE09-1418.
StatusPublished

This text of 656 N.E.2d 1374 (Keffler Bridge Co. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keffler Bridge Co. v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1374, 102 Ohio App. 3d 270, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1306 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

*271 Close, Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Keffler Bridge Company and Keffler Construction Company, appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, denying their request for injunctive relief and granting judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”) and Velotta Company, Inc. (“Velotta”).

The instant case arises out of the bidding of an ODOT project known as “Summit Project 613 (1994).” In 1994, ODOT solicited bids for construction work needed for the completion of the project. The deadline for all bids was August 16, 1994, at 10:00 a.m. Upon the opening of the bids, Velotta was the lowest bidder. Appellants were the second lowest bidder. Accordingly, the project was awarded to Velotta.

By their complaint filed on September 1, 1994, appellants sought to enjoin ODOT from entering into the highway construction contract with Velotta. The court was also requested to enter a declaratory judgment, holding that the contract should have been awarded to appellants. By its entry dated September 26, 1994, the trial court denied the injunctive relief and rendered judgment in favor of appellees. It is from that judgment that appellants now appeal, raising the following assignments of error:

“I. Error of trial court in failing to find an abuse of discretion on the part of the director of the Ohio Department of Transportation when it promulgated and applied sections of the Ohio Administrative Code in direct contravention of the legislative mandate to the department as found in the existing statutes of Ohio.

“II. Error of trial court in finding Velotta’s bid was responsive to the bid process even though Velotta was not prequalified to bid on the amount of the contract.”

Appellants have also filed a motion to dismiss the instant appeal on the basis that the issues raised herein are moot. Upon careful consideration, appellants’ motion is overruled. Accordingly, we proceed with a determination on the merits of the appeal. Appellants’ assignments of error are interrelated and, as such, will be considered and addressed together.

To understand appellants’ position in the instant appeal, it is first necessary to understand ODOT’s bid prequalification process. Each year, contractors submit business and financial information to ODOT. Based on that information, ODOT issues Certificates of Qualification. These certificates state the aggregate amount of work a bidder may have under construction or uncompleted at any one time. The purpose of this process is to ensure that contractors are financially able to complete agreed upon work.

*272 Under this process, a single contractor may receive multiple projects but the size of any subsequently awarded contract is dependent on the amount of other contracts in progress. Simply put, the amount of a contractor’s prequalification is always diminished by the amount of contracts being presently performed. For example, if a contractor is prequalified for $10,000,000, but has a $5,000,000 project in progress, it may only be awarded a contract for an additional $5,000,000. However, if $2,000,000 worth of work is subbed to qualified subcontractors, the prime contractor’s prequalification amount would only be decreased by $3,000,000, leaving an available amount of $7,000,000 to bid.

In the instant case, appellants argue that Velotta was ineligible to receive the contract at issue because its bid was in excess of its prequalification amount. Prior to the bidding of this project, Velotta had obtained a Certificate of Qualification, which authorized that Velotta could submit bids on state highway projects not to exceed $14,587,200. The amount of Velotta’s bid on this ODOT project was $14,310,388.44. At the time of that bid, however, Velotta was involved in uncompleted work totaling $5,998,961. Therefore, on the date set for receiving the bids, Velotta was only qualified to bid $8,588,239. The difference between Velotta’s bid and the amount of prequalification was $5,722,063.97.

However, when Velotta submitted its bid to ODOT, it indicated an intent to subcontract portions of the project. Velotta further indicated that the subcontracts would be broken into five categories of work, and the total amount to be subbed would be $6,845,000. After the date set for receiving bids, but before Velotta was awarded the contract, ODOT received commitment letters from seven of Velotta’s subcontractors. The work proposed to those contractors totaled $6,988,226.74, thus bringing Velotta within its adjusted prequalification amount. On the date that evidence was submitted to the trial court, Velotta had secured eight qualified subcontractors to perform work in an amount totaling $7,621,123.41.

Nonetheless, appellants challenge that the ODOT director committed an abuse of discretion by accepting the post-bid commitment letters of Velotta’s subcontractors and using the amounts of those bids to increase Velotta’s prequalification. Since the commitments were not presented on the date set for submitting bids, it is appellants’ position that appellees were unqualified bidders at the time they made their offer. As such, ODOT’s contract with Velotta would be void. R.C. 5525.02. In support of their challenge, appellants argue that neither the Ohio Administrative Code nor R.C. Chapter 5525 permit ODOT to perform the post-bid activities at issue.

R.C. 5525.01 reads:

“The director shall require all bidders to furnish him * * * detailed information with respect to their financial resources, equipment, past record * * *.”

*273 R.C. 5525.02 reads:

“ * * * [T]he Revised Code shall govern the qualification and classification of all bidders desiring to offer bids * * * all contracts attempted to be awarded to any other person than a bidder previously qualified in compliance with such sections shall be void. * * * ”

R.C. 5525.08 reads:

“The director of transportation shall not consider any bid filed with him by any person who has not been qualified to bid. * * * No contract shall be awarded to any bidder not qualified to bid thereon at the time fixed for receiving bids.”

The prequalification of bidders is further governed by R.C. 5525.03, 5525.04 and 5525.05, and Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 5501:2-3. R.C. 5525.03 provides:

“ * * * The certificate of qualification shall contain a statement fixing the aggregate amount of work, for any or all owners, which the applicant may have under construction and uncompleted at any one time * * *. Subject to any restriction as to amount or class of work therein contained, such certificate of qualification shall authorize its holder to bid on all work on which bids are taken by the department of transportation during the period of time therein specified. * * * ”

Ohio Adm.Code 5501:2-3-09 reads:

“(A) A subcontractor shall be considered as being properly qualified for work sublet to him * * * if he holds a certificate of qualification authorizing him to perform such work * * *.

U * * *

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Bluebook (online)
656 N.E.2d 1374, 102 Ohio App. 3d 270, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keffler-bridge-co-v-state-ohioctapp-1995.