Keepers v. Dombeck

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 22, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-01199
StatusUnknown

This text of Keepers v. Dombeck (Keepers v. Dombeck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keepers v. Dombeck, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ANTHONY KEEPERS,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-CV-1199-JPS

CHARLES DOMBECK, DEVOIE, and JOHN/JANE DOES, ORDER

Defendants.

Plaintiff Anthony Keepers, an inmate confined at Waupun Correctional Institution (“WCI”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 12, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $54.31. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff paid that fee on October 25, 2023. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff names Defendants Charles Dombeck (“Dombeck”), DOC Medical Director Devoie (“Devoie”), and John/Jane Doe HSU Staff 1-5 (“Does”) as defendants. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff suffers from Type 1 Diabetes. Id. at 2. Dombeck, Devoie, and Does were all aware that Plaintiff is a severely brittle, insulin-dependent diabetic. Id. On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff notified the Does and Dombeck that he would start refusing insulin in protest. Id. Dombeck met with Plaintiff and was notified of his intentions and that a court order would need to be filed to force insulin. Id. Dombeck replied that he would wait until Plaintiff keeled over before doing that. Id. Over the next seven to eight weeks, Plaintiff refused the vast majority of insulin shots. Id. As a result, his blood sugars were extremely high every time he checked them. Id. Dombeck did nothing to act on Plaintiff’s behalf; he did not order Plaintiff’s vitals to be monitored, he refused to order urine samples to test for ketones, and he never attempted to get a court order. Id. at 3. Plaintiff quickly deteriorated and suffered extreme symptoms, including serious dehydration, chest and stomach pains, vision blurriness, muscle weakness, excessive urination, severe headaches, and impaired cognitive function. Id. On December 31, 2022, Plaintiff notified a nurse that he was dying, and he was sent to Waupun Memoria Hospital. Id. He was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with Diabetic Keto-Acidosis from not taking insulin. Id. After being stabilized he was sent back to WCI, where he again refused insulin. Id. This cycle of refusing insulin and being rushed to the hospital happened five times from December 31, 2022 through February 18, 2023. Throughout that time, Dombeck, Devoie, and the Does were all aware of Plaintiff’s situation but they refused to get a court order to force insulin or to attempt to monitor his vitals. Id. at 3–4. Any sustained stretch of high blood sugars can and will result in Keto-acidosis and can cause permanent damage, organ failure, coma, or death. Id. Defendants were aware of these risks yet remained indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Id. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendants Dombeck, Devoie, and Does for their indifference to the risk of Plaintiff’s self-harm. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee an inmate’s safety and to ensure that inmates receive adequate care.” Phillips v. Diedrick, No. 18-C-56, 2019 WL 318403, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2019) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). While a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s substantial risk of serious harm violates the Eighth Amendment, not every claim by a prisoner that he did not receive adequate care will succeed. Id. (citing Estelle v.

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Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Berrell Freeman v. Gerald A. Berge
441 F.3d 543 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Reginald Pittman v. County of Madison, Illinois
746 F.3d 766 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Christopher Davis-Clair v. Correctional Officer Turck
714 F. App'x 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
DeWayne Knight v. Thomas Grossman
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Cesal v. Moats
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Bluebook (online)
Keepers v. Dombeck, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keepers-v-dombeck-wied-2023.